Mechanical failures....check lists...SOPs and decisions.

[Chuck Ellsworth]

I have no opinion on whether the successful outcome of your PBY emergency was good management or good luck as I was not there and have no personal Canso operating experience. However I would say that I think care should be taken when extrapolating a very unusual failure in a very non typical aircraft type
into general operating advice.

You have no opinion on whether the outcome was good management or good luck because you have no PBY experience huh?

Yet you question my sharing this experience I had because pilots may take it as advice to just randomly make decisions with no thought process.

You may be correct and I may be far better off just never sharing any of my flying experiences because it may empower some pilots to ignore SOP's for no specific reason.

The basis of good decisions IMO starts with a sound understanding of aircraft systems so that failing systems are detected early and the personal discipline to follow checklists and SOP's. To deviate from SOP's one first has to understand what one is deviating from and should be response to the failure of the "normal" emergency procedures to be effective or appropriate.

Great advice:

However there can be times when systems fail with no warning....and sometimes at the most critical seconds of a flight.

I stand by my decision making process and all the second guessing of asking " what if " does not change the fact I made the safest decision in that instance born out by the results. And my record for making good good decisions is verifiable in that during my whole career my decisions " never " resulted in an accident or incident caused by poor decision making for the simple reason I never wrecked one because I did make the right decisions obviously.

I have been communicating with Hedley on these issues and have decided he has chosen the correct way to deal with this stuff on the Avcanada flight training forum.

Leave it up to all you experts because you know it all anyhow.

This will be the last time I ever share any of my flying experiences on this flight training forum.

There is one big difference between you and I B.P.F. and that is I do not use anonymity to hide behind.

[Beefitarian]

So how long should a pilot look in the book for the proceedure in case of broken throttle lever before switching to thinking?

[Chuck Ellsworth]

So how long should a pilot look in the book for the proceedure in case of broken throttle lever before switching to thinking?

You don't really want to suggest there is critical thinking involved in flying do you Beef?

That might cull a lot of people who are incapable of such a process, and the aviation community would be reduced to the point where pilots would get payed as pilots and not robots.

[Beefitarian]

Push the button ., if you survive you'll get a banana.

[System Message]

., thank you for not just telling stories with a happy ending. Flying requires fast responses to unusual situations and we do the best we can at the time followed by a year or more for others to guess if it was the right thing to do. After thinking about what you did at the time can you say if that was the best thing to do and can you describe what the actual failure was. The PBY throttle looks like a lever connected to cables. If the lever dissconected could the cables have been used directly to set the throttle?
Remember the first post left us guessing about the type of aircraft, its engines, the runway and the conditions.

[Chuck Ellsworth]

., thank you for not just telling stories with a happy ending. Flying requires fast responses to unusual situations and we do the best we can at the time followed by a year or more for others to guess if it was the right thing to do.

It is really quite simple System Message, I spent a half a century flying most everything there is out there and am quite comfortable discussing anything and everything about my career. What people think about the decisions I made will be up to each individual. One thing is a given, I have the self worth to tell it like I experienced it and the fact that I survived is what is important to me. I made lots of mistakes during my career but fortunately I never made one bad enough to have an accident.

After thinking about what you did at the time can you say if that was the best thing to do and can you describe what the actual failure was. The PBY throttle looks like a lever connected to cables. If the lever dissconected could the cables have been used directly to set the throttle?
Remember the first post left us guessing about the type of aircraft, its engines, the runway and the conditions.

The throttles on the PBY are in the roof and the throttle broke off inside of the quadrant and that means there was no way to change the power setting. You should be able to google the inside of a PBY and see how the throttles are mounted.

There was no doubt in my mind at the time that the safest way to deal with the problem was shut down both engines and accept a possible over run of the runway onto the grass....which was exactly what happened.....I got it stopped long before I ran out of flat clear ground.

So yes I did the correct thing under that circumstance and for what ever it is worth I had a couple of thousand hours on the PBY at the time and knew its limitations and how it behaved in any given circumstance...like how much distance I needed ahead of me to safely reject a take off.

