NT Air King Air Accident - Pilot Discussion Thread
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Re: NT Air King Air Accident - Pilot Discussion Thread
I'm sorrey - but that woman is a bimbo. There is so much wrong in that it's not funny.
Mind you - that happens in every aviation incident. Some ding-dong thinks they know everything when really - they can't tell the nose of the plane from the tail.
Mind you - that happens in every aviation incident. Some ding-dong thinks they know everything when really - they can't tell the nose of the plane from the tail.
Re: NT Air King Air Accident - Pilot Discussion Thread
The problem is probably the journalist. Yearwood's comment doesn't look good.boeingboy wrote:I'm sorrey - but that woman is a bimbo. There is so much wrong in that it's not funny.
Mind you - that happens in every aviation incident. Some ding-dong thinks they know everything when really - they can't tell the nose of the plane from the tail.
Good judgment comes from experience. Experience often comes from bad judgment.
Re: NT Air King Air Accident - Pilot Discussion Thread
Flown out of what, Nightguy. What was it in? It had an oil leak.nightguy wrote:I think the old 200 would have flown out of this 9 times out of 10.
Good judgment comes from experience. Experience often comes from bad judgment.
Re: NT Air King Air Accident - Pilot Discussion Thread
I haven't flown a 100, but I have flown various types of PT6 engines for quite some time. With complete loss of oil pressure, the prop will go to feather, but not until the pressure is quite low. Generally you will be dealing with the loss of oil pressure long before the prop goes to feather (unless you're hit with a missile and lose all pressure right away).
If there is a steady loss of oil pressure and the feather is not already in feather, the prop will not suddenly go to feather. It will either start transitioning to a courser pitch, or what can happen is oil pressure fluctuations with the last bit of oil remaining in the engine will cause the prop to cycle in and out of feather repeatedly until all oil pressure is lost, the prop is put into feather or the engine is shut down. I would imagine if this happened on short final at a slow approach speed, this would cause a serious controllability issues. Post crash fire probably not due to an existing fire, but because this happened soon after departure they still no doubt had a lot of fuel on board.
If there is a steady loss of oil pressure and the feather is not already in feather, the prop will not suddenly go to feather. It will either start transitioning to a courser pitch, or what can happen is oil pressure fluctuations with the last bit of oil remaining in the engine will cause the prop to cycle in and out of feather repeatedly until all oil pressure is lost, the prop is put into feather or the engine is shut down. I would imagine if this happened on short final at a slow approach speed, this would cause a serious controllability issues. Post crash fire probably not due to an existing fire, but because this happened soon after departure they still no doubt had a lot of fuel on board.
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Re: NT Air King Air Accident - Pilot Discussion Thread
KK7, great post. I was losing hope at the amount of misinformation being spread about what happens to a PT6 when it loses oil pressure. I can tell you, the pressure will not even start to fluctuate until the oil level drops to about 6-7 quarts which is roughly half of the engines capacity. I hope training captains and ground school instructors are taking note, this looks like an excellent scenario to be taught.
Nightguy, for someone who claims to have lots of King Air time, you should know better. Just because you read it in a magazine is no excuse for not understanding your machine. Spreading the word like gospel only makes it worse for those coming up after you.
Nightguy, for someone who claims to have lots of King Air time, you should know better. Just because you read it in a magazine is no excuse for not understanding your machine. Spreading the word like gospel only makes it worse for those coming up after you.
Re: NT Air King Air Accident - Pilot Discussion Thread
I have a background on BE 90/A100/200 (4000+ hrs) and it has happened when oil caps are not securely tightened oil will leak or even piss out depending. It can be gradual with pressure indications and fluctuations prop rpm. But you will know there is an issue. Personally I would have shut the engine down (with appropriate checklist procedures) at altitude, returned to destination configured for a single engine landing. I will speculate here their engine quit on short final, initially unfeathered and with 7 pax, 2 crew and good load of fuel. In this situation an A100 with that 4 blade propeller is going to be a handful, even for the most experienced.
