UPS A-300 crash - Birmingham Alabama

[CID]

I'm just waiting to see the word "culture" come up in the discussion. But somehow this scenario will be "different".

[Colonel Sanders]

As a non-pilot, CID, you may be aware of this thing
called "the weather" that sometimes causes the yellow
disc in the sky to be not visible, and water to mysteriously
fall from the sky.

As a non-pilot, you should be aware that the wx at KSFO
and Birmingham was a wee bit different

Also, as a non-pilot, you might be fascinated to learn that
the ocean before the runway at KSFO is startlingly flat. The
terrain before the runway at Birmingham is not.

And as a non-pilot, it might interest you to learn that the
runway at Birmingham was much shorter than the runway
at KSFO.

So as a non-pilot CID, you should be aware that the conditions
at Birmingham and KSFO were just a wee bit different, despite
your racially-motivated need to equalize them.

[jpilot77]

As a non-pilot, CID, you may be aware of this thing
called "the weather" that sometimes causes the yellow
disc in the sky to be not visible, and water to mysteriously
fall from the sky.

As a non-pilot, you should be aware that the wx at KSFO
and Birmingham was a wee bit different

Also, as a non-pilot, you might be fascinated to learn that
the ocean before the runway at KSFO is startlingly flat. The
terrain before the runway at Birmingham is not.

And as a non-pilot, it might interest you to learn that the
runway at Birmingham was much shorter than the runway
at KSFO.

So as a non-pilot CID, you should be aware that the conditions
at Birmingham and KSFO were just a wee bit different, despite
your racially-motivated need to equalize them.

+1

[oldtimer]

I may be all wet but I seem to recall that the A300 is not a fully fly-by-wire airplane. Can anyone confirm this.
I do not know if that would make any difference or not.

[jpilot77]

It is completely non fly by wire.

[slowstream]

The A300 is absolutely NOT a fly by wire a/c!

Having just flown it for the past year, I can tell you the FMS is a pig dating back to the 70's and has screwed me more times than I care to remember! Its not an airplane that you want to get caught off guard with, especially high and fast, like most jets, but worse.

Its a nice airplane to fly by hand and although its okay for carrying a sizeable load as a freighter it would not be my first choice. Flying on the backside of the clock and relying heavily on automation because your dead tired and having a outdated piece of garbage FMS that will sewer you as soon as you turn your eye away makes it a poor choice for a night freighter

[CID]

As a non-pilot, CID, you may be aware of this thing
called "the weather" that sometimes causes the yellow
disc in the sky to be not visible, and water to mysteriously
fall from the sky.

As a non-pilot, you should be aware that the wx at KSFO
and Birmingham was a wee bit different

Also, as a non-pilot, you might be fascinated to learn that
the ocean before the runway at KSFO is startlingly flat. The
terrain before the runway at Birmingham is not.

And as a non-pilot, it might interest you to learn that the
runway at Birmingham was much shorter than the runway
at KSFO.

So as a non-pilot CID, you should be aware that the conditions
at Birmingham and KSFO were just a wee bit different, despite
your racially-motivated need to equalize them.

So when I write "culture" it's "racially motivated"? But when the throngs of your cheerleaders say "culture" its not? Wow.

I knew somehow this crash of a large airliner would somehow be "different".

The ironic thing here though is that the A300 is nowhere near as automated as a 777. If anything its more hand flyable AND it has TOGA switches just like most large airliners.

And Hedley, I've never made any statement on this forum of my flight status so you're talking (or writing) out your....

So tell us. How much time do you have in airliners?

But seriously....in the Asiana thread I stated that citing "ethnic" culture in this sort of accident is not very productive. Operators of large airliners that travel internationally are somewhat "normalized" in the manner they operate. Yes, there are exceptions but it isn't an "Asian" thing or any other ethnicity that is singled out in studies these days.

Instead, let's talk about "company" culture. Or event the culture in a certain segment of the industry. We need only to look at the recent DHC-2 accident in the west coast to see that at work. (Again) But what about FedEx or UPS specifically? And the air cargo sector? They seem to be disproportionately represented in these fatal accidents of large airliners.

There have been 2 fatal crashes at UPS this year and 4 in total for US cargo airlines. Over the last decade, the accident rate of cargo carriers is 8 times the rate for passenger airline carriers. Some studies site fatigue from doing so much night flying and having less restrictive duty times which allow them to fly with less rest periods than their passenger airline cohorts.