[Big Pistons Forever]

I have no opinion on whether the successful outcome of your PBY emergency was good management or good luck as I was not there and have no personal Canso operating experience. However I would say that I think care should be taken when extrapolating a very unusual failure in a very non typical aircraft type
into general operating advice.

You have no opinion on whether the outcome was good management or good luck because you have no PBY experience huh?

Yet you question my sharing this experience I had because pilots may take it as advice to just randomly make decisions with no thought process.

You may be correct and I may be far better off just never sharing any of my flying experiences because it may empower some pilots to ignore SOP's for no specific reason.

The basis of good decisions IMO starts with a sound understanding of aircraft systems so that failing systems are detected early and the personal discipline to follow checklists and SOP's. To deviate from SOP's one first has to understand what one is deviating from and should be response to the failure of the "normal" emergency procedures to be effective or appropriate.

Great advice:

However there can be times when systems fail with no warning....and sometimes at the most critical seconds of a flight.

I stand by my decision making process and all the second guessing of asking " what if " does not change the fact I made the safest decision in that instance born out by the results. And my record for making good good decisions is verifiable in that during my whole career my decisions " never " resulted in an accident or incident caused by poor decision making for the simple reason I never wrecked one because I did make the right decisions obviously.

I have been communicating with Hedley on these issues and have decided he has chosen the correct way to deal with this stuff on the Avcanada flight training forum.

Leave it up to all you experts because you know it all anyhow.

This will be the last time I ever share any of my flying experiences on this flight training forum.

There is one big difference between you and I B.P.F. and that is I do not use anonymity to hide behind.

It is too bad that anytime anyone advances an opinion that is not 100 % the same as yours or dares to advance an alternate action, you rubish the poster and then announce we are unworthy of your presence on the board and threaten to stop posting (this is what, the 78 th time )

Maybe it is time to return to the facts of the case. At the time of the throttle failure you had two engines operating at full power and the abilty to make the aircraft 8000 lbs lighter by pushing a button. You had two courses of action.

1) Continue the takeoff, jettison the load and shut down the engine in flight, or

2) Reject the takeoff and therefore either shut down the engine with the mixtures or the master mag switch.

Like I said I wasn't there and therefore I can not make an opinion as to whether you made the correct choice or just got lucky. Personally if I am well down the runway and both engines are running my first choice would be to keep going. This is because accidents statistics have shown that this is almost always the better choice, especially for large aircraft. But like I said I wasn't there. I am sure your very considerable flying experience on this type allowed you to accurately estimate how much runway you need to stop and you used your comprehensive knowledge of the aircraft systems to determine the best way to shut down the engines. However I still am not sure the "lesson" to be learned here. Is it

1) I need to remind everyone I am such an awesome pilot by posting another example of my derring - do, or

2) SOP's are for brain washed saps from the new age of aviation, and you should just do the "right" thing when an emergency occurs, or

3) Understanding the aircraft systems is important because when the one in a thousand failure occurs that is not covered in "normal" emergency checklists, you will be able to appropriately respond.

If it is, as I suspect No 3, then we are in violent agreement, and frankly why the histrionics

The bottom line from my POV is that how this failure is dealt with ultimately has nothing to do with the response to emergencies that are covered in the Sop's or the emergency checklists

[Chuck Ellsworth]

B.P.F. we have a history of disagreement and the only difference between us here on this site is you know who I am...but I do not have the faintest idea of who you are except you sure love to jump all over a lot of my posts.

One thing you can take to the bank and sticky in your mind is this will be the last time I share any flying experiences on this training forum because it just is not worth the effort of the constant whine from posters like you who comment from the safety if anonymity.

May I very calmly and seriously make a suggestion to you?

If you are at Pitt Meadows any time in the future drop by the hangars on the north side and express your opinions to some of the owners / operators on how I do things and what a negative influence I am on aviation.

[Dagwood]

I agree with you ., that in this case, you made the right decision. However, maybe for another pilot who is not as strong on system knowledge, or is new on the airplane, or just woke up cranky that morning, doing as you did might have ended differently.

