Air France tailstrike

[pdw]

Ok, there is no more CYKZ, so the nearest airport-grade metar data (at least ten meters up) E of YYZ is Trenton Ontario. Archived GFA 211800-0000Z maps are enough to identify directions of circulation drawn in by trough.

Edit
post below reminds me of ‘don’t shoot messenger’

[SpyPilot]

Every time I see a post from pdw I can't help but think of Jules Winnfield.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m_mDTLphIVY

[boeingboy]

I wonder if we’ll get to see a Beluga deliver a new fuselage section to YYZ

I doubt it - but It would depend on how big the tailcone is (if it's being replaced) The skin sections and tooling containers for Transats plane were delivered in a Cargojet 767. The fuselage skin sections for the 350 would probably fit a 67 as well.

[boeingboy]

New TSB update...

On Feb 27th 2025 the TSB reported the first officer was pilot flying and was under training. Upon touchdown the captain, pilot monitoring, called a go around, while the first officer was already starting to set the thrust reversers to reverse idle. The captain repeated the go around instruction, the first officer complied and pushed the thrust levers to the TOGA detent. The aircraft became airborne again at low speed and the pitch was increased while both pilots focussed on the go around. The tail strike occurred at that point. The crew remained unaware of the tail strike, completed the go around and a second approach. The aircraft was repaired in Toronto until June 2024, then transferred to Toulouse (France) and returned to service in October 2024.

[Dry Guy]

Has anyone seen a good explanation on why Air France's safety record is so poor? Some cultural reason?

[Eric Janson]

Upon touchdown the captain, pilot monitoring, called a go around, while the first officer was already starting to set the thrust reversers to reverse idle.

Sounds a bit vague as to whether reverse had been selected or not.

The video from inside the cabin sounds like the engines were in reverse idle prior to the go-around. There's a definite sound change.

This a breach of airbus SOPs where once reverse is selected you have to stay on the ground.

[pdw]

Sounds a bit vague as to whether reverse had been selected or not.

The captain (who was the pilot monitoring) instructed “go around”; the TSB script states there the “FO had started to set thrust reversers” … the captain “repeated” the order; the FO complied and “set TOGA detent”. Sounds firm, a bit like the captain watching very closely. So now could also ask how any potential hesitation (dallying) factors in to the tail strike result, which might also depend on what/where was the trigger for aborting this landing in the first place.

[SpyPilot]

I'll bite.

Was it the wind? Was the wind the trigger?

[pdw]

No; with this info (tsb) and what the capt had stated upon go-around over the pa/ radio (passenger/atc info) .. basically says ‘used up (“occupied”) too much runway’ as the reason. As it was a ‘training” situation … that could be it as far as hearing about any other details about it.

[Dronepiper]

I wonder if the FO hesitated on the go around because he already actioned the reverse thrust. I know the procedures at some airlines dictate that you are committed to landing once you have deployed thrust reverse. I think the 737 crash in Cranbrook is the reason this policy exists.

[Eric Janson]

I wonder if the FO hesitated on the go around because he already actioned the reverse thrust. I know the procedures at some airlines dictate that you are committed to landing once you have deployed thrust reverse. I think the 737 crash in Cranbrook is the reason this policy exists.

Airbus and Boeing both state that once reverse is selected a full stop is mandatory.

There is no ambiguity in this situation.

Hopefully the final report will clarify the sequence of events.

[pdw]

With an investigation’s findings we would get a better idea how near or into an overrun situation this landing would otherwise have gone without the “pilot monitoring” ordering go-around.

“Under training” as it is referred to there in the TSB update above, is hands-on gaining the experience landing in different conditions including rollouts without reverse thrust (where early executed go-around is THE option if LDA in jeopardy).

Hopefully we’ll see … this type of goaround decision IMO would not be a fail on an actual/eventual check ride down-the-road if forced for any similar (unpredictable or unforseeable) reason.

[pdw]

Was it the wind? Was the wind the trigger?

For not having a better description … can call it a component sandwich …

[SpyPilot]

The components in my sandwich are peanut butter and strawberry/rhubarb jam. Jelly is not an option.

[pdw]

Ok, maybe not the best analagy. (We’ve had enough food commentary)

For go-around, how often does a pilot opt it or not because of MORE experience vs on account of LESS ? Let’s say an airport (or a pilot) sees an average of go-arounds performed between one and three per thousand landings, but then for some reason exceeds that number by a lot. Is there ‘benefit of the doubt’ for any reason staying in place or is a ‘pressure to avoid’ going to influence future decisiveness in some way?

[goingnowherefast]

Does any airline actually track that sort of thing? Without more context a pilot's go-around rate is largely useless.

A trainer will have more go-arounds
Someone who prefers and bids for a more challenging airport will see more go-arounds.
I'd even argue a captain who's super comfortable in the airplane would see more go-arounds since they're more likely to let a green FO try a challenging approach.
Even time of day. Afternoon is generally the windiest and most gusty time of day, so a pilot who bids for pairings with more afternoon approaches might have a higher go-around rate.

Even if an airline tracks it, go-around rate is pretty difficult to investigate. The subject pilot will start wondering what's happening and feel pressure to go-around less. Also, does a pilot's go-around rate really matter? They didn't like the approach, so tried again. Good job, who cares, end of story, moving on.

[Eric Janson]

For go-around, how often does a pilot opt it or not because of MORE experience vs on account of LESS ? Let’s say an airport (or a pilot) sees an average of go-arounds performed between one and three per thousand landings, but then for some reason exceeds that number by a lot. Is there ‘benefit of the doubt’ for any reason staying in place or is a ‘pressure to avoid’ going to influence future decisiveness in some way?

I've worked at multiple Airlines.

They've all had a "no fault" go-around policy. This means there are zero consequences to the Pilot for making a go-around.

Some wanted a report with a reason - but that was all.

"A clearance for an approach is also a clearance for a go-around" - that's from our SOP.

I have never heard anything about any go-around I have ever made.