Other studies cite the types of airports they often operate from. Many large cargo airlines fly in to secondary airports that have less services and many lack instrument approaches. Apparently that is the case in the subject accident airport.

Personally, I think it's hazardous to expect flight crew to manually fly approaches into these ill-equipped airports with large airliners especially the more automated ones that were designed to be flown primarily with an autopilot. I know that may here don't share that sentiment.

It's certainly worthwhile looking in to this issue. Why are these large cargo airliners so prone to accidents?

[Jack In The Box]

As a non-pilot, CID, you may be aware of this thing
called "the weather" that sometimes causes the yellow
disc in the sky to be not visible, and water to mysteriously
fall from the sky.

As a non-pilot, you should be aware that the wx at KSFO
and Birmingham was a wee bit different

Also, as a non-pilot, you might be fascinated to learn that
the ocean before the runway at KSFO is startlingly flat. The
terrain before the runway at Birmingham is not.

And as a non-pilot, it might interest you to learn that the
runway at Birmingham was much shorter than the runway
at KSFO.

So as a non-pilot CID, you should be aware that the conditions
at Birmingham and KSFO were just a wee bit different, despite
your racially-motivated need to equalize them.

So when I write "culture" it's "racially motivated"? But when the throngs of your cheerleaders say "culture" its not? Wow.

I knew somehow this crash of a large airliner would somehow be "different".

The ironic thing here though is that the A300 is nowhere near as automated as a 777. If anything its more hand flyable AND it has TOGA switches just like most large airliners.

And Hedley, I've never made any statement on this forum of my flight status so you're talking (or writing) out your....

So tell us. How much time do you have in airliners?

But seriously....in the Asiana thread I stated that citing "ethnic" culture in this sort of accident is not very productive. Operators of large airliners that travel internationally are somewhat "normalized" in the manner they operate. Yes, there are exceptions but it isn't an "Asian" thing or any other ethnicity that is singled out in studies these days.

Instead, let's talk about "company" culture. Or event the culture in a certain segment of the industry. We need only to look at the recent DHC-2 accident in the west coast to see that at work. (Again) But what about FedEx or UPS specifically? And the air cargo sector? They seem to be disproportionately represented in these fatal accidents of large airliners.

There have been 2 fatal crashes at UPS this year and 4 in total for US cargo airlines. Over the last decade, the accident rate of cargo carriers is 8 times the rate for passenger airline carriers. Some studies site fatigue from doing so much night flying and having less restrictive duty times which allow them to fly with less rest periods than their passenger airline cohorts.

Other studies cite the types of airports they often operate from. Many large cargo airlines fly in to secondary airports that have less services and many lack instrument approaches. Apparently that is the case in the subject accident airport.

Personally, I think it's hazardous to expect flight crew to manually fly approaches into these ill-equipped airports with large airliners especially the more automated ones that were designed to be flown primarily with an autopilot. I know that may here don't share that sentiment.

It's certainly worthwhile looking in to this issue. Why are these large cargo airliners so prone to accidents?

You're absolutely putting blinders over your eyes and ears if you are going argue that culture was anywhere near as prominent a factor in this crash as the Asianna crash. It will likely have very little to do with company culture. But if you want something to pin point, perhaps look into crew rest restrictions and the exemption UPS lobbied for for cargo pilots claiming cargo was not as "important" as passenger aircraft.

No offense CID, but if you're not a pilot, what are you doing here on a pilots forum speculating with other pilots about accident causes and other topics of debate? There's a level of experience there that teaches us pilots things that you will be missing. It's intuition, it just can't be described. It can only be experienced. Not saying this is the case here necessarily...
So, if I am mistaken please forgive me, but why don't you join an aviation enthusiasts forum? You surely must understand some of your posts will not be received warmly...

I have no idea what "prone to accidents" means, but both UPS and FedEx have only ever had 2 fatal crashes in the span of their existence (correct me if I'm wrong...if I am, it won't be far off). I do not consider them "prone" to accidents.

[Chuck Ellsworth]

We need only to look at the recent DHC-2 accident in the west coast to see that at work.

Are you referring to the accident on Friday here on Vancouver Island?

[frozen solid]

Personally, I think it's hazardous to expect flight crew to manually fly approaches into these ill-equipped airports with large airliners especially the more automated ones that were designed to be flown primarily with an autopilot. I know that may here don't share that sentiment.