I had an unsecured oil cap on a BE-A100 a few years back but thankfully for me, it was an uneventful single engine landing.
I had an unsecured oil cap on a BE-A100 a few years back but thankfully for me, it was an uneventful single engine landing.
Re: NT Air King Air Accident - Pilot Discussion Thread
First of all, my sincere condolences to the pilot's wife and baby, family, friends, and co-workers at N.T. And thoughts and prayers for the co-pilot and other passengers who are suffering in a bad way right now. It sends shivers down my spine imagining the poor guys stuck in the fire...so terrifying and awful, every pilot's worst nightmare.
I'm not 100% on these discussion threads starting up so soon after a tragedy; it seems like there should be a period of mourning and respect first, although I appreciate a pilot's need to know and understand, and I guess the educational value and exchange of knowledge validates it. So I'll continue with my thoughts:
We've all flown machines with fluctuating/erratic gauges, and it's easy to understand how a high time turbine guy who has thousands of hours behind or beside one or a couple of trusty P&W's would probably think indication error first, real problem second, as these engines are so very reliable.
I'm not speculating on this particular accident, but perhaps a good rule of thumb for all of us is to treat any oil pressure fluctuation/loss in a P&W as a real problem first, and as an indication problem second. And in the event of any decrease in oil pressure, land ASAP at the nearest suitable aerodrome.
I also can understand how an experienced company man would want to land his machine with an issue at the most convenient location for a specific company's maintenance (like a machine based and maintained out of Calgary that has an issue Westbound over Banff might feel a "duty" to limp the plane back to Calgary where the mechanics are waiting inside a heated hangar with tool and parts at an arms reach rather than stranding the machine and passengers in Springbank) and I think this is where chief pilots, training captains and owners have to stand up and let their guys know it's not only OK, but it is preferred by them to first and foremost land at the closest/safest airport and worry about the passenger's and mechanic's convenience second.
Again, I am not speculating on this terrible tragedy or on NT's SOP's. I'm just sharing some thoughts that might be in everyone's best interest to think about, that might save a life in the future, and that might spark up some new/fresh discussion in the manager's meetings in the next few days or weeks.
There but for the grace of God go most of us...
I'm not 100% on these discussion threads starting up so soon after a tragedy; it seems like there should be a period of mourning and respect first, although I appreciate a pilot's need to know and understand, and I guess the educational value and exchange of knowledge validates it. So I'll continue with my thoughts:
We've all flown machines with fluctuating/erratic gauges, and it's easy to understand how a high time turbine guy who has thousands of hours behind or beside one or a couple of trusty P&W's would probably think indication error first, real problem second, as these engines are so very reliable.
I'm not speculating on this particular accident, but perhaps a good rule of thumb for all of us is to treat any oil pressure fluctuation/loss in a P&W as a real problem first, and as an indication problem second. And in the event of any decrease in oil pressure, land ASAP at the nearest suitable aerodrome.
I also can understand how an experienced company man would want to land his machine with an issue at the most convenient location for a specific company's maintenance (like a machine based and maintained out of Calgary that has an issue Westbound over Banff might feel a "duty" to limp the plane back to Calgary where the mechanics are waiting inside a heated hangar with tool and parts at an arms reach rather than stranding the machine and passengers in Springbank) and I think this is where chief pilots, training captains and owners have to stand up and let their guys know it's not only OK, but it is preferred by them to first and foremost land at the closest/safest airport and worry about the passenger's and mechanic's convenience second.
Again, I am not speculating on this terrible tragedy or on NT's SOP's. I'm just sharing some thoughts that might be in everyone's best interest to think about, that might save a life in the future, and that might spark up some new/fresh discussion in the manager's meetings in the next few days or weeks.
There but for the grace of God go most of us...
Re: NT Air King Air Accident - Pilot Discussion Thread
This is all fine but doesn't answer a number of questions.KK7 wrote:I haven't flown a 100, but I have flown various types of PT6 engines for quite some time. With complete loss of oil pressure, the prop will go to feather, but not until the pressure is quite low. Generally you will be dealing with the loss of oil pressure long before the prop goes to feather (unless you're hit with a missile and lose all pressure right away).
