Pull up buddy pull up

[SuperchargedRS]

Evidence, well seeing the Feds control that, not sure they'll leave much when they get things wrong, just like how when a cop is in the wrong video camera are way more likely to be forgotten to be turned on, and evidence which goes the other way tends to get lost.

Now I'm not saying that's the case with the NTSB here, but your a fool if you don't think a few phone conversations didn't take place, and a private entity wouldn't even have that Rolodex

Read up on NTSB reports, when the pilot dies, and can not defend himself, it's pilots fault, like 99.9% of the time.

It's also interesting if you compare other mid airs, like private plane vs private plane, google it.

As far as government abuse of power, my god, just google it that too


It's funny, Canadians are probably the most trusting of all nations in all things "official".

[AuxBatOn]

Evidence, well seeing the Feds control that, not sure they'll leave much when they get things wrong, just like how when a cop is in the wrong video camera are way more likely to be forgotten to be turned on, and evidence which goes the other way tends to get lost.

You clearly do not know how the real world actually works. Believe it or not, most people try to live a honest life.

Now I'm not saying that's the case with the NTSB here, but your a fool if you don't think a few phone conversations didn't take place, and a private entity wouldn't even have that Rolodex

Please provide evidence.

Read up on NTSB reports, when the pilot dies, and can not defend himself, it's pilots fault, like 99.9% of the time.

Really? A very similar accident and guess what, the pilot is not mentionned in the probable cause!
http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Acci ... AR1005.pdf

Oh, and it was two small civilian aircraft

As far as government abuse of power, my god, just google it that too
It's funny, Canadians are probably the most trusting of all nations in all things "official".

How about you present you facts here, clear and concise, so we can follow you argument rather than putting the onus on your audience by making some allegations but telling us to use "google". Show us what you want us to see.

[Rockie]

A certain somebody claimed millions of people voted illegally costing him the popular vote in a recent election, and when asked for evidence supporting that claim his camp replied with "prove that it didn't happen".

Well, real life outside the delusion bubble doesn't work like that. If you make an accusation it is not the accused party's responsibility to prove the accusation is false. Perhaps you've heard how the court system works? The state investigates, gathers evidence, and if they think they can prove their case they charge the individual and then try to prove their case before an impartial judge or jury.

So SuperchargedRS, where is your evidence in this case.

[pelmet]

Please everybody....do not let this thread become the next one with politics in it. Do not respond to anything political....especially in a forum about aviation safety.

[Rockie]

Please everybody....do not let this thread become the nexr one with politics in it. Do not respond to anything political....especially in a forum about aviation safety.

I agree. Where is the evidence the NTSB altered their accident report in this case to protect the USAF?

It's a simple question, one that seeks to clarify accusations against the impartiality of the most important transportation accident investigation agency in the world. Doesn't get any more safety related than that does it Pelmet?

[pelmet]

NTSB has blamed the controller as the probable cause. However, I have highlighted an inportant statement below. Now we can discuss the controllers mistake(s) but for the pilots, we have no control over that. All we know is the information given to us. And it shows that the information may be late. We really should try to ignore who was the operator of the high speed aircraft and assume that it was just some business jet or airliner. I still think that the turn and climb is the best option.

Even though the quote below is in the report, the jet pilot was not found to be at fault..

"Further, the controller issued the instruction to turn left if the F-16 pilot did not have the Cessna in sight. The F-16 pilot responded to the controller's conditional instruction with a question ("confirm two miles?") that indicated confusion about the distance of the traffic. The F-16 pilot's attempt to visually acquire the Cessna per the controller's conditional instruction likely resulted in a slight delay in his beginning the turn. The collision likely would have been avoided had the F-16 pilot initiated the left turn, as ATC instructed, when he realized that he did not have the traffic in sight. About 7 seconds elapsed between the beginning of the controller's first conditional instruction to turn and the beginning of her subsequent conditional instruction to the F-16 pilot to turn "immediately." Analysis of the radio transmission recordings and the F-16's flight recorder data showed that, as the controller was
making the subsequent conditional instruction, the F-16 pilot began turning to the left, which pointed his aircraft toward the Cessna."

http://aviationweek.com/awinbizav/contr ... ons-report

WASHINGTON—The NTSB has determined that air traffic controllers failed to safely separate aircraft involved in two fatal 2015 midair collisions—one near Charleston, South Carolina, in July and another near San Diego in August—and that electronic safety aids, increasingly available but not used in the four aircraft involved, may have helped prevent one or both accidents.

