Shutting an engine down to stay airborne can work, but that’s a Hail Mary attempt. If you ever get yourself into that position, you’re probably also praying out loud. I heard a story of a Dash 8crew in northern Quebec saving the day by shutting one engine down.
The news story was posted to a thread on this site. A headwind southbound increased until the crew realized ‘won’t make it’ to destination past the point of no return between two airports. A midflight turnaround decision gave enough groundspeed range to reach the other (edit … a different one than departure) airport with the one engine shut down to maximize slowflight economy for a huge tailwind range advantage.
That option worked as the extended time airborne on the one engine was high ground speed.
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Last edited by pdw on Wed Nov 17, 2021 6:17 pm, edited 2 times in total.
If you were just hauling MT drums Southbound, and the upper winds were favourable, you could always go high and shut off the bleeds to conserve fuel burn...but it gets mighty cold!
I thought there was a story about a Dash 8 missing in Cape Dorsett maybe, and then returning to somewhere in Nunavik like Kuujuak or Kangiksualujuak (spelling may be an issue here) and missing there and being on fumes and shutting one down to get somewhere else. I figured it was Air Inuit, but but maybe Canadian North? It's hard to find old incident reports if nobody was hurt and nothing got bent.
co-joe wrote: ↑Mon Nov 15, 2021 3:46 pm
It's hard to find old incident reports if nobody was hurt and nothing got bent.
Nobody hurt, nothing bent, will be a lot less pressure to force all the details to light in some instances. That news narrative was fairly simple though too. You are correct that they were going from A to B and diverted to C (an optimal airport to divert to with that unexpected vector).
The first officer then sat down in the cockpit and asked the captain if he would like to commence the Before Start checks. The captain declined and started the engines at 1743.
The attitudes of save 25 secs here and there need to change.
BTD wrote: ↑Thu Nov 24, 2022 12:24 pm
I can’t believe this bs still goes on.
The first officer then sat down in the cockpit and asked the captain if he would like to commence the Before Start checks. The captain declined and started the engines at 1743.
The attitudes of save 25 secs here and there need to change.
Read on. It was/is standard practice at Air Tindi. I find it hard to believe that management did not know that the captains were not using checklists. The cp’s all flew/have flown the twin at some point.
BTD wrote: ↑Thu Nov 24, 2022 12:24 pm
I can’t believe this bs still goes on.
The first officer then sat down in the cockpit and asked the captain if he would like to commence the Before Start checks. The captain declined and started the engines at 1743.
The attitudes of save 25 secs here and there need to change.
Read on. It was/is standard practice at Air Tindi. I find it hard to believe that management did not know that the captains were not using checklists. The cp’s all flew/have flown the twin at some point.
And…..?
The practice of skipping checklists whether done only by the individual or if it is company culture is irrelevant to my argument. This attitude needs to go away.
If the other pilot is anticipating the checklist and you skip it, he is that much further removed from the loop.
Now if the company decides to make it a “flow” that is something different. In that case it is formalized and everyone does it the same way perhaps backed up by a checklist perhaps not depending on how it is developed.
If the sop, fcom, FOM, com or whatever says it is a read and do or challenge and response do it that way, or have it changed at the top. Nobody else needs to die to know that the half baked way of doing it eventually catches up to a sizeable portion of the population.
BTD wrote: ↑Thu Nov 24, 2022 12:24 pm
I can’t believe this bs still goes on.
The attitudes of save 25 secs here and there need to change.
Read on. It was/is standard practice at Air Tindi. I find it hard to believe that management did not know that the captains were not using checklists. The cp’s all flew/have flown the twin at some point.
And…..?
The practice of skipping checklists whether done only by the individual or if it is company culture is irrelevant to my argument. This attitude needs to go away.
If the other pilot is anticipating the checklist and you skip it, he is that much further removed from the loop.
Now if the company decides to make it a “flow” that is something different. In that case it is formalized and everyone does it the same way perhaps backed up by a checklist perhaps not depending on how it is developed.