If there is a steady loss of oil pressure and the feather is not already in feather, the prop will not suddenly go to feather. It will either start transitioning to a courser pitch, or what can happen is oil pressure fluctuations with the last bit of oil remaining in the engine will cause the prop to cycle in and out of feather repeatedly until all oil pressure is lost, the prop is put into feather or the engine is shut down. I would imagine if this happened on short final at a slow approach speed, this would cause a serious controllability issues. Post crash fire probably not due to an existing fire, but because this happened soon after departure they still no doubt had a lot of fuel on board.
One if this was actually the case why didn't they shut down the engine at altitude, instead risking losing it on short final and or risk causing extensive damage to the engine from being run short on oil?
Two why did they not request / accept the offer of emergency equipment? The last offer was on clearance to land. Given the description above they should have been seeing signs by then that this might be a serious issue.
Three with a gradual loss of oil pressure leading to a gradual feather wouldn't this make the engine failure a relatively slow and predictable event and as such easily dealt with?
Four I've never been to sim but some of my friends and colleges have and everyone talks about the engine failure while on final. This seems like a commonly practiced event for which both pilots should be easily able to handle. Further knowing there is an issue with the engine and anticipating a possible failure should have made them both even more ready to respond and keep control.
From what is described by all witness accounts the engine failure seemed very abrupt causing a sever swerve to the left. That doesn't match with a gradual loss in oil pressure. It matches more with a sudden loss of an engine for which they weren't able to fully predict might fail.
What could have happened that caused them to a) suspect there was a problem warranting a return to the airport, b) made them not want to request emergency services c) cause an abrupt engine failure for which they weren't fully prepared for?
Lots of stuff not adding up but the CVR will answer all these questions within a week or so until then I wouldn’t put any credit into any reports from passengers considering I’ve heard pilots giving all sorts of pacifying reasons for returning to an airport.
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Re: NT Air King Air Accident - Pilot Discussion Thread
Stall does not seem to be the case here; so, I see two mechanical possibilities for the wing drop on short final:
1. Prop bearing seizure, but you would like to think loss of oil pressure would have initiated autofeather well before that (assuming that going into feather on short final would be manageable).
2. Prop going into ground fine pitch or beta -- a suspected cause of the Luxair 9462 loss. In the Luxair case, the aircraft was behaving normally until the loss of control at low level.
So if you have an oil pressure problem on a PT-6:
Would you feather as a precaution?
Would you spiral down to the airport below you even if you are at a good altitude for a normal approach to your departure airport?
This crew did not know the exact problem in the engine and it will take the TSB some time to figure it out.
The Air Transat crew that, even after contacting maintenance at base, did not figure out the low oil temperature indication on one of their engines until they had a double flameout was in the same position even though they had considerably more time and a lot more luck.
1. Prop bearing seizure, but you would like to think loss of oil pressure would have initiated autofeather well before that (assuming that going into feather on short final would be manageable).
2. Prop going into ground fine pitch or beta -- a suspected cause of the Luxair 9462 loss. In the Luxair case, the aircraft was behaving normally until the loss of control at low level.
So if you have an oil pressure problem on a PT-6:
Would you feather as a precaution?
Would you spiral down to the airport below you even if you are at a good altitude for a normal approach to your departure airport?
This crew did not know the exact problem in the engine and it will take the TSB some time to figure it out.
The Air Transat crew that, even after contacting maintenance at base, did not figure out the low oil temperature indication on one of their engines until they had a double flameout was in the same position even though they had considerably more time and a lot more luck.
Re: NT Air King Air Accident - Pilot Discussion Thread
Many years ago two of the companies I worked for each lost a turbo prop aircraft that had an engine oil problem.
Engine power was reduced to idle and both aircraft ended up with airspeed below Vmca on short final and didn't recover.
Engine power was reduced to idle and both aircraft ended up with airspeed below Vmca on short final and didn't recover.
