Widow wrote:Engine failures will happen. No matter how good the maintenance is, they will happen.
The CAUSE of the failure is important to determine, obviously ... but the TSB has pointed out that the engine failure COULD have been survivable ...
Why is it a problem to believe that inadequate oversight may have played a part in the SURVIVABILITY of this accident?
TAWS or EGPWS would not have changed the outcome of this accident at all Widow. The engine quit. That brings the question of prevention, not survivability. Plane crashes are rarely survivable. Maybe SEIFR should be done away with although I would still contend that the safety record of the PT6 is pretty damn good. Unfortunately pointing the finger at TC on this one is barking up the wrong tree.
Let's say that they shut down sonic the nine days before when they found the missed inspection. The Caravan would have gone immediately to another operator after the company liquadated its assets. Then the crash would have happened for that operator.
Had TAWS been installed that would not have changed the gliding ability of the aircraft. In fact the only thing that could have helped is less weight. That might have enabled him to make the road but probably not. So Widow if you want to make a difference then bark up the right tree. You're off base here and working against the safe operators by trying to make ridiculous requirements come to fruition. Don't fly. Make sure you drive everywhere or take a boat to Europe. That is the best way for you to support your plethora of arguments against TC and aviation in general.
marktheone wrote:
Had TAWS been installed that would not have changed the gliding ability of the aircraft. In fact the only thing that could have helped is less weight. That might have enabled him to make the road but probably not. So Widow if you want to make a difference then bark up the right tree. You're off base here and working against the safe operators by trying to make ridiculous requirements come to fruition. Don't fly. Make sure you drive everywhere or take a boat to Europe. That is the best way for you to support your plethora of arguments against TC and aviation in general.
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I am not sure TAWS/GPWS would have helped either. As a matter of fact, I really would rather not have the thing screaming TERRAIN,TARRAIN,PULL UP,PULL UPand/or a blinking screen, as i got closer to the ground.
BUT I do think that a good moving map display would have helped in this situation (all other holes in the cheese aside).
The more situational awareness I can get the better I feel about flying in any machine.
The issue is not avionics. There is nothing not even a heads up display that could have helped. No power, the machine is coming down. The terrain around there is very unforgiving.
LOL, don't shoot the messenger. I'm just going by what the TSB report says. They seem to think the outcome could have been different ...
I'm no expert, as you all know. But I do take the side of the "unknowing" pax ... it is the responsibility of the overseer to ensure their safety, whether through the distribution of information, regulatory change or improved oversight.
I'll leave it to the courts to decide how to apportion the blame.
It's a contentious issue widow. I honestly don't know about this cursed goddamn business anymore. Every year it just gets stupider. Just when you think it's hit the bottom of the bowl some jackass uses the plunger and crams more in. Pardon the french.
safetywatch wrote:If the TSB is right and TAWS would have identified a safe glide path then given the US required TAWS from day one and it is not expensive, why wouldn't TC have done the same. I know some of you think TAWS wouldn't help and I can't comment.
The TAWS thing is a red herring.
And when you do the math contained in the report; they were 17nm from the airport, the 208 glides at 2:1 (under ideal conditions, which by the way, does not factor in turning in the wrong direction at the outset of the emergency as the accident pilot did). They would very likely have come up short of the field either way.
All that aside, the chances of being within gliding distance of an airport in the mountains (or over many parts of this country, for that matter) is slim.
Focusing on TAWS or the glide distance available to an airport are not relevant because neither would likely make much difference in future accidents.
marktheone wrote:So Widow if you want to make a difference then bark up the right tree. You're off base here and working against the safe operators by trying to make ridiculous requirements come to fruition. Don't fly. Make sure you drive everywhere or take a boat to Europe. That is the best way for you to support your plethora of arguments against TC and aviation in general.
Agreed. TC is not to blame every time a plane crashes.
Had the pilot been able to glide the aircraft to the Port Alberni Regional Airport, the forced landing pattern would have had to be accomplished with a ceiling as low as 800 feet agl.
I support the argument that the available avionics wouldn't have made a difference in this case. I think you'd have to be extremely skilled and lucky to navigate to the airport and then pop out at 800ft and make a glide approach to the runway. Although, I suppose it would be better to have that equipment on board than not.
I think I would be looking for a road. But what do I know. If I am driving a single engine and have an engine failure I guess I should point the nose down and get it over with. "No power, the machine is coming down"
I guess thats what the BA 777 guys were thinking eh.
What-ever.
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Last edited by 2milefinal on Thu Jan 17, 2008 4:38 pm, edited 1 time in total.
I have only ever used one type of TAWS so my opinion is based upon that. Arguing about whether or not the plane would've made it if it was equipped with TAWS is a moot point. There is no way we would ever know. However, I think a good TAWS would've given him one more useful tool. It may not have got the airplane to the airport, but it might have got into the middle of a valley where a better surface to carry out a forced could've been found. I know on the King Air I flew around in, the TAWS provided amazing situational awareness and in the event I had to glide it down blind, you can bet I would be using that screen to find my way.
Of course, if I had a choice between TAWS and a 2nd engine, that's a no brainer.
Here's what I was working with. Pretty easy to pick out Howe Sound, even zoomed out to 50 miles. I could zoom it right in to 5 miles for higher detail of the immediate area.
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Last edited by Go Guns on Thu Jan 17, 2008 4:57 pm, edited 1 time in total.
Sonicblue Airways was not providing downloaded engine parameter data for engine condition trend monitoring (ECTM) evaluation at appropriate intervals.