If the sop, fcom, FOM, com or whatever says it is a read and do or challenge and response do it that way, or have it changed at the top. Nobody else needs to die to know that the half baked way of doing it eventually catches up to a sizeable portion of the population.
I’m agreeing with you. Just pointing out that it is company culture. That’s all.
Read on. It was/is standard practice at Air Tindi. I find it hard to believe that management did not know that the captains were not using checklists. The cp’s all flew/have flown the twin at some point.
And…..?
The practice of skipping checklists whether done only by the individual or if it is company culture is irrelevant to my argument. This attitude needs to go away.
If the other pilot is anticipating the checklist and you skip it, he is that much further removed from the loop.
Now if the company decides to make it a “flow” that is something different. In that case it is formalized and everyone does it the same way perhaps backed up by a checklist perhaps not depending on how it is developed.
If the sop, fcom, FOM, com or whatever says it is a read and do or challenge and response do it that way, or have it changed at the top. Nobody else needs to die to know that the half baked way of doing it eventually catches up to a sizeable portion of the population.
I’m agreeing with you. Just pointing out that it is company culture. That’s all.
I flew with a captain on the Twin Otter who didn't like the checklist. Typically, the copilot was in the back for the engine start and would get up into the cockpit while the aircraft was being taxied. Then that particular captain would do a flow(or would have already done the flow) and recite every challenge and response checklist item like an auctioneer in about an eight second time period after the copilot put on the headset.
I would simply do the checklist items myself, making sure to focus on the important items. That always included checking the fuel guages. Bad move by both pilots to not always check that item regardless of how the checklist was used.
What kind of captain doesn't read the fuel receipt combined with not bothering to look at the fuel guages? He assumed the receipt was for that flight but even if it was.......how can he confirm that the proper amount of fuel was uplifted? Sometimes a mistake is made in quantity. You have to make sure.
One should check their fuel quantity again soon after takeoff(I suggest as part of a flow/procedure at top of climb) to see if there is a leak. Then you are still close to the departure airport if a problem is discovered rather than potentially discovering a fuel issue at a significant range/time position from an airport. It does take a few seconds time from the time some prefer to spend gossiping.
I started a thread called A Top of Climb Check a couple of years ago suggesting a tailored flow for your type. Several posters took issue with it resulting in the thread being deleted. This flight is a good example of how one can save the day.
It's common in 703/704 for the captain to do the before starts and start the engines while the FO is in the back briefing/cabin check. But what's also common is that nothing progresses until the FO is back in the cockpit and after start checklist completed.
pelmet wrote: ↑Fri Nov 25, 2022 6:02 am
I started a thread called A Top of Climb Check a couple of years ago suggesting a tailored flow for your type. Several posters took issue with it resulting in the thread being deleted. This flight is a good example of how one can save the day.
On the contrary, this accident is a good example as to why extra checks are useless if you don't have the discipline to follow the ones you have. The company already had such a procedure in place to check the fuel at the beginning of cruise. But if you don't have the checklist discipline to perform the checks when necessary, then piling on extra checks won't help. Does that surprise anyone?
To sum up, most of the checks for DHC-6 operations do not necessarily require reference to the checklist. Further, of the 3 checks that include checking the fuel quantity (Before start, Taxi, and Cruise), only the Taxi checks require a full verbal challenge and response using the checklist.
There was one checklist where the pic did a flow (before start), one checklist where a verbal challenge and response was supposed to be used (taxi) and then one in the air that could be done by one crew member (cruise). And they missed them all....
So more checks is the answer? Please...
---------- ADS -----------
As an AvCanada discussion grows longer:
-the probability of 'entitlement' being mentioned, approaches 1
-one will be accused of using bad airmanship
Shutting an engine down to stay airborne can work, but that’s a Hail Mary attempt. If you ever get yourself into that position, you’re probably also praying out loud. I heard a story of a Dash 8crew in northern Quebec saving the day by shutting one engine down.