Re: NT Air King Air Accident - Pilot Discussion Thread
With my experience with the PT6 engine, it is an extremely reliable engine, and 9 out of 10 times something that looks bad on the gauge has been a problem with the gauge/transmitter/wiring to that gauge. I think this can lead to a complacency for when a real problem happens.
In general the gauges you have for each engine is Torque, Prop RPM (Np), Inter Turbine Temperature (ITT or T5), Gas Generator Speed (Ng), Fuel Flow, Oil Pressure and Oil Temperature. For the first 5 indicators that I listed (Torque, Np, T5, Ng and FF), if something isn't right and it's a real indication problem you will see the problems on the other respective gauges, you may hear an unexpected change and notice a change in aircraft performance. If only one of these gauges is showing something wonky, and the remaining gauges are normal and everything else seems fine, it's likely an indicator problem, or another symptom will show soon to indicate a problem. Oil temperature and oil pressure will not directly affect your engine's performance. Temperature can rise or drop, and if everything else is looking normal on the engine, chances are it is an indication problem.
In my opinion, the one gauge to be really cautious about is the oil pressure gauge. Yes the indicator can fail, but a dropping oil pressure can indicate something bad coming and it may or may not be gradual. As was mentioned, the PT6 can run on nearly no oil at all, including keeping the prop out of feather. Once you run out of oil, the few splashes that remain may make your prop cycle in and out of feather and it may start with very little warning. You may think the engine is still running fine with an oil pressure indication on short final, then suddenly a large reduction of drag on one side followed by the pitch going back to fine and producing a lot of drag will cause a great deal of yaw and bank on a twin engine aircraft. With enough power going to the engine, the prop going from fine to full feather can make an aircraft jump the brakes when parked on the ground.
What you do about an engine with an oil indication problem depends on whether you need that engine or not. If I was in a C208B I'd leave that engine running for as long as I need to to get me to a safe place to land. If I'm in a twin and I need to climb or if it's too dangerous to descend to my single engine ceiling, I'll leave it running. If I don't need that engine, I'll shut it down not only to save the engine, but to get myself stabilized with the engine out instead of it quitting at an unexpected time during some critical phase of flight. Fortunately my airplane has 4 PT6 engines on it, so usually the safer bet is to shut'er down and figure it out on the ground. But if you're going to leave it running, prepare for the worst to happen at the worst possible time. Get ready for that yaw and sudden loss of power.
I'm only saying all of this in pure speculation. None of us have any idea what happened on final to Vancouver, maybe it was related to their oil pressure problems, maybe it was unrelated, maybe they made an error. But until there is strong evidence to suggest otherwise, I prefer to assume my counterparts performed their duties professionally to the very end, and they did everything they could within their abilities to prevent such a catastrophe.
In general the gauges you have for each engine is Torque, Prop RPM (Np), Inter Turbine Temperature (ITT or T5), Gas Generator Speed (Ng), Fuel Flow, Oil Pressure and Oil Temperature. For the first 5 indicators that I listed (Torque, Np, T5, Ng and FF), if something isn't right and it's a real indication problem you will see the problems on the other respective gauges, you may hear an unexpected change and notice a change in aircraft performance. If only one of these gauges is showing something wonky, and the remaining gauges are normal and everything else seems fine, it's likely an indicator problem, or another symptom will show soon to indicate a problem. Oil temperature and oil pressure will not directly affect your engine's performance. Temperature can rise or drop, and if everything else is looking normal on the engine, chances are it is an indication problem.
In my opinion, the one gauge to be really cautious about is the oil pressure gauge. Yes the indicator can fail, but a dropping oil pressure can indicate something bad coming and it may or may not be gradual. As was mentioned, the PT6 can run on nearly no oil at all, including keeping the prop out of feather. Once you run out of oil, the few splashes that remain may make your prop cycle in and out of feather and it may start with very little warning. You may think the engine is still running fine with an oil pressure indication on short final, then suddenly a large reduction of drag on one side followed by the pitch going back to fine and producing a lot of drag will cause a great deal of yaw and bank on a twin engine aircraft. With enough power going to the engine, the prop going from fine to full feather can make an aircraft jump the brakes when parked on the ground.
