Air France sues over crash

[xsbank]

What you are all missing is that aircraft are still crashing/taking off on the wrong runways/landing long/just generally flying into the ground. Not that often in airline ops, but occasionally it still happens. Yes, get some more dual. But what about the passengers? If you just dug a large ditch and filled it with gravel, pilots not as perfect as those who post here might still screw up but maybe their passengers would survive? Then send them for more dual. Why so much resistance to the safety devices? Didn't I read on another posting on motorcycles, where the same posters on here are exhorting us about how important it was to wear all the safety gear? Has anyone been involved in a car crash recently and avoided injury because of the air bags, the guard rails, the collapsing steering columns?

What if a 340 touches down perfectly, at the perfect weight, at the perfect speed, in the perfect weather, on the centreline and the anti-skid fails and blows all the tires? Wouldn't we all feel warm and fuzzy about the clever over-run zone that Toronna just installed on that runway? Incidentally, and finally meeting the certification rules its always supposed to meet?

Why are you all acting so weird?

[scrambled_legs]

I think we all prefer safety mechanisms in place but its the way things are being done that frustrates us. The airline that landed on 1/3 of the runway available rather then going around is suing the airport for not providing them with a stopping mechanism!!! Doesn't that sound ironic or moronic to you?

If suing is an acceptable way of getting things done then why don't the passengers sue airbus for not having air bags (seeing as you brought it up). Surely the device is readily available and would ensure safer operations in future incidents like these. Why not sue Airbus for not having fire supression on board. Surely the technology is there to allow it. Why not sue Air France for not having protocol in place ensuring that they don't try and land airplanes in the middle of thunderstorms after having floated down 2/3's of the runway. Only the last one seems to make any sense to me.

If runway overrun strips are an affordable, effective, safety measure then it should be up to TC to mandate that it be required at all airports being used by airliners. If they don't mandate it as a safety requirement, same as obstacle clearance, runway lighting, obstacle lighting, runway quality etc. Then it should not be something that a foreigner can sue for after continuing on an asinine approach.

[Four1oh]

So Four1oh.....at what point would you end the runway, and create an over run area? Would you have a three hundred foot over run on a 10,000 foot runway? Then what length of over run area would you suggest for an 8,000 foot runway? Longer. It'd have to be, wouldn't it? Five hundred feet enough? Can you see where I'm going here? At what point do you consider enough, enough? Never? Or after the runways are all 15,000 feet long? Why not just knock down all the buildings,and pave an area, say, three miles by three miles, stick a wind sock in the middle and say..."Have at 'er..." Or would we still need an over run area for all these bloody poor pilots, who just don't seem to be able to make good decisions? Well? Get some dual!

Thanks for completely missing the point, man. Are you not aware that there may be a lot of reasons why an airport can't have a runway longer than it has? That a stopway or clearway might be the only option to extend the safety of that runway? Do you want to go back to the days of a wall of trees off the threshold of the runway? If a runway's safety could be enhanced, why wouldn't you want that? If an airport advertises to be a certain standard, shouldn't it be held to that standard?

[scrambled_legs]

Four1oh, it is TC that ensures obstacle clearance before certifying an airport. If the runway overrun area is below standard then TC should have mandated the airport to improve it or lose their certification. If it's a clear breach of safety, then the blame lies with our safety regulator not the Airport that's certified as having the correct obstacle clearances, lighting, runway weight bearing, wingtip clearance, Runway Surface Condition reporting etc. TC is at fault not the GTAA and if we're all in agreement that this needs to change, it is TC who is responsible for affecting the change nation wide, not each individual airport authority.

[adf]

Rah rah rah SMS; it should solve all the worlds problems!!!
If the inadequate runway environment at Pearson is at fault for the accident then the mature Air France SMS should have nailed it before the accident. That being said, AF should obviously have immediately ceased use of this inadequate runway that is so high on classic risk assessment scale. Has this occurred?
Next problem- Canadian soldiers falling to their deaths into Afghan wells.

[Widow]

Before this accident, Air France recognized the potential for overrun accidents in its operation and took measures to prevent such an occurrence. However, despite its targeted efforts, the overrun accident in Toronto essentially fits the pattern of the accident these programs and training procedures were aimed at preventing.

As early as 1989, the FAA established airport design criteria that included a requirement for a RSA length of 300 m (1000 feet). By 1999, in recognition of the enhanced safety of a longer RESA, ICAO recommended that a RESA should extend at least 240 m beyond the end of the runway strip. Had a RESA been designed and published for Runway 24L in accordance with the ICAO recommended practice, an obstacle-free overrun area, free of hazardous ruts, depressions, and other surface variations, would have extended to a distance approximately 75 m beyond Convair Drive.