As part of its recommendations, the NTSB is asking the FAA and contract tower providers to use the accident reports to educate controllers about “judgment errors that, if picked up early, may have prevented the accidents.”

The unusual hearing—in which three board members were not present but voted electronically and the fourth member, Robert Sumwalt, recused himself—highlighted the inherent limitations of “see-and-avoid” principles, and benefits of augmenting the legacy practice with Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast (ADS-B) In avionics, which provide the relative position of nearby aircraft and often alert the pilot to potential collisions.

Both accidents featured visual weather conditions and good visibility, with at least one of the aircraft being handled by air traffic controllers. Despite the weather, pilots are often not able to see (due to aircraft structure) or to distinguish from the background another aircraft on a collision course.

In the Charleston accident, a U.S. Air Force Lockheed F-16CM was being vectored by a Charleston approach controller on a practice instrument approach to Runway 15, while the Cessna 150, with two aboard, departed a local uncontrolled airport on a pleasure flight. The Cessna was not talking to air traffic control and was not required to do so in that location.

After the air traffic control automation issued a warning about a potential collision between the two aircraft, the controller alerted the F-16 pilot to the traffic, and then soon after issued a “conditional” instruction to the F-16 to turn left (across the path of the oncoming Cessna) if he did not see the aircraft. The F-16 responded with a question about the traffic and did not immediately begin the turn.

Eight seconds later, the controller radioed the F-16 pilot to turn left “immediately” if he did not have the traffic in sight, a command the pilot then implemented using the aircraft’s autopilot system. The input resulted in a relatively shallow 30-deg. bank and loss of altitude, putting the aircraft at the same altitude as the Cessna and intersecting its perpendicular course at a closure speed of 300 kt. The collision occurred shortly thereafter, with the F-16 attempting to pull up at the last second. Both occupants in the Cessna died when the F-16 sliced through the light aircraft, while the damaged fighter jet flew several more miles before the pilot successfully bailed out.

The NTSB said the collision could have been avoided if the F-16 pilot had turned when first asked by the controller, or later, if the pilot would have used a high-performance maneuver when told to turn “immediately.” However the meaning of the term “immediately” was different for the controller and the pilot, NTSB investigator-in-charge Dennis Diaz said. “While the use of that term goes with established guidance, using ‘expedited’ would have removed ambiguity,” he said.

Diaz said an instruction that required the F-16 to turn in front of the Cessna was the least conservative decision, because it depended on the F-16’s timely action. The best action for the controller would have been instruct the F-16 to turn before coming into close proximity with the Cessna, and in a direction not in front of its path.

[pelmet]

Please everybody....do not let this thread become the nexr one with politics in it. Do not respond to anything political....especially in a forum about aviation safety.

I agree. Where is the evidence the NTSB altered their accident report in this case to protect the USAF?

It's a simple question, one that seeks to clarify accusations against the impartiality of the most important transportation accident investigation agency in the world. Doesn't get any more safety related than that does it Pelmet?

The discussion about impartiality of the NTSB has nothing to do with me. I have no problem with your point except please leave any politics out of it as we have seen threads lately go far off topic.

That being said, I disagree that the pilot whose action to not follow initial turn instructions resulted in the accident(as admitted by the NTSB and quoted by me in the previous post) was not partially responsible for the accident. If he had done so, he most certainly would have not had the collision. I don't think this decision was due to impartiality, just due to error in judgement on the part of the NTSB.

"Probable Cause and Findings
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be: The approach controller's failure to provide an appropriate resolution to the conflict between the F-16 and the Cessna. Contributing to the accident were the inherent limitations of the seeand-avoid concept, resulting in both pilots' inability to take evasive action in time to avert the collision."