It's certainly worthwhile looking in to this issue. Why are these large cargo airliners so prone to accidents?

OK, first off I'm sorry to jump into this discussion at this point, since I rarely comment on large airliner stuff. But I've been reading this and the San Francisco accident thread, and I have to wonder about this particular theme: How does designing an airliner to be flown primarily on auto-pilot make it more difficult to hand-fly than one which is not? Why is the aircraft harder to fly manually than a less automated one? It still has controls and instruments, doesn't it? Do the designers skimp on the aerodynamic refinements that would make it stable or easy to steer with the manual controls, because they feel it's not necessary? I'm afraid I don't buy this. I feel that the only thing that would make a highly automated aircraft harder to fly manually than a conventional one would be the pilot's relative lack of ability to handle the aircraft without the automation. I think if anything the highly automated aircraft must be easier to hand-fly, judging from what I've read about all the "control laws" that seem to be built into the manual controls of these aircraft.

Or am I out to lunch? I admit, I haven't flown any aircraft that was built after 1985 so I don't know much about it. I "hand fly" 100% of my instrument approaches, like many people here do.

[Doc]

Personally, I think it's hazardous to expect flight crew to manually fly approaches into these ill-equipped airports with large airliners especially the more automated ones that were designed to be flown primarily with an autopilot. I know that may here don't share that sentiment.

It's certainly worthwhile looking in to this issue. Why are these large cargo airliners so prone to accidents?

EDITED

I guarantee you ANY airliner that is certified to fly in North America CAN be flown QUITE SAFELY with the auto pilot turned OFF, by any competent, qualified crew! Very few of us GARA whether or not YOU personally think it's hazardous.

[CID]

No offense CID, but if you're not a pilot, what are you doing here on a pilots forum speculating with other pilots about accident causes and other topics of debate?

Regardless of what my personal background and experience is, calling this a "pilots forum" is interesting. So apparently "aviation" equals "pilots"??

EDITED

frozen solid, I understand the question. It's a bit of a modern phenomenon. As aircraft designs include more and more automation and less and less people in the cockpit, there is a tendency to make the airplane as "autonomous" as possible. The buy-in required to develop airplanes like that is that the human pilot is the weak link.

I don't know of many pilots who fly modern airliners who would say they can fly an approach better than an autopilot. Some would say that an autopilot can't make the decision to NOT make the approach because of bad weather but there are plenty of accidents on record that prove that human pilots don't do that so well all the time either.

I also don't know of many computers that get "bored" or "complacent" or suffer from other "human" factors. So...the most modern airplanes are designed to be primarily flown with automation. When these huge complicated aircraft are hand flown, any little deviation from the norm can result in a HUGE increase in workload. That's when things go horribly wrong. The smart pilot in these scenarios pull the plug on the approach and go around to reconfigure.

You can consider the automation on an airplane like the 777 as the 3rd crew member. Before the level of automation used on airplanes like the 777 there were more hands (and heads) in the cockpit managing systems. Taking manual control is almost like removing the 3rd crew member. It's fine of course as long as the workload remains low.

[Donald]

I don't know of many pilots who fly modern airliners who would say they can fly an approach better than an autopilot.

[shimmydampner]

It's a bit of a modern phenomenon. As aircraft designs include more and more automation and less and less people in the cockpit, there is a tendency to make the airplane as "autonomous" as possible. The buy-in required to develop airplanes like that is that the human pilot is the weak link.

Other studies cite the types of airports they often operate from. Many large cargo airlines fly in to secondary airports that have less services and many lack instrument approaches. Apparently that is the case in the subject accident airport.

Personally, I think it's hazardous to expect flight crew to manually fly approaches into these ill-equipped airports with large airliners especially the more automated ones that were designed to be flown primarily with an autopilot. I know that may here don't share that sentiment.