As stated in Section 1.10.11, alternative solutions do exist for runways that cannot meet the RESA standard or where the area beyond the RESA does not meet the recent ICAO recommended practice of a 240 m overrun area beyond the 60 m runway strip. The EMAS technology is designed to stop an aircraft where it is not possible to construct a 300 m (ICAO 60 m + 240 m) or FAA 300 m overrun. This technology has demonstrated that it provides an alternative for runways where natural obstacles, such as bodies of water or sharp drop-offs, as in the case of Runway 24L, make the construction of a standard safety area impracticable. Had Runway 24L been designed with a RESA built to ICAO recommended practice, the FAA standard, or the FAA alternate means of compliance, the damage to the aircraft and injuries to the passengers may have been reduced.

What could have been an incident turned into an accident.

SMS can only work if the regulator works too.

[Cat Driver]

Next problem- Canadian soldiers falling to their deaths into Afghan wells.

That is beyond out of line and should be removed.

[xsbank]

Now at least there is some logic being espoused - at least it sounds like some are finally agreeing with me(!).

[CD]

I wouldn't necessarily quote the FAA "standard" ... considering that there are US airports that don't seem to meet it either:

[55+]

TP312 Aerodrome Standards and Recommended Practices indicate RESA is a recommendation not a "standard" on a code 3 & 4 runway. ICAO Annex 14 - Aerodrome Standards indicates RESA is a "standard" for a code 3 & 4 runway. Canada is a signatory to ICAO requirements BUT all countries do file "Differences" with the ICAO standards citing an equivalent level of safety for their own standards.
Air France is well aware of the differences yet did accept Canada's standards by using LBPIA as I am sure will be made plain to their lawyers. To date, AF still uses LBPIA so they are still accepting Canada's "differences" with ICAO conventions. As for that A340 touching down 4000ft beyond the thld at a higher than calculated approach speed..........................................

[xsbank]

I don't think anyone is disputing that Air France pooched that landing, what is contentious is that accidents continue to happen and Toronna is guilty of 'rationalizing' the likelihood of more happening at their god-forsaken airport and simply ignoring the improvements to the operational side in favour of gold-plated terminals (sounds like a car audio discussion) and $10 Big Macs.

[GilletteNorth]

Had Runway 24L been designed with a RESA built to ICAO recommended practice, the FAA standard, or the FAA alternate means of compliance, the damage to the aircraft and injuries to the passengers may have been reduced

May have been, but not for certain.
The 'damage' would have been reduced if they had avoided landing in a thunderstorm, had made a much better approach, had done a missed approach, had touched down alot closer to the numbers than 2/3 of the way down the runway, had deployed reverse thrusters faster. There's far more 'hads' than 'may have beens' to say the lack of an overrun was an exceptional reason for the aircraft being destroyed.

Next problem- Canadian soldiers falling to their deaths into Afghan wells.

That is beyond out of line and should be removed.

Thought the same thing, where'd that comment come from?

ignoring the improvements to the operational side in favour of gold-plated terminals

You mean like this one at Wellington airport in New Zealand?

[ACA_272]

If Air France wins this one, it wont be long till Southwest Airlines goes after Midway Airport.

[FamilyGuy]

Why doesn't Toronto just build a new super duper airport out to the North where there's lots of land for runways and run-offs etc....kinda like CYMX...oh wait.................

How bout arrester wires on all runways? Seems to work for the Military. Air France 040 call the ball......oh wait, the French don't do wars.........

[Four1oh]

and the IQ of this thread continues to drop.

[Widow]

Part of TSB report into Air France crash watered down, documents show

Jack Branswell and Phil Couvrette , Canwest News Service
Published: Sunday, July 13, 2008

OTTAWA -- The Transportation Safety Board's final report on the Air France crash in Toronto three years ago watered down how the lack of having an extended runway impacted both passenger injuries and damage to the plane, according to documents obtained by Canwest News Service.

Transport Canada is still grappling with whether to require 300-metre Runway End Safe Areas (RESA) as a safety measure - it was a key recommendation of the TSB's report into the crash. The lack of these buffers continues to be an issue at some airports in the country, including some of the biggest like Toronto and Vancouver.

How much of a safety issue is it? Since the Air France crash in August 2005, at least 10 other large aircraft have gone off runways in bad weather around the world.

On the Air France crash, an early version of the TSB's report, shown in a document called "Representations from Transport Canada" noted that if Runway 24L at Pearson International Airport had a safety area at the end of it "the damage to the aircraft and injuries to the passengers would certainly have been reduced."