Sorry, this probable cause is not completely correct. The inability of the fighter pilot to avoid the collision was based on his decision not to follow an ATC instruction in a timely manner.

Faulty accident report probable causes(or similar type of conclusions) has happened before in my opinion and in fact we have discussed it in the past with you blindly accepting the accident investigators with statement on how they had much more training in investigating) while I provided solid arguments showing how the reports were in error as shown in this link.

viewtopic.php?f=118&t=104010&p=934134&h ... aq#p934134

[AuxBatOn]

The report also talks about despite having two radio, the other aircraft did not communicate with ATC, which contributed to the accident. Your quote mentions there was a big question mark in the F-16 pilot's mind hence the delay in response. But he eventually did and it took him right into the aircraft, with absolutely no knowledge of the other aircraft's altitude beyond what ATC told him earlier (400 ft below).

These are not causes though, they are contributing factors. The root cause if the controller's inneffective deconfliction plan. She had a couple of minutes to tell the F-16 to turn and she did not until 40 seconds before impact, which painted herself and thr F-16 pilot in a very small corner.

[pelmet]

The report also talks about despite having two radio, the other aircraft did not communicate with ATC, which contributed to the accident. Your quote mentions there was a big question mark in the F-16 pilot's mind hence the delay in response. But he eventually did and it took him right into the aircraft, with absolutely no knowledge of the other aircraft's altitude beyond what ATC told him earlier (400 ft below).

These are not causes though, they are contributing factors. The root cause if the controller's inneffective deconfliction plan. She had a couple of minutes to tell the F-16 to turn and she did not until 40 seconds before impact, which painted herself and thr F-16 pilot in a very small corner.

The Cessna was not required to be in contact with ATC and may well have been still monitoring the frequency of the airport he just departed which would be considered as good airmanship. I don't see any reason for "a big question mark" in the F-16 pilot's mind. He was told to turn amd he delayed and instead spent those 7 seconds trying to visually acquire the conflicting traffic.

I agree that this delay is a contributing factor and frequently, the NTSB reports will give a contributing factor. It amazes me that they did not, especially after having admitted that the delay in turning contributed to the accident. They called it a "slight" delay. I haven't looked at the exact definition of slight but I think that it could easily be subjective and dependent on the situation. But with a closing speed of 300 knots and quite possibly less than two miles to go(based on the fact that the two mile call has been made), seven seconds is not slight, it is significant.

The controller should not be considered as the only one at fault in my opinion and sadly, it this does contribute to conspiracy theories of why.

[complexintentions]

The defence chiming in from our military brethren is understandable, but perhaps not entirely impartial, hmmm?

I don't claim any conspiracy theories. Not interested in debating the inherent morality of government, that ship sailed long ago. I just read the facts as presented and see a very slow-reacting fighter pilot, which seems a tad suspect given that the type is usually selected on, among many things, the basis of ability to maintain situational awareness, make correct decisions, and act rapidly and decisively. Hopefully even the most ardent military supporters could agree none of this was achieved? Sure, "swiss cheese" comes into play but a pilot - particularly a military-trained one, in the far more capable aircraft, has to be the last line of defence when the holes start lining up. Pawning the blame off on ATC strikes me as somewhat cowardly.

I wonder if in hindsight they wish they had chosen something a little less on-the-nose for a callsign...

[AuxBatOn]

The defence chiming in from our military brethren is understandable, but perhaps not entirely impartial, hmmm?

I don't claim any conspiracy theories. Not interested in debating the inherent morality of government, that ship sailed long ago. I just read the facts as presented and see a very slow-reacting fighter pilot, which seems a tad suspect given that the type is usually selected on, among many things, the basis of ability to maintain situational awareness, make correct decisions, and act rapidly and decisively. Hopefully even the most ardent military supporters could agree none of this was achieved? Sure, "swiss cheese" comes into play but a pilot - particularly a military-trained one, in the far more capable aircraft, has to be the last line of defence when the holes start lining up. Pawning the blame off on ATC strikes me as somewhat cowardly.