I can certainly buy into the notion that the human element in the system that gets an airliner from point A to point B, is the weak link. I don't think too many of us here regardless of our opinion on this topic could dispute that. What I find odd is some of the opinions on how best to minimize risk from that element. There seems to be a strong sentiment that because modern airliners are so complex, more technology should be employed to further insulate the system from the weak human element, and procedures should be put in place to minimize any human interaction with the technology while it's doing it's job, especially during the actual business of flying. It would seem this would render the flight crew as quite ineffectual. I mean, when you strip it all away-all the automation and doo-dads and gizmos-isn't the crew's job still to get from point A to point B? Instead of simply throwing technology at the weak point in the system in an attempt to marginalize it's potential negative effects, shouldn't we invest equal effort into improving the deficiencies in that element of the system? And I don't mean a feel-good CRM or human factors course; how about getting at the good old fashioned nuts and bolts of being an aviator, albeit in an incredibly complex marvel of modern technology. Perhaps we've imperceptibly gone past some sort of ideal combination of man and machine and the increased complexity is causing human performance to suffer.
Forgive me if this seems antagonistic or condescending to airline pilots as that is not my intent however my experience is far different from the airline world and so I'm rather ignorant of exactly what it's like, save what I can glean from conversations with friends in airlines. It just seems that the professional airline pilot has gone from being a universally respected figure whose knowledge and skill was accepted as a given, to being someone who is viewed by aircraft manufacturers and airline brass as an accident waiting to happen that could easily be removed entirely from the whole equation if only the travelling public would accept it.

[Chuck Ellsworth]

CID...

What difference was the view out the windshield in that 777 that hit the seawall in front of the runway before they hit it than the view would have been out the windshield of say a light twin engine airplane?

It was a visual approach was it not?

Are we to believe that when the automatics are not used the pilots of big jets go blind?

[Doc]

I don't know of many pilots who fly modern airliners who would say they can fly an approach better than an autopilot.

I'd venture to say almost no pilots can fly an approach "better" than an autopilot.......but pilots CAN fly an approach safely, the vast majority of the time.

[pelmet]

Personally, I think it's hazardous to expect flight crew to manually fly approaches into these ill-equipped airports with large airliners especially the more automated ones that were designed to be flown primarily with an autopilot. I know that may here don't share that sentiment.

Having flown a couple of the more modern types now, I would say that there is a valid argument for the opposite in some sense. It has been my experience that the screw-ups happen when using the autopilot for non-precision approaches.

It is another one of those things where you have to say...it depends. People get themselves in trouble with all the button pushing required sometimes and not pushing the right buttons at the right time. Different modes that are less commonly used are now being used. The overshoot is where it gets really interesting.

The only time I took control from someone was when the other guy was doing a circling approach and here we are at around 300 feet, close in and it is time to turn final after a couple of suggestions to do so. He is using heading select to turn us onto final and the roll rate is obviously too slow and we will definitely overshoot the final approach course. No more time for discussion and quickly disengaging the autopilot and an immediate bank to 30° works out perfect. I hate trying to re-align at low altitude(and of course it is not allowed).

[KK7]

Children of the Magenta Line

"Filmed in 1997, Captain Warren Vanderburgh of the American Airlines Flight Academy focuses on Automation Dependency and its threat on the flight deck.

"A MUST SEE for any pilot operating in a multi crew, FMS/EFIS environment.

"This training was developed because in 1995 American's Chief Pilot, Cecil Ewell, asked Vanderburgh to develop an Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program to teach pilots clearly how to handle certain critical maneuvering matters discussed in the presentation, as well as automation complacency (Children of the Magenta). He won a major award from the Flight Safety Foundation for it."

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jZDjkIjuHGE

[Doc]

The only time I took control from someone was when the other guy was doing a circling approach and here we are at around 300 feet, close in and it is time to turn final after a couple of suggestions to do so. He is using heading select to turn us onto final and the roll rate is obviously too slow and we will definitely overshoot the final approach course. No more time for discussion and quickly disengaging the autopilot and an immediate bank to 30° works out perfect. I hate trying to re-align at low altitude(and of course it is not allowed).

If you're "at around 300 feet" on a circling approach, the deck is already dangerously loaded against you. Don't think I've ever seen 300 feet on a circling, and I've done a couple. For sure, the auto pilot should be off well before it was in this case. No shame in a missed. I would have been "bugging out" long before I made it to 300 feet, on anything but a straight in. We know better.

[pelmet]

The only time I took control from someone was when the other guy was doing a circling approach and here we are at around 300 feet, close in and it is time to turn final after a couple of suggestions to do so. He is using heading select to turn us onto final and the roll rate is obviously too slow and we will definitely overshoot the final approach course. No more time for discussion and quickly disengaging the autopilot and an immediate bank to 30° works out perfect. I hate trying to re-align at low altitude(and of course it is not allowed).