When the report was published last December that section was changed to read: "the damage to the aircraft and injuries to the passengers may have been reduced."

The document called the earlier version "subjective opinion that makes a few assumptions."

It said an RESA can reduce injuries and plane damage but it also said "the same improvements could result in a longer stopping distance due to reduction in energy transference during deceleration."

But the representation also noted that the earlier statement was accurate, that the plane travelled about 300 metres before stopping, but not before it went through ditches, fences and into a steep ravine and that the injuries and the plane damage "was incurred due to these."

However, at the end of that section of the representation, the document notes that the report was amended but doesn't state why.

Six months after the TSB report was released, Air France announced it was suing the Greater Toronto Airport Authority and NavCanada, which oversees Canadian airports, for "failing to provide a safe environment for the conduct of civil air operations," it said in its statement of claim filed in Ontario Superior Court. There is also a passengers' class-action lawsuit against the airport, Air France, the control tower staff, Airbus and Goodrich, which made the plane's escape chutes.

All 309 passengers and crew survived the accident but 33 people were taken to the hospital, including 12 who were treated for serious injuries.

Requiring RESAs - 300-metre buffer zones on Code 4 runways, which are used for larger planes - was one of several TSB recommendations out of the Air France crash.

In a memorandum dated a little more than a month after the TSB delivered its recommendations on the crash landing, the Standards Branch of Transport Canada noted that "current airport certification standards are under review with the participation of industry experts."

That position hasn't changed from January of this year, when the memo was written.

"We are still reviewing regulations for runway length and still consulting with industry to ensure the safety of Canadians and passengers from abroad," said Jean Riverin, a spokesman for Transport Canada.

"At the time it would be inappropriate (to talk about) the details of the proposed amendments because we're still in the phase of consultation."

The court cases have appeared to turn the safety issue into a hot political potato.

Trish Krale, a spokeswoman for the Toronto airport authority, said "unfortunately I can't say too much about it (RESAs) because of ongoing litigation. All I can say is that if Transport Canada makes a change to the regulations that we will comply and that at the moment we comply with all current regulations."

Vancouver also doesn't have RESAs because they aren't required, said Brett Patterson, a spokesman for the Vancouver Airport Authority.

Montreal recently refurbished its airport and runways and it brought them up to the most recent standards of International Civil Aviation Organization, including adding RESAs.

The RESAs don't necessarily have to be paved or cemented runways. For example, Edmonton has fields that would simply stop a plane. Some U.S. airports use the Engineering Materials Arresting System, which is material that crushes under the plane's weight and slows its momentum.

Meanwhile, Riverin said that Transport Canada is reviewing studies from ICAO and American FAA on runway design standards and RESAs "and this review has resulted in a recommendation to amend the Canadian regulations and standards," but the department will consult with the aviation industry before finalizing changes.

Fact Box:

Canada has 102 Code 4 runways
89 are at certified airports
3 at military airports
9 at registered aerodromes
1 at an airport which is closed

http://www.canada.com:80/topics/news/na ... eada4220e0

[Guido]

How much of a safety issue is it? Since the Air France crash in August 2005, at least 10 other large aircraft have gone off runways in bad weather around the world.

My goodness! That's 3.3 per year for the whole entire world. The monetary aspect is immaterial, I wonder more about how many people have been seriously injured in these 10 crashes...

[EI-EIO]

Let's just reduce the official landing distance of 24L by 1,000ft and call the rest a stopway. Easypeasy

[liketofly]

Lawsuits of this nature rarely go to trial. I think Air France is trying to recover the costs they incurred as a result of the accident.

I believe that the likeliest scenario is that the GTAA will determine the cost of formulating a defense and offer Air France a settlement that is close to or less than the amount of a defense.

And EI-EIO hit the nail right on the head, RESAs can be created for nearly all runways by reducing the LDA. Runway 24L is 9,000' long (not sure what the LDA is), a 90m RESA (plus 60m for the new runway strip) required by ICAO would mean a reduction of 500' for landing distance.

So if the paint markings ended 500' feet sooner, would Air France still have gone into the ravine?

[Widow]

Surprised no one has posted this here yet ...

From the Toronto Star

Air France must disclose cockpit voice recorder
Published On Fri Sep 17 2010

Tracey Tyler
Legal Affairs Reporter

The cockpit voice recorder that captured conversations between the pilots aboard Air France Flight 358 before it overshot a runway at Pearson airport and exploded in flames must be disclosed to Canada’s air traffic control agency, the Ontario Court of Appeal has ruled.