What you do about an engine with an oil indication problem depends on whether you need that engine or not. If I was in a C208B I'd leave that engine running for as long as I need to to get me to a safe place to land. If I'm in a twin and I need to climb or if it's too dangerous to descend to my single engine ceiling, I'll leave it running. If I don't need that engine, I'll shut it down not only to save the engine, but to get myself stabilized with the engine out instead of it quitting at an unexpected time during some critical phase of flight. Fortunately my airplane has 4 PT6 engines on it, so usually the safer bet is to shut'er down and figure it out on the ground. But if you're going to leave it running, prepare for the worst to happen at the worst possible time. Get ready for that yaw and sudden loss of power.
I'm only saying all of this in pure speculation. None of us have any idea what happened on final to Vancouver, maybe it was related to their oil pressure problems, maybe it was unrelated, maybe they made an error. But until there is strong evidence to suggest otherwise, I prefer to assume my counterparts performed their duties professionally to the very end, and they did everything they could within their abilities to prevent such a catastrophe.
Re: NT Air King Air Accident - Pilot Discussion Thread
A wonderful post with great balance and insight. You have everything that is in issue here and particularly that one bit that I didn't want to say, as I know NTAir is a first class company and the way I may have put it would be taken wrong, but you have said it just the right way.180 wrote:First of all, my sincere condolences to the pilot's wife and baby, family, friends, and co-workers at N.T. And thoughts and prayers for the co-pilot and other passengers who are suffering in a bad way right now. It sends shivers down my spine imagining the poor guys stuck in the fire...so terrifying and awful, every pilot's worst nightmare.
I'm not 100% on these discussion threads starting up so soon after a tragedy; it seems like there should be a period of mourning and respect first, although I appreciate a pilot's need to know and understand, and I guess the educational value and exchange of knowledge validates it. So I'll continue with my thoughts:
We've all flown machines with fluctuating/erratic gauges, and it's easy to understand how a high time turbine guy who has thousands of hours behind or beside one or a couple of trusty P&W's would probably think indication error first, real problem second, as these engines are so very reliable.
I'm not speculating on this particular accident, but perhaps a good rule of thumb for all of us is to treat any oil pressure fluctuation/loss in a P&W as a real problem first, and as an indication problem second. And in the event of any decrease in oil pressure, land ASAP at the nearest suitable aerodrome.
I also can understand how an experienced company man would want to land his machine with an issue at the most convenient location for a specific company's maintenance (like a machine based and maintained out of Calgary that has an issue Westbound over Banff might feel a "duty" to limp the plane back to Calgary where the mechanics are waiting inside a heated hangar with tool and parts at an arms reach rather than stranding the machine and passengers in Springbank) and I think this is where chief pilots, training captains and owners have to stand up and let their guys know it's not only OK, but it is preferred by them to first and foremost land at the closest/safest airport and worry about the passenger's and mechanic's convenience second.
Again, I am not speculating on this terrible tragedy or on NT's SOP's. I'm just sharing some thoughts that might be in everyone's best interest to think about, that might save a life in the future, and that might spark up some new/fresh discussion in the manager's meetings in the next few days or weeks.
There but for the grace of God go most of us...
I don't see any evidence that this was a gauge problem. The captain told the passengers there was a small oil leak, which implies that the problem was identified visually. The decision was made to return to Vancouver. Why that was, we don't yet know, but there were aircraft to company communications, we do know that. Both Pitt Meadows and Abbotsford have emergency equipment, and if an emergency was so imminent that a weighing of where the best emergency equipment was available was necessary, then Abbotsford was the better choice and Vancouver the worst.
I think it would be speculation to say that the dangerous problem which did develop was not related to the oil leak. I'm not sure of the mechanics, and I defer to the great expertise on these type of engines and systems in this thread. What should come into the analysis is that the longer the aircraft flew, the closer the approach of danger. When the problem was first detected, a timetable came into play and there was x amount of time before a serious problem would manifest itself. That x amount of time seems to have expired about 900 meters short of 26 or slightly before that. The time to Abbotsford or Pitt Meadows would have been significantly less than x.