I wonder if in hindsight they wish they had chosen something a little less on-the-nose for a callsign...

He reacted after he understood what she said. He tought tge aircraft was 20 miles away initially.

I don't defend him because he is a military pilot. I can be critical of fellow military pilots when they mess up. In this case, ther was ambiguity in what the controller said (2 miles vs what he was seeing at 20 miles on his radar). Once that was clarified, he initiated a turn as directed (immediately). If I am told to turn immediately, it only means now. It doesn't mean "plug in the AB and conduct a max performing turn". If I am on A/P, I may just initiate the turn on A/P (and I have done that in the past when told to turn immediately on an IFR clearance). There was, in reality, a 1 second delay between him getting the second call where the ambiguity about the distance is cleared up and when the turn INTO the traffic was initiated. If I was getting my first call about a traffic 2 miles away (and an ambiguous one nonetheless. If you are not visual with traffic), I'd be surprised and perhaps a bit confused too.

Yup, the other pilot did not have to contact ATC, but him not doing this is nonetheless a contributing factor.

[pelmet]

In this case, ther was ambiguity in what the controller said (2 miles vs what he was seeing at 20 miles on his radar). Once that was clarified, he initiated a turn as directed (immediately). If I am told to turn immediately, it only means now. It doesn't mean "plug in the AB and conduct a max performing turn". If I am on A/P, I may just initiate the turn on A/P (and I have done that in the past when told to turn immediately on an IFR clearance). There was, in reality, a 1 second delay between him getting the second call where the ambiguity about the distance is cleared up and when the turn INTO the traffic was initiated. If I was getting my first call about a traffic 2 miles away (and an ambiguous one nonetheless. If you are not visual with traffic), I'd be surprised and perhaps a bit confused too.

Yup, the other pilot did not have to contact ATC, but him not doing this is nonetheless a contributing factor.

(a) If you have traffic on your radar at 20 miles and a controller tells you that you have traffic at two miles, believe them. Why would you become confused? ATC is not going to give you 20 mile traffic in this situation.
(b) I agree that someone may not be expected to turn at max aggressiveness(as the controller expected in the second avoidance instruction as the first one had been ignored) but a normal turn when told to do so would have avoided the collision.
(c) It surprises me that an experienced pilot(especially a fighter guy who is supposedly the best of the best) would get confused at traffic being pointed out at two miles. I have had it happen at 1 mile at 12 o'clock on several occasions and I wasn't confused, just worried.
(d) It is very nice to say that not contacting the controller almost immediately after departure when not required to and quite possibly monitoring the frequency where there would be the highest risk of collision is a cop out to shift blame. If he hadn't gone flying that day, the collision wouldn't have happened. If he hadn't gotten his licence, the accident wouldn't have happened. If he hadn't been born......

Any other reasons for not initiating a standard rate turn for collision avoidance when told to do so aside from confusion, not on my radar, I'm not required to do a max effort turn, other guy hasn't contacted ATC yet.

[AuxBatOn]

(a) If you have traffic on your radar at 20 miles and a controller tells you that you have traffic at two miles, believe them. Why would you become confused? ATC is not going to give you 20 mile traffic in this situation.

I had ATC give me wrong information only corrected after I asked them to comfirm. I was also given traffic avoidance imstructions 20 miles away from traffic, so the confusion is not out of the realm of possibility.

(c) It surprises me that an experienced pilot(especially a fighter guy who is supposedly the best of the best) would get confused at traffic being pointed out at two miles. I have had it happen at 1 mile at 12 o'clock on several occasions and I wasn't confused, just worried.

If you read his interview with his command, he was confused and worried. You were not confused because you don't have a second system telling you something different.

(d) It is very nice to say that not contacting the controller almost immediately after departure when not required to and quite possibly monitoring the frequency where there would be the highest risk of collision is a cop out to shift blame. If he hadn't gone flying that day, the collision wouldn't have happened. If he hadn't gotten his licence, the accident wouldn't have happened. If he hadn't been born......