In a unanimous decision Friday, the court dismissed arguments from the Transportation Safety Board of Canada that disclosing the contents of the voice recorder – part of a plane’s “black box” – would destroy or greatly diminish the trust pilots have in the confidentiality of the process for investigating airline crashes.

NAV Canada, which is responsible for air traffic control at the airport, says it needs the voice recorder – described earlier in the case as an “electronic fly on the cockpit wall” – to defend itself against lawsuits from Air France and nearly 300 passengers on-board the flight from Paris on Aug. 2, 2005.

The Airbus A340 plunged into a ravine while landing in lightening and heavy rain.

NAV Canada alleges pilots Alain Rosaye and Frederic Naud were negligent.

Naud, the first officer, was not opposed to having the voice recorder released as part of the litigation.

But the board contended that if the contents were disclosed, pilots will hold back on what they are willing to tell investigators in the future.

Writing for a three-judge panel Friday, Justice Stephen Goudge characterized that as little more than speculation.

“It is simply baldly asserted and is unsubstantiated by evidence, for example, that previous orders for disclosure have caused pilots to be less cooperative with subsequent investigations,” he said.

The court also rejected the board’s claim that cockpit recordings should only be disclosed if withholding them would lead to a miscarriage of justice.

In Canada, cockpit voice recordings are normally privileged, to be disclosed only to aviation investigators.

But under the Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board Act, a judge can order the voice recorder to be disclosed if the importance of the evidence outweighs confidentiality concerns.

Two pilots’ unions, the Air Line Pilots Association and the Air Canada Pilots Association, representing nearly 60,000 pilots around the world, intervened in the case, arguing the cockpit is their inner sanctum, a private workspace comparable to an office.

Disclosing the recording would be detrimental to aviation safety, they maintained, because pilots may not speak freely to the control tower if their every word might later be reviewed in court.

The transportation safety board’s report into the Air France crash suggests “certain acts or omissions” of the pilots may have contributed to the accident, according to a Superior Court judge, who last year ordered the voice recorder disclosed, a decision the board appealed.

Justice George Strathy also ordered the board to provide NAV Canada with its animation of cockpit activity.

In court documents, NAV Canada alleges a passenger was flying in a cockpit jump seat contrary to Canadian aviation regulations.

[sanjet]

Does anyone recall the Air France A320 that crashed during an air show.
The CVR was magically "replaced" and a new altered one was given to the accident investigators.
I wouldn't be surprised if the DGAC had some influence in this too..... I've never seen a government so protective of a national airline even during an accident investigation.

http://www.airdisaster.com/investigatio ... f296.shtml

The Black Boxes from which the official report has been made show a series of anomalies, which has led a lot of critical people since 1988 to call in question their authenticity:

The black boxes have been physically opened, the magnetic tape has been cut. Normally you put the black boxes into a reading machine without opening them - the same way you read a cassette in a video recorder.
8 seconds are missing in the recording, 4 seconds are missing just before the impact. That means that the DFDR would have stopped accidentally just before the impact.
The DFDR and the CVR are 4 seconds out of synchronization during the last part of the recording.

[Tim]

this sounds like less of a concern over privacy and more of a concern over avoiding responsibility for actions.

widow, being that youre such a post nazi im surpised you didnt post this in the previous thread regarding the lawsuit

viewtopic.php?f=54&t=43560

(...sorry couldn't help it)

[F-16]

Checklist passenger evacuation...

First Item - CVR erase button
Last Item - CVR erase button (for good measure).

What an unbelievable joke.

So does this mean that all discussions that occur in the Judge's chambers are now going to be published as well?

[Tim]

So does this mean that all discussions that occur in the Judge's chambers are now going to be published as well?

ALL discussions on CVRs arent published...in fact you could say that almost all cvr tapes are NOT published.

but to use your judge analogy, if the discussions revealed a course of actions that resulted in the building burning down, and the judge is suing the owner of the building...yes, it should be made available.

[F-16]

Tim,

I get what you are saying.

My point is that this is a disturbing trend and a slippery slope.

Pilots are only going to be more careful about what is said/disclosed in fear of punishment or reprimand.

The last 10 years have seen incidents around the world where pilots were immediately tossed in jail and guilty until proven innocent.

Sadly, I think this puts us closer to that in Canada/North America.

The worst part about it is that non-aviation people are getting involved with the interpretation of a highly technical job that most people do not understand, or have a hard time grasping.

Just wait until the so-called experts are called to testify - it's going to be just like on the news, the arm chair pilots will come out of the woodworks to play and be heard.

This can of worms should never have been taken off the shelf, let alone opened.