I don't fly turboprops but I do have a question for those that do. I know there is some type of prop setting checklist item on final. In the context of oil running low or exhausted, would going to this setting have resulted in an asymmetric thrust condition and the resultant apparently uncontrollable yaw?
We had this discussion in the Resolute thread(s) and I maintain that early discussion as to analysis and causes when carried out in a respectful and intelligent way is entirely appropriate. If some young pilot who reads this today has an oil leak in a King Air or any similar aircraft tomorrow, I am sure he or she will be better equipped to make decisions that result in the best outcomes for all who depend on his or her decisions.
Thank you once again for a great post.
Good judgment comes from experience. Experience often comes from bad judgment.
Re: NT Air King Air Accident - Pilot Discussion Thread
That is an interesting discussion point, but I would be surprised if this caused any serious problem.cncpc wrote:I don't fly turboprops but I do have a question for those that do. I know there is some type of prop setting checklist item on final. In the context of oil running low or exhausted, would going to this setting have resulted in an asymmetric thrust condition and the resultant apparently uncontrollable yaw?
In normal conditions, for most types of aircraft and operations the prop levers are advanced to max RPM or full fine from a cruise setting when on final. AFAIK, most operators require some sort of stabilized approach before the aircraft reaches below 500' AGL on final. That means the prop RPM should be advanced at or prior to this point.
In the PT6 advancing the the prop levers to maximum RPM opens a valve to allow more oil pressure into the prop hub to force the prop blades to fine, but the quantity of this oil is not a substantial amount. However if they had both engines running and the the RPM was left at a cruise setting until final, then they advanced the prop levers to max RPM and at that particular time they ran out of oil or something happened to one of the engines, it would only exacerbate the situation. Whether it would be the direct cause I don't know, but my feeling would be no.
I don't know what the procedure is in the King Air, but generally when there is a problem with the engines the prop levers are advanced to maximum RPM early on as if maximum power is ever required, the prop RPM must be at it's maximum setting. I suppose if they felt the problem wasn't serious, they wouldn't change the prop RPM until on final.
Re: NT Air King Air Accident - Pilot Discussion Thread
If the quotes are accurate this Cross person is a complete wingnut. What a load of make believe.
This part though:
This part though:
I'm so glad to hear that thinking is still demonstrated in some professions. Great big A+ to the fire crew in that truck.The other fire truck used its reinforced bumper to crash through a runway gate.
Re: Small Aircraft Crash CYVR
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Re: NT Air King Air Accident - Pilot Discussion Thread
+1. She said there were four passengers in front of her, which means she was sitting at least three rows behind the pilots; how could she see a hand trembling? Why did she believe they were going to die from the moment the pilot announced they were returning to Vancouver, even though there was no indication of a serious problem? How would she know "[t]hey went very high up"? On what basis did she determine "[t]he pilots were taking us much higher than normal and I understand that is because they were going to glide us in"? They weren't gliding; at least one engine was running. Most of all, how did she know "that they were not going to make it despite a gallant effort" before the wing dropped? They weren't trying to glide in without power, and prior to the wing drop it appears the approach was normal and they were going to make the runway. The human mind has an incredible capability to inject new information into memories and add detail where none previously existed, which I suspect is the case here. I hope the TSB doesn't place a great deal of credence on her testimony.ahramin wrote:If the quotes are accurate this Cross person is a complete wingnut. What a load of make believe.
I'm sure it had nothing to do with the accident, but she flagrantly broke the law by sending e-mails in flight. Regardless of whether the signal disrupted navigation equipment, the phone is one more projectile flying around the cabin.
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Re: NT Air King Air Accident - Pilot Discussion Thread
The lady is in hospital with several fractures. I'd cut her some slack.
Waiting for the sanctimonious lecture on using a cellphone during an approach in VFR conditions.
Waiting for the sanctimonious lecture on using a cellphone during an approach in VFR conditions.