The news story was posted to a thread on this site. A headwind southbound increased until the crew realized ‘won’t make it’ to destination past the point of no return between two airports. A midflight turnaround decision gave enough groundspeed range to reach the other (edit … a different one than departure) airport with the one engine shut down to maximize slowflight economy for a huge tailwind range advantage.
That option worked as the extended time airborne on the one engine was high ground speed.
WardAir used to shut down the centre engine on the 727 going eastbound on log haul flights. Until TC started asking why that engine had less hours on it the the other 2.
pelmet wrote: ↑Fri Nov 25, 2022 6:02 am
I started a thread called A Top of Climb Check a couple of years ago suggesting a tailored flow for your type. Several posters took issue with it resulting in the thread being deleted. This flight is a good example of how one can save the day.
On the contrary, this accident is a good example as to why extra checks are useless if you don't have the discipline to follow the ones you have. The company already had such a procedure in place to check the fuel at the beginning of cruise. But if you don't have the checklist discipline to perform the checks when necessary, then piling on extra checks won't help. Does that surprise anyone?
To sum up, most of the checks for DHC-6 operations do not necessarily require reference to the checklist. Further, of the 3 checks that include checking the fuel quantity (Before start, Taxi, and Cruise), only the Taxi checks require a full verbal challenge and response using the checklist.
There was one checklist where the pic did a flow (before start), one checklist where a verbal challenge and response was supposed to be used (taxi) and then one in the air that could be done by one crew member (cruise). And they missed them all....
So more checks is the answer? Please...
This accident sounds a lot like Keewatin at Gillam a few years ago. They just started with more fuel and bounced the plane onto the runway.
The Captain needs to held more accountable on a King Air because the FO can't see the gauges easily which isn't the case in double otter.
pelmet wrote: ↑Fri Nov 25, 2022 6:02 am
I started a thread called A Top of Climb Check a couple of years ago suggesting a tailored flow for your type. Several posters took issue with it resulting in the thread being deleted. This flight is a good example of how one can save the day.
On the contrary, this accident is a good example as to why extra checks are useless if you don't have the discipline to follow the ones you have. The company already had such a procedure in place to check the fuel at the beginning of cruise. But if you don't have the checklist discipline to perform the checks when necessary, then piling on extra checks won't help. Does that surprise anyone?
So more checks is the answer? Please...
You might notice that I mentioned how a fuel leak could be found doing the check that I recommend. And guess what, I did discover a fuel leak one time(on a Citabria). You are welcome to stick to the belief that a quick check of items at top of climb is piling things on and won't help but it would have helped here. The reality, is that there are quite a few items that can be selected that are not on the regular checklist such as ice protection, radio selection, lights, fuel configuration, weather radar management, MEL items, etc. Most of these items have the potential to lead to some sort of an incident.
pelmet wrote: ↑Fri Nov 25, 2022 6:02 am
I started a thread called A Top of Climb Check a couple of years ago suggesting a tailored flow for your type. Several posters took issue with it resulting in the thread being deleted. This flight is a good example of how one can save the day.
On the contrary, this accident is a good example as to why extra checks are useless if you don't have the discipline to follow the ones you have. The company already had such a procedure in place to check the fuel at the beginning of cruise. But if you don't have the checklist discipline to perform the checks when necessary, then piling on extra checks won't help. Does that surprise anyone?
So more checks is the answer? Please...
You might notice that I mentioned how a fuel leak could be found doing the check that I recommend. And guess what, I did discover a fuel leak one time(on a Citabria). You are welcome to stick to the belief that a quick check of items at top of climb is piling things on and won't help but it would have helped here. The reality, is that there are quite a few items that can be selected that are not on the regular checklist such as ice protection, radio selection, lights, fuel configuration, weather radar management, MEL items, etc. Most of these items have the potential to lead to some sort of an incident.