A safery investigation will look to pinpoint what the root cause is and, once the causal process was engaged, what could have prevented it. These are contributing factors. They are not cop outs but a way to better our practices in the interest of safety.

In this case, someone had full situational awareness available on what was going on for 5 minutes. She did not tell anyone about it until 40 seconds to impact, dumped responsibility on the F-16 pilot AND gave him a collision course turn. Had she not done anything, all would have survived. So I can say faily confidently that her deconfliction plan was the root cause. The small plane pilot not tuning ATC, F-16 pilot confused with ATC call, faster reaction time, better radar work from the F-16 guy, interrogator setup, etc are merely contributing factors after that. It is not about coping out. It's about being safer.


As an aside, fighter pilots get very little time in civilian airspace under IFR. This is a way to get From A to B and is not a priority (training wise) in general. Our IFR work consists of transiting to and from the working areas and shooting an approach once a month, as well as our annual IFR ride.

[Rockie]

Why would anybody choose to disregard ATC instructions knowingly putting themselves and others in danger of a mid-air collision? I've never yet met anybody like that in 40 years of flying and it seems unlikely this guy did either.

[pelmet]

(a) If you have traffic on your radar at 20 miles and a controller tells you that you have traffic at two miles, believe them. Why would you become confused? ATC is not going to give you 20 mile traffic in this situation.

I had ATC give me wrong information only corrected after I asked them to comfirm. I was also given traffic avoidance imstructions 20 miles away from traffic, so the confusion is not out of the realm of possibility.

(c) It surprises me that an experienced pilot(especially a fighter guy who is supposedly the best of the best) would get confused at traffic being pointed out at two miles. I have had it happen at 1 mile at 12 o'clock on several occasions and I wasn't confused, just worried.

If you read his interview with his command, he was confused and worried. You were not confused because you don't have a second system telling you something different.

(d) It is very nice to say that not contacting the controller almost immediately after departure when not required to and quite possibly monitoring the frequency where there would be the highest risk of collision is a cop out to shift blame. If he hadn't gone flying that day, the collision wouldn't have happened. If he hadn't gotten his licence, the accident wouldn't have happened. If he hadn't been born......

A safery investigation will look to pinpoint what the root cause is and, once the causal process was engaged, what could have prevented it. These are contributing factors. They are not cop outs but a way to better our practices in the interest of safety.

In this case, someone had full situational awareness available on what was going on for 5 minutes. She did not tell anyone about it until 40 seconds to impact, dumped responsibility on the F-16 pilot AND gave him a collision course turn. Had she not done anything, all would have survived. So I can say faily confidently that her deconfliction plan was the root cause. The small plane pilot not tuning ATC, F-16 pilot confused with ATC call, faster reaction time, better radar work from the F-16 guy, interrogator setup, etc are merely contributing factors after that. It is not about coping out. It's about being safer.


As an aside, fighter pilots get very little time in civilian airspace under IFR. This is a way to get From A to B and is not a priority (training wise) in general. Our IFR work consists of transiting to and from the working areas and shooting an approach once a month, as well as our annual IFR ride.

I read his interview. He said that he had never heard traffic being pointed out so close and immediately started to try to visually acquire the traffic. In fact he wasn't confused, he was ignoring the turn command to instead try to visually acquire the traffic.

Like I said, I am not trying to exonerate the controller, just not put all the blame on her while he gets away with ignoring the call to turn the first time. Amount of exoerience in the civilian ATC world is meaningless. If a controller tells you traffic is at two miles, believe them until confirmed differently.

[AuxBatOn]

Quote from the interview:

,I locked up a contact at 20 miles and approach told me there was traffic at 1,200 feet, two miles, my 12 o’clock. I just queried back and said, “confirm two miles” because I had somebody at 20 miles. They said, “Yes, if you don’t see them turn left to 180 immediately.” So, I began a left turn to heading 180 looking aggressively because two miles is really close, looking underneath my aircraft and then saw the small aircraft obviously very close and I tried to pull up and it was too late.

[RatherBeFlying]

I once had ATC descend me right in front of air carrier traffic that they had on radar. The right side pax had a pretty view of a glider in a 90° bank a hundred yards or so off. The guys in front seemed to be heads down at 5500 in class E as I didn't see any reaction from them.