Re: NT Air King Air Accident - Pilot Discussion Thread
+1 Loudly.RatherBeFlying wrote:The lady is in hospital with several fractures. I'd cut her some slack.
Waiting for the sanctimonious lecture on using a cellphone during an approach in VFR conditions.
She said what she thinks she saw. The reporter ate it up. People are hurt, people are grieving, and a lot of pilots in this thread are contributing to understanding what happened. It is the story of one human being who has been through a very trying ordeal. What does it possibly contribute to start belittling a woman in a hospital bed?
Good judgment comes from experience. Experience often comes from bad judgment.
Re: NT Air King Air Accident - Pilot Discussion Thread
Wingnut? Sounds like she was fairly accurate about not making it and people dying. So she texted in flight. Probably was never told not to. Maybe she figured they were climbing because she saw the altimeter increasing or heard the engine power increase on both engines. Maybe from 10 feet away you can see someone's hand shaking.
Re: NT Air King Air Accident - Pilot Discussion Thread
Doesn't look like the plane climbed after they turned around:
The flight path, air speed and altitude of Flight 204.
3:41 p.m. - Plane takes off from Vancouver International Airport
3:51 - Speed: 295 km/h, Altitude: 4,000 metres over Coquitlam Lake
3:54 - Speed: 327 km/h, Altitude: 4,600 metres over Golden Ears Park
4:01 - Speed: 331 km/h, Altitude: 2,652 metres heading southwest toward Coquitlam
4:05 - Speed: 410 km/h, Altitude: 1,311 metres over Fraser River near Port Coquitlam
4:07 - Speed: 302 km/h, Altitude: 884 metres over North Delta neat Scott Road and 96 Avenue
4:09 - Speed: 295 km/h, Altitude: 457 metres over Richmond
4:10 - Speed: 266 km/h, Altitude: 366 metres over Highway 99 in Richmond
4:11:28 - Speed: 162 Km/h, Altitude: 61 metres near airport
4:11:34 - Speed: 198 km/h, Altitude: 61 metres (Final reading on radar before plane disappears from radar)
Source: WebTracker: YVR
© Copyright (c) The Vancouver Sun
The flight path, air speed and altitude of Flight 204.
3:41 p.m. - Plane takes off from Vancouver International Airport
3:51 - Speed: 295 km/h, Altitude: 4,000 metres over Coquitlam Lake
3:54 - Speed: 327 km/h, Altitude: 4,600 metres over Golden Ears Park
4:01 - Speed: 331 km/h, Altitude: 2,652 metres heading southwest toward Coquitlam
4:05 - Speed: 410 km/h, Altitude: 1,311 metres over Fraser River near Port Coquitlam
4:07 - Speed: 302 km/h, Altitude: 884 metres over North Delta neat Scott Road and 96 Avenue
4:09 - Speed: 295 km/h, Altitude: 457 metres over Richmond
4:10 - Speed: 266 km/h, Altitude: 366 metres over Highway 99 in Richmond
4:11:28 - Speed: 162 Km/h, Altitude: 61 metres near airport
4:11:34 - Speed: 198 km/h, Altitude: 61 metres (Final reading on radar before plane disappears from radar)
Source: WebTracker: YVR
© Copyright (c) The Vancouver Sun
Re: NT Air King Air Accident - Pilot Discussion Thread
Sonny, I didn't see this post when I responded to the one below, but here's a bit of advice for youDiadem wrote:+1. She said there were four passengers in front of her, which means she was sitting at least three rows behind the pilots; how could she see a hand trembling? Why did she believe they were going to die from the moment the pilot announced they were returning to Vancouver, even though there was no indication of a serious problem? How would she know "[t]hey went very high up"? On what basis did she determine "[t]he pilots were taking us much higher than normal and I understand that is because they were going to glide us in"? They weren't gliding; at least one engine was running. Most of all, how did she know "that they were not going to make it despite a gallant effort" before the wing dropped? They weren't trying to glide in without power, and prior to the wing drop it appears the approach was normal and they were going to make the runway. The human mind has an incredible capability to inject new information into memories and add detail where none previously existed, which I suspect is the case here. I hope the TSB doesn't place a great deal of credence on her testimony.ahramin wrote:If the quotes are accurate this Cross person is a complete wingnut. What a load of make believe.