A small but significant quote from the report .If they are not doing what is required to satisfy the engine TBO extension. Then the aircraft is not being maintained as required by the manufacture requirements and the aircraft is not airworthy and should not have left the ground until the airworthy requirements have been satisfied.
The missing trends will let P&W off the hook as the engine was not being operated as per their written instructions.
The missing trends are a significant contribution to that accident .Ask anyone who has used an engine trend for engine TBO extensions.
The out of date GPS card could be misinterpreted as corporate culture .Rather than a sign that the maintenace was not being carried out in a correct or timely manner.
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Last edited by 2R on Thu Jan 17, 2008 4:59 pm, edited 1 time in total.
Well, honestly, probably not much. The only way it would've effected anything is if perhaps there was a GPS approach into Port Alberni that wasn't on his old data base and he just happened to be near the track. I think there is a GPS approach into Port Alberni but I'm not sure how old it is or which direction it comes in from so I can't comment on that. Again, it's a pretty out-there argument. There was no legal requirement for Sonicblue to update the database either.
TAWS uses GPS data though so if it becomes law to have TAWS, you'll likely be legally required to update the database.
In the event that an emergency landing is required, Section 723.22 of the CASS requires that an aircraft used in SEIFR operations have an electronic means of rapidly determining the location of the nearest airport and navigating to it. For an operator to be assured that such equipment is able to perform accurately, it must not only be functioning (serviceable), but the data it is using to calculate the exact whereabouts of the "nearest suitable airfield" must be accurate. This requirement can only be met through the use of the most current databases available. The accident aircraft was equipped with an approved King KLN 89B global positioning system (GPS) navigation system, but the system had an expired aviation database that was more than seven years out of date.
A button on the King KLN 89B GPS allows the pilot to display the range and bearing to the nearest airports; with the exception of the age of the database, this equipment meets the requirements of Section 723.22 of the CASS. Although not currently required by regulation, more modern GPS equipment is available that provides moving map displays, obstacle information, as well as the positions of towns, cities, roads, or other geographical features that could potentially be used to identify emergency landing sites if there are no airports within gliding range.
I'm forced to retract my previous statement.
There was no legal requirement for Sonicblue to update the database either.
Avcanada forced me to learn something, how bout that?
What ever happened to that mod that was being offered for Caravans, where someone had basically bolted two turbines together, but they shared the drive to the prop?
Would that have mattered/helped in this case? I'm not a PT6 expert, but considering the report states that the engine of the accident aircraft seized in the compressor section, this means that a prop attached to a common gearbox between two engines would not be affected, correct?
Anyone know if those engines ever made it into service?
I think you would have a hard time getting that IFR certified because the two engines still connect to one gearbox to keep the airplane airborne. This setup would have no reliability data to go by in order to meet the CARs requirement.
Widow, new GPS card would have made zero difference. Pt. Alberni been's there forever, certainly more than 7 years. Really the only thing that changes with GPS cards are the occasional intersection or special use airspace.
TAWS is a bit of a stretch to. No way to tell for sure but I would have to say it is unlikely that it could have mitigated the severity of the accident. It all comes back to having a second engine. No matter what the numbers say it is EXTREMELY rare for a PT6 to quit. That being said it is unheard for 2 to quit in flight. Fuel starvation aside of course. 2 engines and he certainly would have made it somewhere, even at max weight on a summer day.
I've been converted. I have to agree that no SEIFR with pax is the way to go. Only because the flying public is not aware of the potential risk. Even though that risk is low.
The rules for SEIFR commercial operations apply to all aircraft so if the PT6 reliability is not good enough for the C208 that means it is also not good enough for other aircraft types that use it, such as the PC12.
I believe special training is required to use a GPS (RNAV) approach in Canada. If the pilot did not have that special training then the existence of a GPS approach at Port Alberni might not have been of any help. Even if he had been tempted to unofficially become familar with using GPS for approaches he might not have been fully familiar with the particular unit in the plane. I make this comment because GPS units are in effect computers and there are major differences between the operation methods of different makes and models. If a pilot can operate one VOR or ADF receiver he can operate other makes and models because they all have the same basic interface. This does not apply to GPS. Perhaps it is time to legislate a standard GPS interface so that pilots will not have to face this problem and operators will not have to face the heavy training costs involved with having different GPS units in their various aircraft.
The aircraft you are referring to did not fail because of the absence of any reliability data, it was as a result of the airframe Soloy chose and it's structural limitations.
The PT6 TwinPac has over thirty years of reliability data drawn from use in a multitude of helicopter applications, a far more stringent role than it's intended use by Soloy.
What people have to realize is that SEIFR is here to stay. There are more to come. A number of the VLJs are Single Engine. I am betting the VLJ does not glide much better then a 208.
They will crash. But so do twin-engine-aircraft.
With proper Maintenance, a well equipped cockpit AND GOOD TRAINING all types can be much safer.
What does it take to get this,,, MONEY and thats the kicker.
What if .....?
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Last edited by 2milefinal on Fri Jan 18, 2008 10:08 am, edited 1 time in total.
TAWS uses GPS data though so if it becomes law to have TAWS, you'll likely be legally required to update the database.
TAWS only uses the GPS for position. It doesn't care how old the GPS navigation database is. It also uses an internal terrain database (at minimum) which doesn't neccessarily need to be current however its recommended as newer databases usually contain more airport data and higher resolution terrain information.
The rules for SEIFR commercial operations apply to all aircraft so if the PT6 reliability is not good enough for the C208 that means it is also not good enough for other aircraft types that use it, such as the PC12.
Only the PC12 and Cessna 208 meet the criteria to date for SEIFR in Canada.