[pelmet]

Perhaps time to clarify things. There has been a statement that he was confused about the distance of the other aircraft. So here is what he said in the interview on page 11 of 15 of the link you provided...

http://dms.ntsb.gov/public/59000-59499/59235/596836.pdf

Q79 (PRESIDENT): -- the two-mile call?
A79 (WITNESS): Yes, sir.
Q80 (PRESIDENT): That was the first traffic advisor message from Charleston?
A80 (WITNESS): Yes, sir. There was traffic at two miles, 1200 feet, my 12 o’clock, and that’s what my other statement said. What I’ve read in other reports, is probably what I remember for the rest of the call. I know there’s more to it.
Q81 (PRESIDENT): Do you remember what you were doing then, and where you were looking, and then as that call was made, what did you do in the cockpit as a pilot, for your attention and processes, and hands? And what were you doing?
A81 (WITNESS): They gave me a -- a two-mile call is the closest call I’ve ever received. That was a big alert for me. I immediately tried looking left and right over the HUD, anything in my way to try to find the aircraft visually. Hands-wise I was still on autopilot, still flying normal stuff, I really had nothing else taking away from my task time. I was looking aggressively, trying to find that plane.

I don't see anything mentioned about confusion in terms of what the controller said. In fact it seems that he was very aware of the distance being close as he said that it was a "big alert". I do agree that he may have let let himself become confused by worrying about some other traffic that was not a factor instead of turning although that is not mentioned in his answer.

Quote from the interview:

'I locked up a contact at 20 miles and approach told me there was traffic at 1,200 feet, two miles, my 12 o’clock. I just queried back and said, “confirm two miles” because I had somebody at 20 miles. They said, “Yes, if you don’t see them turn left to 180 immediately.” So, I began a left turn to heading 180 looking aggressively because two miles is really close, looking underneath my aircraft and then saw the small aircraft obviously very close and I tried to pull up and it was too late.'

The problem with this quote is that it doesn't reflect what the ATC recording shows. There is a missed call that he doesn't mention in the interview which is the most important one, the first call to turn. He responded to all three calls but in the interview, only mentions two of them.

You might remember a thread I started a few months ago called "Are the pilots lying to the investigators" (or perhaps just conveniently not mentioning everything). Now, it is quite possible that he happened to forget about the first call to turn, a call that he did respond to by asking for confirmation of the distance instead of reading back and following that ATC instruction in the same manner that he did with all the other ATC instructions he received on that transcript.

The bottom line is that his statement that you quoted is an innaccurate statement. And that is where the investigators have to gather the evidence and get to the bottom of the story. Which we now have, even if they came to the wrong conclusion on contributing factors.

https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/59000-59499 ... 596869.pdf (see page 89 of 114)

Anyways, from a pilot point of view...what can we learn?

If ATC says traffic is at 12 o'clock and two miles(or something similar)....

(a) Consider it valid even if your TCAS or radar shows someone at 20 miles.
(b) Request a change in heading and altitude right away as the primary avoidance tool instead of hoping to visually acquire the aircraft. Consider doing both anyways with your emergency authority as pilot in command.
(c) If ATC says to turn now if you don't have the traffic in sight, turn now if you don't have the traffic in sight and consider turning anyways without an ATC clearance as you may have a different aircraft in sight.

[pelmet]

Sorry, I meant to make a minor edit my last post and somehow accidentally made this post. The Forum has a box that says delete but when you try to, it says that I cannot delete Posts in this Forum.

[Illya Kuryakin]

1. The Cessna was not required to be on freq, and probably wasn't.
2. F16 driver WAS told about the traffic and didn't react in a timely manner.
3. Controller did not transmit "turn RIGHT F'ING NOW, and is being blamed.

But.....the F16 driver was the only person who's immediate actions could have made a difference. Sorry, I'm thinking the blame game is being poorly played here. For whatever reason.

Illya

[AuxBatOn]

Illya,

Continue focusing on the last 40 seconds while ignoring the 4 previous minutes.

