Mechanical failures....check lists...SOPs and decisions.

[Doc]

Anybody unfortunate enough to be in the front of that airplane as the events described would be SLAUGHTERED in today's industry. This is not a personal attack, this is a professional opinion based on the events as presented combined with my biases of the industry I operate in today.

I find this a telling comment from a poster who's opinion I respect. Not that SOP's cannot be deviated from in today's world, but the tendency to do so, has been "trained" out of today's pilots. I think today's pilots, while having the benefit of years of learning from the mistakes of the past, modern technology and equipment not even dreamed about during .'s PBY days, would be far less likely to throw the "rules" and SOP's "out the window" at a moment's notice. If this were to happen today, the aircraft would most certainly have rotated at V1. I know there have been times when I've changed the "play" in the middle of the "down" without any dire consequences. You just have to know when to say, "WTF".

[trey kule]

SOP's are part of the alphabet speak of new CPL's. But the understanding of their purpose is sometimes lacking.
SOP's work very very well in normal situations. They allow pairing of pilots without previous experience as a team to immediately work well as the procedures are standardized. They eliminate the "I thought you did that" incidents. And they should eliminate such boo boos as leaving the master on , flaps down after landing, type of error.
But too many of the alphabet speakers feel they somehow apply to all emergency situations.. They dont. You cannot train for every possible emergency. Sometimes you just have to think, and you dont have all that much time.. All these decision making models that are so well taught in the classroom, the use of checklists, and SOP's all get forgotten when there is 300 feet of runway left and something has gone wrong..It is at that point that common sense, and, yes , experience come into play Anybody who does not think experience is necessary in flying is either someone who does not have any so cannot really judge what they dont know, because.....well ,,,,they dont know what they dont know..Or, someone who celebrates all failures as learning opportunities (I love that line)...the kind that thinks all kids should get a Participation ribbon in sports, or that we should not keep score in a game..

What I see in this thread is a lack of understanding about the actual role SOP's are to play ...the S stands for standard....and they apply to more than just when the plane is flying.

Doc, you make a good point, but it is a difficult balancing act sometimes. Once SOP's start being ignored, we get little screwups, like a plane not being fueled and not be checked properly (SOP not being followed to be present at fueling, and checklist ignored). An FO, who is out of their seat before the final checklist is run, and the master being left on.
On the other hand, there are simply times when you must forget about the SOP, and sometimes that decision has to made in a split second. That is a big part of where experience comes in...how does that little prayer go....courage to change the things I can, accept the things I cannot change, and the wisdom to know the difference.

As to the thread itself, I had the sense that Cat felt there was only one option open to him. Chose it. And it worked out well for him.
I am not certain that means there were not other options available, but I was not there. I am not sure what can be learned form this incident as few , if any of the others here (myself included) know the working, limitations, etc. of the PBY. Possibly a choice to use a plane more people are familiar with would have provided a better opportunity for knowledgable discussion.

And while I am ranting, let me share this. One of the things I get some shameful joy of is watching a brand new hire CPL's face when they first open up the company SOP....and after reading the first pages regarding duty times, reporting times for duty, appropriate dress...they thumb through the pages for the flying parts...and, as someone posted early, when asked, can never properly answer the question regarding the very first page that indicates when SOP's can /should/must be deviated from. Some of this I attribute to the fact that many of the simulated SOP's the colleges use really only relate to flying. Nothing about preflight responsabilities such as confirming NOTAMs and Weather understanding.post flight etc.. SOPs and checklists have a very important role to play in flying, particualrily in complex machinery, but understanding their appropriate use seems to be a real problem. Few pilots who are exposed to them during training seems to have ever been taught ...when can/should you deviate from them? Not when you are in hurray to TGIF with the folks so you ignore a shutdown checklist. Not because it is cold outside so you decide it is not necesssary to watch the fueling trunk actually put fuel in the plane. But when you have less time to make a decision than it will take to read the checklist..of course....

[C-206]

Pika,
Finally someone said it, after all the SOP bull***t , and old pilot vs. new pilot, robot vs. non robot, You, Pika finally said it.
C-206

[Doc]

As to the thread itself, I had the sense that Cat felt there was only one option open to him. Chose it. And it worked out well for him.
.

