yycflyguy wrote:Perhaps you could elaborate on 15.1 (a) and (c) that provides the exceptions to the human rights that you vigourously defend and why this has not even been definitively ruled on? How do you expect an outright victory from a Tribunal/LCC when we all know this will end up before the SCC? Mitigating. With government legislation won't the abolishment contain a date from which all complainants will either be re-instated or case thrown out?
As I stated here recently, I am doing my best to make my posts factual and not argumentative. Hence a short reply to your most recent post.
I have no comment on the government's involvement in the labour relations field, as that is irrelevant to the issue before us in these proceedings.
Regarding BFOR, the July decision is currently under judicial review on at least ten points of law, the most significant being that the Tribunal member who rendered the decision stated that the "purpose" of Air Canada's mandatory retirement policy was "melding the needs of the company with the collective rights and needs of the pilots…" Not only is this purpose not the purpose that the employer pleaded before the Tribunal, but it is expressly prohibited as a justification for a BFOR defence by the SCC. (See the other posts here for the references to the case law). Compare that purpose to to the SCC requirements for the purpose, namely, "a
work-related purpose rationally connected to the
performance of the job."
Also compare it to the reasons provided in the August Tribunal decision on BFOR (Thwaites).
The point here is that if you don't meet the SCC requirements at the Step 1 test, you don't get to evaluate the impact on the employer at Step 3, including all of the cost implications, such as those you mention.
On a much more basic level, assuming that a Tribunal did address its mind to the ICAO purpose of the BFOR pleaded by Air Canada instead of incorrectly finding that the "legitimate purpose" of mandatory retirement provision was based on a collective agreement purpose, it is difficult to see how a Tribunal could find that ICAO restrictions that affect only pilots-in-command could form the basis of a BFOR for First Officers and Relief Pilots, who have no ICAO restrictions based on age. If it affects only pilots-in-command, what justification is there for terminating everyone's employment?
So, that will play out in the Federal Court, as you say. But one thing that you should recognize is that once a decision is rendered by the Federal Court, it is law, unless and until it is overturned by the Court. So if the Federal Court disallows the BFOR defence in Vilven-Kelly, as the Tribunal did in Thwaites, the case does not have to get to the SCC before pilots are reinstated.
15(1)(a), BFOR, and 15(1)(c), normal age of retirement and the constitutionality thereof are still before the courts. The constitutionality issue is before the Federal Court of Appeal, the last stop before the SCC, with the hearing to take place on November 22nd. Decision expected by late February.
Because the BFOR issue has resulted in two polar opposite decisions by the Tribunal, the issue, in law, is termed a "live issue." But BFOR has been disallowed for all 70 Thwaites complainants, so if the Charter decision is upheld by the Federal Court of Appeal, there will be no impediment to many of those pilots being reinstated.
We are claiming no outright victory. What we are saying is that the BFOR issue was correctly decided by the Thwaites decision, and the repeal of the mandatory retirement exemption, that will come into effect by next December, will spell the end of the age 60 limit at Air Canada.
The repeal legislation is separate from the litigation. The repeal is prospective, while the litigation is retrospective. The repeal will apply to all pilots whose scheduled termination of employment occurs after the coming into force of the repeal next December. All others will be forced to deal with their complaints through the Tribunal process, including those whose employment has yet to be terminated before December, 2012.