As I said, the Cessna pilot was not required to be on freq however, had he been on freq, this could have been avoided. Lesson learned and perhaps a best practice would be to tune ATC for flight following even when flying VFR.

As I also said, the F-16 pilot had conflicting information and queried the controller to confirm what she said. After that was cleared up, he immediately initiated a turn.

By the time he got the first call, they were in a right spot where any delay would result in at least a near-miss, ar worst, what happenned. A simple call 3-4 minutes earlier by ATC to turn 10 deg right would have solved the whole thing without any aggressive maneuvering required. But continue thinking that the lack of agressive maneuvering was what caused the collision....

[AOW]

(a) If you have traffic on your radar at 20 miles and a controller tells you that you have traffic at two miles, believe them. Why would you become confused? ATC is not going to give you 20 mile traffic in this situation.

Because on the radio, sometimes, "TWO" and "TWO-ZERO" can sound very similar, especially if there is any interference, other sounds in your aircraft, or the controller is speaking quickly.

The problem with this quote is that it doesn't reflect what the ATC recording shows. There is a missed call that he doesn't mention in the interview which is the most important one, the first call to turn. He responded to all three calls but in the interview, only mentions two of them.

This is one of the reasons why eye witness testimony has to be taken with a grain of salt. Your memory is biased towards a particular outcome, and especially on the spot in an interview, you may not piece things together perfectly. Have you ever had one of those situations where you can't actually remember exactly how you got to where you are? You can probably make some educated guesses, and fill in the blanks pretty clearly to tell the story, but the actual details are vague.

[pelmet]

(a) If you have traffic on your radar at 20 miles and a controller tells you that you have traffic at two miles, believe them. Why would you become confused? ATC is not going to give you 20 mile traffic in this situation.

Because on the radio, sometimes, "TWO" and "TWO-ZERO" can sound very similar, especially if there is any interference, other sounds in your aircraft, or the controller is speaking quickly.

That certainly can happen. But as we can see in the interview quote that I posted above, he very clearly heard two miles and in terms of trying to sight the aircraft, took immediate action. Therefore, this is not an issue in this accident. But good point anyways as a general statement.

As I also said, the F-16 pilot had conflicting information and queried the controller to confirm what she said. After that was cleared up, he immediately initiated a turn.

I have already posted from his interview above. He was extremely concerned about traffic at two miles and searching for it.

But lets just analyze this idea about conflicting information. You are flying at 250 and told of traffic at two miles. The closure rate could easily exceed 400 knots depending on the type and direction of that traffic. ATC now tells you to turn for avoidance but you don't because you think the controller may have meant two zero miles. Why would anybody take a chance on that and disregard a turn instruction. Take the safest course of action, turn and figure it out later. It is likely that the controller is giving you a valid instruction that will avoid a collision. If the controller made a mistake and it was 20 miles away, no big deal. Does anybody think that this is good airmanship to delay the turn? Do you AuxBatOn? Would you really be defending the pilot if your family member had been on that Cessna? Not likely. I have to say that I question the thinking of a pilot who says that it is justifiable to ignore a collision avoidance instruction due to their confusion caused by a source separate from the controllers instruction.

As I said, the Cessna pilot was not required to be on freq however, had he been on freq, this could have been avoided. Lesson learned and perhaps a best practice would be to tune ATC for flight following even when flying VFR.

You have mentioned this several times so lets analyze this as well. First of all, you continue to post incorrect information about this accident. You stated "The report also talks about despite having two radios, the other aircraft did not communicate with ATC, which contributed to the accident". In fact, the final report on page 4 says that the Cessna had one radio. Please post accurate information.

Second, page 16 of the report shows where the collision happened. It was two miles south of the departure airport at about 1600 feet. The the Cessna pilot had a choice, keep monitoring the local airport frequency for other aircraft that could be in the vicinity almost certainly not talking to ATC in order to reduce the risk of a collision with them(in general, a very wise idea) or leave the airport frequency and make contact with ATC in order to reduce the risk of a collision from other aircraft that would already be getting collision avoidance instructions from ATC.