If you're "at around 300 feet" on a circling approach, the deck is already dangerously loaded against you. Don't think I've ever seen 300 feet on a circling, and I've done a couple. For sure, the auto pilot should be off well before it was in this case. No shame in a missed. I would have been "bugging out" long before I made it to 300 feet, on anything but a straight in. We know better.

Maybe it was 400 feet and we got wings level near 300 feet, I don't remember for sure. I really didn't want to go around in that particular case because there was a really low cloud deck moving up the runway from the far end at literally 100 feet which had left only about the first quarter of the runway visible. It was actually a nice day for the most part with no other low cloud around except that cloud deck marching up the runway from the far end but the F/O had kept it in really tight from the downwind, despite my suggestion for going somewhat further out. May have been a good thing if we wanted to get in. It would have been a cool picture but we were a bit busy. Too bad.

As for circling at 300 feet. In the bad old days, I used to fly with a captain who liked to circle a fairly big plane at around 100 feet(and it was necessary to stay visual). One time he claimed to be below airport elevation(yes it was somewhat hilly). But I am not saying that I was with him at these times. Weird things used to happen up north sometimes.

[Doc]

As for circling at 300 feet. In the bad old days, I used to fly with a captain who liked to circle a fairly big plane at around 100 feet(and it was necessary to stay visual). One time he claimed to be below airport elevation(yes it was somewhat hilly). But I am not saying that I was with him at these times. Weird things used to happen up north sometimes.

Think I've flown with that guy. Initials ID. perchance?
I totally hear you though, sometimes when you're "under it" you want to stay "under it", for a multitude of very good reasons.

[bmc]

http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/learm ... e-wake-up/#

[CID]

What difference was the view out the windshield in that 777 that hit the seawall in front of the runway before they hit it than the view would have been out the windshield of say a light twin engine airplane?

That's easy to answer. Disregarding things like the airplane dimensions, they will see very much the same thing if not "exactly" the same thing. But the issue is not what they see, it's if they're looking.

Even pilots in light twins can be distracted and find themselves looking down when they should be looking out. The accident reports are riddled with crashes where a light twin crashes after the pilot is distracted just after lift-off and allows the airplane to sink back down to the ground.

Now compare the cockpit of a Navajo and a 747. (It will be obvious why I'm using a 747 rather than a 777) Previous to the 747-400 variant, there was not only an extra flight crew member, altogether there were about 300 additional instruments, indicators and aural alerts in the cockpit. All that to make sure the PF could stick to flying the airplane when the PNF and flight engineer are dealing with faults.

With the 747-400, there was the introduction of advanced automation that allowed for the removal of the flight engineer station and those 300 extra "features". Along with that advanced technology came the advanced reliability that made the chances of the remaining flight crew having to take on the total workload that the old 747 three crew cockpits. But....what happens when something goes wrong? Depending on the failure it can easily take the attention of the PF and/or the PNF away. If it happens at a critical, high workload phase, even a very short distraction can lead to disaster.

A Navajo and most other light twins for that matter, were never complicated enough to need more than 2 pilots and depending on the ops authority, one pilot. So there are very few conceivable recoverable failures in a Navajo that could raise the workload up to a level where a single pilot can't handle it.

In a 747 or a 777 for that matter it certainly can.

[Chuck Ellsworth]

That's easy to answer. Disregarding things like the airplane dimensions, they will see very much the same thing if not "exactly" the same thing. But the issue is not what they see, it's if they're looking.

The 777 was cleared for a visual approach in perfect weather.

They were either not looking out the windshield or they did not recognize they were to low...period.

The question is " why "

[CID]

The question is " why "

Well...the preliminary investigation cites two possible distractions. During the final stages of the approach the pilot pulled back to reduce his rate of descent thinking that the A/Ts would maintain the speed. (They seem to have been in the ARMed state, not the active state). While the speed decayed, the crew were distracted by a sudden lateral deviation and a bright light that "temporarily blinded" the PF. That allegedly happened at about 500 AGL.

So it appears that the pilot thought the automation was taking care of the speed and figured it would be OK to ignore the airspeed indications and take care of other things. If all this is true then one of them should have maintained his/her gaze out the window(s) and continued the normal scan.

Another factor is that a third pilot was in a cockpit jump seat and could have contributed to a breakdown in CRM protocol. Especially if he was a senior guy.

But back to this one......