How did you know the throttle cable broke anyway? Most of the time I set takeoff power and don't touch the levers until climb power reduction. Were you tweaking the settings and noticed one side wasn't responding?

[Chuck Ellsworth]

I agree with you ., that in this case, you made the right decision. However, maybe for another pilot who is not as strong on system knowledge, or is new on the airplane, or just woke up cranky that morning, doing as you did might have ended differently.

If we examine the above comment and look at from a safety viewpoint we need to ask a simple question.

If you are have not determined at what point down the runway you can reject a take off and something entirely unexpected like a throttle lever breaking off what else would you be unsure of?

How did you know the throttle cable broke anyway?

It was the throttle lever, when it broke off there it was quite evident as it had snapped completely off.

Most of the time I set takeoff power and don't touch the levers until climb power reduction. Were you tweaking the settings and noticed one side wasn't responding?

[Chuck Ellsworth]

I agree with you ., that in this case, you made the right decision. However, maybe for another pilot who is not as strong on system knowledge, or is new on the airplane, or just woke up cranky that morning, doing as you did might have ended differently.

If we examine the above comment and look at from a safety viewpoint we need to ask a simple question.

If you are have not determined at what point down the runway you can reject a take off and something entirely unexpected happens like a throttle lever breaking off at full power what else would you be unsure of?

How did you know the throttle cable broke anyway?

It was the throttle lever, when it broke off there it was quite evident as it had snapped completely off.

Most of the time I set takeoff power and don't touch the levers until climb power reduction. Were you tweaking the settings and noticed one side wasn't responding?

Excluding heavy jets I always keep my hand on the power levers until I am airborne with a positive rate of climb.....this is especially important for me as should there be a loss of power on one engine I have my hand on the power levers and can reduce power on the operating engine if there is not enough rudder effectiveness to prevent yaw.

I have never flown an airplane yet that I could not control with one hand on the wheel / stick and the other on the power levers.

That was the way I was taught and there were a few airplanes I flew that would have really been a problem with if an engine failed at a critical point where there was not enough rudder to keep it straight....like say a Beech 18 on wheels as an example....

I am sure many here will disagree with my method, but that is the way I fly them and I have never had a check ride where the examiner faulted that method.....what would an examiner criticize????...the fact that I had complete control of the airplane?

Please note:::

The above is how I fly and I am not suggesting you fly using my methods.....I have enough problems in this thread with B.P.F without starting another shit storm over how I do things.

[Big Pistons Forever]

.I have enough problems in this thread with B.P.F without starting another shit storm over how I do things.

Whatever

[Colonel Sanders]

Odd how experience is treated as unimportant - even with contempt - in aviation.

I figured that you could probably learn something from old pilots, but I guess that isn't the case, because there's nothing to be learned from experience.

[Chuck Ellsworth]

Unfortunately this is quite common in aviation Colonel Sanders, the reasons are complex.

Sometimes this attitude is because the person who shows contempt for those who have more experience is they are insecure with their own ability, but here in cyberspace there really is no way to determine why an individual would feel that way because the anonymity of the internet is a place from which they can safely make any comment they feel they need to.

I have been on this site for a long time and am as guilty as anyone for making ill thought out comments when responding to some posts that are nothing more than personal attacks. Of course when I do I am putting myself on the same level as the person who makes the comments....so I guess I'm just human.

What separates me from most here is I am secure enough within myself that I do not have to post under an assumed name.

But sometimes I wonder why I bother.

In this thread my intent was to share a truly unusual mechanical failure and relate what I did and why.......

......simply put the message is always strive to think before you do something.....and the more experience one gets the quicker you solve the problem of the moment.

. ..

[Airtids]

Guess what I did and why.

You did exactly as you briefed before takeoff?

Honestly ., I hear ya about being able to think outside the box. A few years ago I posted a story about a situation I ran into that drove home to me the value of not following SOPs into your grave if the occasion arises that dictates doing something different.
viewtopic.php?f=54&t=55626
I know that's what you're getting at. I think BPF does as well...