I'm sure it had nothing to do with the accident, but she flagrantly broke the law by sending e-mails in flight. Regardless of whether the signal disrupted navigation equipment, the phone is one more projectile flying around the cabin.
One day you're going to have to come down off that high horse with the Microsoft Flight Simulator built into the saddle horn and walk through a door. The real world is going to be out there, and you ain't going to fit in well with a sanctimonious berate the injured attitude like you have in this drivel above. It's a Vancouver Sun story, sonny. It's not like it was a real newspaper. Get over it.
Good judgment comes from experience. Experience often comes from bad judgment.
Re: NT Air King Air Accident - Pilot Discussion Thread
I have read a number of posts by others about the PT 6 and the King Air 100. I used to fly a 100 years ago and in fact I was the one who delivered GXRX to the new owners many moons ago. Also flew GXVX, a sister ship, both as a straight 100 and as a Raisbeck mod airplane. GXRX is a very early model 100 that has the Raisbeck performance mods. One thing I noticed was that the 4 blade prop will create a lot more drag when either the power levers are brought to idle or the engine quits. Also, the prop will not feather right away when an engine looses oil because there is an oil pump as part of the prop governor, driven by the prop shaft, that will keep the prop on speed until the governor and pump also looses oil supply. With the engine failed and the prop in high RPM or even in cruise RPM, the drag will be considerable. The oil will stream out of the engine and stain the cowl if a cap is left loose. The oil pressure will fluctuate slightly with the cap off, even if there is lots of oil still in the engine. That is why the tank is pressurized. there was no oil pressure fail light in the airplane as delivered, just an AC powered oil pressure gauge that can at times also jiggle a bit when all is well. Also, the King Air 100 will set up a high sink rate if the speed is allowed to decrease and it can catch one by surprise. This was a tragic accident and my heart goes out to all involved. It was a sad day.
The average pilot, despite the somewhat swaggering exterior, is very much capable of such feelings as love, affection, intimacy and caring.
These feelings just don't involve anyone else.
These feelings just don't involve anyone else.
Re: NT Air King Air Accident - Pilot Discussion Thread
A big +1
Four blades is great for performance as long as the engine is operating, and the worse thing ever when you no longer have an engine. I've flown 3 blade B200's and four blade B200's. They have a lot of bite!
Four blades is great for performance as long as the engine is operating, and the worse thing ever when you no longer have an engine. I've flown 3 blade B200's and four blade B200's. They have a lot of bite!
Re: NT Air King Air Accident - Pilot Discussion Thread
Is anybody certain that one of the engines was indeed not making any power at the time of the crash?
From what I see, the detached propeller and the one that stayed with the aircraft both look like they were being driven at the time they contacted.
There is nothing to say though that they weren't in beta, perhaps but I do not think either one displays indications of having hit while feathered.
When I first saw this accident, my thought was that maybe with their unscheduled return to the airport, they'd been slotted in too close behind a heavy jet and got caught up in the wake turbulence; reminiscent of the Navajo that ended up in Ikea's parking lot a couple years ago.
Just a thought.
'48
From what I see, the detached propeller and the one that stayed with the aircraft both look like they were being driven at the time they contacted.
There is nothing to say though that they weren't in beta, perhaps but I do not think either one displays indications of having hit while feathered.
When I first saw this accident, my thought was that maybe with their unscheduled return to the airport, they'd been slotted in too close behind a heavy jet and got caught up in the wake turbulence; reminiscent of the Navajo that ended up in Ikea's parking lot a couple years ago.
Just a thought.
'48
The fastest way to turn money into smoke and noise..
Re: NT Air King Air Accident - Pilot Discussion Thread
Another lesson learned. After the crash someone at Vancouver Airport Authority called Vancouver General Hospital to give them advance notice. Great idea but they didn't know how many people were involved so they gave no information. VGH thought they were dealing with an airliner crashed and called in 60 people on overtime.