That's really the"bottom line" here. If it hadn't worked out for him, well we wouldn't be hearing about it, now would we? That, and things WERE done a little differently back then. Yes they were.
I flew with a crusty old fart of a guy who retired as a BOAC 707 Captain. Loads of time on Britannia's, Connie's an the like. He was a pretty good story teller (to say the least!) and let me tell you, they had NO CRM! The Captain was the bloody KING. The lowly "fool" in the right seat was his "slave". When something ran amok, the "old boy" played HIS cards. They either worked, and he was a hero, or they didn't, and the landscape became littered with corpses. THIS IS NOT A SHOT AT CAT, it's just the way the "game" was played. SOP's were very much in the future, and indeed THE future of aviation. Now, with the equipment we fly, a pilot can maintain strict adherence to SOP's his entire career and NEVER have a reason to deviate from them. They are "usually" that good. Sometimes (Hello Air France) when they don't work, you have to know when to "toss" them. It may never happen.
But, bottom line remains. It IS SOP to continue a take off after V1. It was an unusual situation, that required the high speed processor known as the human brain to make a snap decision based on available data in the memory banks. In this case, it worked. It could well not have. Continuing the take off, might have worked as well. We'll never know. I know I've "gotten away" with a couple . Perhaps Cat "got away" with one here?

[Big Pistons Forever]

As to the thread itself, I had the sense that Cat felt there was only one option open to him. Chose it. And it worked out well for him.
.

That's really the"bottom line" here. If it hadn't worked out for him, well we wouldn't be hearing about it, now would we? That, and things WERE done a little differently back then. Yes they were.
I flew with a crusty old fart of a guy who retired as a BOAC 707 Captain. Loads of time on Britannia's, Connie's an the like. He was a pretty good story teller (to say the least!) and let me tell you, they had NO CRM! The Captain was the bloody KING. The lowly "fool" in the right seat was his "slave". When something ran amok, the "old boy" played HIS cards. They either worked, and he was a hero, or they didn't, and the landscape became littered with corpses. THIS IS NOT A SHOT AT CAT, it's just the way the "game" was played. SOP's were very much in the future, and indeed THE future of aviation. Now, with the equipment we fly, a pilot can maintain strict adherence to SOP's his entire career and NEVER have a reason to deviate from them. They are "usually" that good. Sometimes (Hello Air France) when they don't work, you have to know when to "toss" them. It may never happen.
But, bottom line remains. It IS SOP to continue a take off after V1. It was an unusual situation, that required the high speed processor known as the human brain to make a snap decision based on available data in the memory banks. In this case, it worked. It could well not have. Continuing the take off, might have worked as well. We'll never know. I know I've "gotten away" with a couple . Perhaps Cat "got away" with one here?

IMO this is the best post on this thread so far ........

[Chuck Ellsworth]

Having started this thread I will try and keep explaining what I did and why I did it.

Whipline asked:

I'm all for systems knowledge and using your brain but SOPs were designed to mitigate pilots from doing "their own thing". Some SOPs are obviously better then others though.

SOP's were not an acronym we had been exposed to in that era....it happened over thirty five years ago and at the time I not only had around two thousand hours on type I was very familiar with the mechanical systems having worked as a mechanic on them for years.

SOP's are a modern acronym that basically describes a company developed set of procedures that all crew members are expected to use in crew management and who does what when.

Earlier in this thread I pointed out that I flew for Mobil oil starting in 1970 and they had one of the best SOP's that I have ever used.....we used PMA in IMC as an example....we just never heard of the acronym SOP's.

Your outcome was good (you didnt get hurt and no metal was bent) but could have it been better? If the aircraft was flyable I would have continued the takeoff, raised the gear, dumped the load over the trees, kept climbing for 4 minutes, secured the engine, set up for final, dropped the gear and landed. But I don't know anything about the PBY.

At the time as I said I had around two thousand hours on the PBY, I now have over four and a half thousand hours on type and given the same circumstances I would do exactly what I did in the story I have related here.....I would reject because the airplane was still on the runway and I knew there was more than enough room for the reject before I would run out of safe surface to stop on.

Somehow I have really fucked this up in the way I have handled the discussion.....what I was trying to do was point out that " sometimes " lateral thinking will save your ass..and by lateral thinking I was able to not only make the decision I could safely reject I realized that a rote thinking reaction for the reject at that point would be close both throttles...that would have been a real nightmare had I did that because one engine was at full power with no throttle linkage to it.