You're missing the point. The check would be useful, they already should have done it according to their SOPs. The check you are suggesting *was* already mandatory, yet they didn't do it. Piling on another check would not have helped this situation. It demonstrates that just throwing more mandatory checks to a crew does not work when they need it most.
If you already need to check an item *3* times, which this crew didn't do, do you honestly believe requiring the same check a 4th time would have made any difference?
---------- ADS -----------
As an AvCanada discussion grows longer:
-the probability of 'entitlement' being mentioned, approaches 1
-one will be accused of using bad airmanship
We could all carry on about Checklists, SOPs, MELs and bad culture within the company. What ever happened to good airmanship. Obviously, these guys sat up there telling jokes, complaining about the company, or just staring out the window. They certainly weren’t scanning the gauges on a regular basis. It’s not like an airplane has never vented out fuel. I don’t know about the rest of you but a check ALL gauges on a regular basis and I don’t need a checklist to tell me to do it. This is just bad airmanship. These guys may want to consider a new job that doesn’t include concentration.
godsrcrazy wrote: ↑Fri Nov 25, 2022 12:53 pm
We could all carry on about Checklists, SOPs, MELs and bad culture within the company. What ever happened to good airmanship. Obviously, these guys sat up there telling jokes, complaining about the company, or just staring out the window. They certainly weren’t scanning the gauges on a regular basis. It’s not like an airplane has never vented out fuel. I don’t know about the rest of you but a check ALL gauges on a regular basis and I don’t need a checklist to tell me to do it. This is just bad airmanship. These guys may want to consider a new job that doesn’t include concentration.
On the contrary, this accident is a good example as to why extra checks are useless if you don't have the discipline to follow the ones you have. The company already had such a procedure in place to check the fuel at the beginning of cruise. But if you don't have the checklist discipline to perform the checks when necessary, then piling on extra checks won't help. Does that surprise anyone?
So more checks is the answer? Please...
You might notice that I mentioned how a fuel leak could be found doing the check that I recommend. And guess what, I did discover a fuel leak one time(on a Citabria). You are welcome to stick to the belief that a quick check of items at top of climb is piling things on and won't help but it would have helped here. The reality, is that there are quite a few items that can be selected that are not on the regular checklist such as ice protection, radio selection, lights, fuel configuration, weather radar management, MEL items, etc. Most of these items have the potential to lead to some sort of an incident.
You're missing the point. The check would be useful, they already should have done it according to their SOPs. The check you are suggesting *was* already mandatory, yet they didn't do it. Piling on another check would not have helped this situation. It demonstrates that just throwing more mandatory checks to a crew does not work when they need it most.
If you already need to check an item *3* times, which this crew didn't do, do you honestly believe requiring the same check a 4th time would have made any difference?
My suggestion applies to all flights, regardless of whether it was a mandatory procedure for this crew. Many pilots do not have it as a requirement.
This accident just drives home the potential consequences.
Therefore, if your SOP’s already require this kind of a check, follow the SOP. If not, create your own procedure for top of climb.
godsrcrazy wrote: ↑Fri Nov 25, 2022 12:53 pm
We could all carry on about Checklists, SOPs, MELs and bad culture within the company. What ever happened to good airmanship. Obviously, these guys sat up there telling jokes, complaining about the company, or just staring out the window. They certainly weren’t scanning the gauges on a regular basis. It’s not like an airplane has never vented out fuel. I don’t know about the rest of you but a check ALL gauges on a regular basis and I don’t need a checklist to tell me to do it. This is just bad airmanship. These guys may want to consider a new job that doesn’t include concentration.
Well said and I could not agree more. What ever happened to good airmanship and common sense I might add. Blaming this on management or company culture is absolutely ridiculous. Who the F*** hops in an airplane fires up and takes off without even the thinking of fuel quantity, fuel burn, VFR reserves, etc. I believe they only became aware of their predicament once the fuel light came on. Yep time for a new career x2.