That being said, those occasions are few and far between, and these days, it is the unfortunate pilot that will experience one of these events over the entire span of their career. SOPs work for the VAST MAJORITY of failures. I may be the best damned PBY pilot on the planet, and I may have decided to "Go", and dumped the load, raised the gear, caged the failed engine, come around for a landing after pumping the gear down, and saved the day (although, I really liked the idea about getting the load on target too!!). You did something different, and we both met up later for a soda, which ultimately is all that matters- favorable outcome.

SOPs are there for a reason, but one of the differences between a good pilot and a great pilot, is the knowledge/experience/je ne sais quoi to know when to abandon them in favor of a course of action that will have a better outcome. That's a big reason why we as pilots continually need to strive for improvement.

Now, BPF, I want to hear the solution to your conundrum. I would have applied full power on the remaining 3, selected gear up, climbed away, pulled the breaker for the nose gear, selected gear down (so only the two mains came out) come around and landed right down the center of the runway with the nose gear in the well. Replaced a couple of skins (and an engine and nose gear assy), and gone flying again. How'd I do??!

[Big Pistons Forever]

Now, BPF, I want to hear the solution to your conundrum. I would have applied full power on the remaining 3, selected gear up, climbed away, pulled the breaker for the nose gear, selected gear down (so only the two mains came out) come around and landed right down the center of the runway with the nose gear in the well. Replaced a couple of skins (and an engine and nose gear assy), and gone flying again. How'd I do??!

Going around was never considered, and in retrospect was not an option as we would have had to rotate to a pretty nose high attitude to get the nose wheel off the runway and then would have been only able to got to max power on two engines while the the third was slowly fed in while retracting flaps and re-trimming. A very possible result would have been running out of runway before getting to Vr, or losing directional control and going of the side of the runway at high speed.

In this case full use of the rudder and a bit of judicious braking was able to (barely) hold the aircraft on the runway until we could get it stopped, but it was a wild ride. The only lesson here is don't give up, fly the mother until it is stopped.

One factor in the successful out come was effective crew co-ordination, something I notice didn't seem to get mentioned in the PBY incident. I wonder what role (if any) the copilot had in dealing with his emergency.......

[winds_in_flight_wtf]

Odd how experience is treated as unimportant - even with contempt - in aviation.

I figured that you could probably learn something from old pilots, but I guess that isn't the case, because there's nothing to be learned from experience.

An old timer once told me : "Experience says f*** all about their competence" .

Take that for what it's worth. You will always have a critic no matter what you do unfortunately.

[robertsailor1]

Actually experience is how you derive judgment and competence and its a damn good thing to have. Don't you understand that the insurance companies want a certain amount of experience before they will give you the best rate. Common sense ain't very common on this site sometimes.

[Chuck Ellsworth]

AAAhhhh when will I learn not to open up a can of worms on this instructors forum.

For anyone to suggest that I lack the professionalism to not brief my F.O. before take off I find to be insulting beyond belief.

Also for those of you who only know how to second guess and critize try working on your reading and comprehension skills.

Here is part of what I wrote about this event.

The mixture levers are behind the pilots seats and above their heads so a bit difficult to get at real fast......the F.O. had no idea the throttle lever had broken off and the fucking noise level in one of those beasts is unbelievable so trying to tell him to cut both mixtures would have been a waste of time.

May I add to this posters comment?

Actually experience is how you derive judgment and competence and its a damn good thing to have. Don't you understand that the insurance companies want a certain amount of experience before they will give you the best rate. Common sense ain't very common on this site sometimes.

In the latter part of my career my experience level was good enough that I worked directly for Lloyds of London.'s underwriters in a training program that once you were signed off you qualified for a low insurance rate.

This is not just a claim, it is fact.

The issue I have been talking about took place thirty five years ago in a type of airplane that has long ago disappeared off the commercial flying scene.