Who thinks that it is good airmanship to leave the local aircraft frequency while still very close to the airport like this? I think that in general, that would be very poor airmanship. There are always the occasional accidents where doing the wise thing was the wrong choice but in all likelyhood, if you really think about it, even if this Cessna pilot had done what is being suggested, by the time he was able to get a transmission into the controller and get a squawk code, the collision would have already happened.

http://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/Report ... l&IType=MA

Sadly, I have to admit that I do get the circling of wagons feeling in this thread.

[SuperchargedRS]

(a) If you have traffic on your radar at 20 miles and a controller tells you that you have traffic at two miles, believe them. Why would you become confused? ATC is not going to give you 20 mile traffic in this situation.

Because on the radio, sometimes, "TWO" and "TWO-ZERO" can sound very similar, especially if there is any interference, other sounds in your aircraft, or the controller is speaking quickly.

That certainly can happen. But as we can see in the interview quote that I posted above, he very clearly heard two miles and in terms of trying to sight the aircraft, took immediate action. Therefore, this is not an issue in this accident. But good point anyways as a general statement.

As I also said, the F-16 pilot had conflicting information and queried the controller to confirm what she said. After that was cleared up, he immediately initiated a turn.

I have already posted from his interview above. He was extremely concerned about traffic at two miles and searching for it.

But lets just analyze this idea about conflicting information. You are flying at 250 and told of traffic at two miles. The closure rate could easily exceed 400 knots depending on the type and direction of that traffic. ATC now tells you to turn for avoidance but you don't because you think the controller may have meant two zero miles. Why would anybody take a chance on that and disregard a turn instruction. Take the safest course of action, turn and figure it out later. It is likely that the controller is giving you a valid instruction that will avoid a collision. If the controller made a mistake and it was 20 miles away, no big deal. Does anybody think that this is good airmanship to delay. Do you AuxBatOn? Would you really be defending the pilot if your family member had been on that Cessna? Not likely. I have to say that I question the thinking of a pilot who says that it is justifiable to ignore a collision avoidance instruction due to their confusion cause by a source separate from the controllers instruction.

As I said, the Cessna pilot was not required to be on freq however, had he been on freq, this could have been avoided. Lesson learned and perhaps a best practice would be to tune ATC for flight following even when flying VFR.

You have mentioned this several times so lets analyze this as well. First of all, you continue to post incorrect information about this accident. You stated "The report also talks about despite having two radio, the other aircraft did not communicate with ATC, which contributed to the accident". In fact, the final report on page 4 says that they had one radio. Please post accurate information.

Second, page 16 of the report shows where the collision happened. It was two miles south of the departure airport at about 1600 feet. The the Cessna pilot had a choice, keep monitoring the local airport frequency for other aircraft in the vicinity in order to reduce the risk of a collision from aircaft operating in the airport area and not almost certainly not talking to ATC(in general, a very wise idea) or leave this frequency and make contact with ATC in order to reduce the risk of a collision from other aircraft that would already be getting collision avoidance instructions from ATC.

Who thinks that it is good airmanship to leave the local aircraft frequency while still very close to the airport like this. I think that in general, that would be very poor airmanship. There are always the occasional accidents where doing the wise thing was the wrong choice but in all likelyhood, if you really think about it, even if this Cessna pilot had done what is being suggested, by the time he was able to get a transmission into the controller and get a squawk code, the collision would have already happened.

http://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/Report ... l&IType=MA

Sadly, I have to admit that I do get the circling of wagons feeling in this thread.

That.





But remember this is a Canadian forum, most Canadians trust and rely on government more than their own family.

[AuxBatOn]

My appologies, I misread the Cessna had two radios.

I never said the F-16 pilot acted perfectly. In fact, I said his delayed actions contributed to the accident.

Let me put it this way and answer my question honestly.

The F-16 pilot doesn't delay his actions, collision avoided but it is still considered a near-miss, a fairly significant aviation incident. What is the cause of the near-miss?

Don't you agree that the cause that would have resulted in a near-miss should be the same that caused the collision?