The SOP's used in today's modern high performance aircraft may not have worked in those aircraft...especially the reject option that I chose in that instance.

As I stated this will be the last time I ever relate anything that happened in my career in this training forum because I can see it is a no win for me and I sure as hell do not owe anyone here anything.

And please, please don't bother to point out how modern aircraft are flown and how CRM works...I taught it in Europe and was trained in same at Airbus in Toulouse France.

[Beefitarian]

As I stated this will be the last time I ever relate anything that happened in my career in this training forum because I can see it is a no win for me and I sure as hell do not owe anyone here anything.

What about my watch? I am the high bidder after all.

[andy_mtl]

Even tho i might be the one with the least experience i have to say i agree with ..

It s called decision making, SOPs are great and defenally make like easier and safer however...
How about all of us that fly without SOPs? smaller planes yes, less people on board yes but even just one life is priceless.
So being said that we dont have SOPs it all relies on good decision making and good judgement.
V1 or the speed of no retourn is calculated on a brand new A/C not a 18 years old plane with props that are filed down to sticks.
Especially if you know the plane well enough, and you think, ok true i am 5 Knots about V1 but this wont make it and yeah looks like i can stop... then do it. and i m not saying with my 325 hours i would do it, but if i had a decent time on type and on that specific A/C well i would trust my judgement just like i judge it now to reject on a c182.

Lets now forget SOPs were written by fellow senior and experienced pilots, they just didn t magically appear in a company s COM.
Andy

[Chuck Ellsworth]

Lets now forget SOPs were written by fellow senior and experienced pilots, they just didn t magically appear in a company s COM.
Andy

Andy, I have worked for some of the largest corporations on earth, in 1970 I flew for Mobil Oil out of Calgary on their DC3.

Mobil Oil had one of the best operating procedures of any company I ever flew for and every pilot in their employ used exactly the same procedures in the airplane.

Mobil OIL had no F.O.s as such as all the pilots were captain qualified and the crews changed seats every trip.

We flew PMA approaches in IMC at all times and had strict pre. take off and pre. landing briefings. Common sense dictates that using the PMA system of flying means we had defined duties for the pilot flying and the pilot not flying, the only difference really was they had not coined all the acronyms yet.

It would be interesting to know what some of my more persistent critics were flying in 1970.

[robertsailor1]

Nobody can be considered wise that has done little. Wisdom is earned through exposure and experience­.
Wisdom is very seldom associated with the young, because its usually based on experience and the young simply haven't been around long enough. That's not to diminish young peoples skills, because often their skill levels are very very high, but their wisdom/judgement can be very lacking. One of the reasons that most cultures treat their elders with such high respect is that they value wisdom. Debate is a wonderful way to gain perspective and learn, but it usually wise to treat elders with a great deal of respect when debating them. Personally over the years I love to listen to pilots that are older and wiser than myself. I don't feel a need to challenge everything they say, nor do I necessarily agree with them all the time. When I disagree I find the best way is to ask questions. You guys have some wonderful resources on this site, but from time to time you misuse them and in the end you'll be left with 1500 hour know it alls which would be a real loss.

[Chuck Ellsworth]

in the end you'll be left with 1500 hour know it alls which would be a real loss.

This forum has lost so many valuable contributors over the past few years it is depressing, in the final analysis all the good ones will fade away because the crap one has to accept sometimes is just not worth being here.

[winds_in_flight_wtf]

Actually experience is how you derive judgment and competence and its a damn good thing to have. Don't you understand that the insurance companies want a certain amount of experience before they will give you the best rate. Common sense ain't very common on this site sometimes.

Egotistical responses on the contrary are very common on this site.

Accident investigators have also used that line numerous times. When you're in denial it says something. Stop making it sound like 1+1=2 meanwhile insulting my intelligence. Based on your concrete analysis, there should be no issues regarding judgement by those with experience. So which accident should we start with where the pilots were very "experienced" and yet they killed hundreds of passengers?

Insurance companies have nothing to do with this as there is no rate factor. Common sense ain't very common on this site sometimes.