Was it an Engine Failure

[pelmet]

From TSB.....

"C-FPQQ, a Beech B200 operated by Keewatin Air LP., was conducting flight KEW213-M from
Winnipeg/James Armstrong Richardson Intl Airport (CYWG), MB to Churchill Airport (CYYQ), MB.
Shortly after takeoff, the #2 engine (Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-42) torque rolled back. The
flight crew feathered the #2 propeller, declared an emergency, ran the appropriate checklists, and
shut down the #2 engine. The aircraft returned to CYWG and landed uneventfully.
The operator's maintenance reviewed the engine trends from an onboard recording device and
noted the #2 engine torque slowly decreased to idle over a 28 second span after takeoff power
was applied. All other recorded data was reported to have remained in the normal parameters. The
operator's maintenance inspected/cleaned the firewall and engine high pressure fuel pumps filters
and replaced the low-pressure fuel filter. No faults or excessive contamination was reported to
have been found. During a follow-up ground run, the operator's maintenance could not duplicate
the fault but noted that the #2 engine power lever friction lock was not engaged. The aircraft was
returned to service subject to a satisfactory flight test."

[bobcaygeon]

From TSB.....

"C-FPQQ, a Beech B200 operated by Keewatin Air LP., was conducting flight KEW213-M from
Winnipeg/James Armstrong Richardson Intl Airport (CYWG), MB to Churchill Airport (CYYQ), MB.
Shortly after takeoff, the #2 engine (Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-42) torque rolled back. The
flight crew feathered the #2 propeller, declared an emergency, ran the appropriate checklists, and
shut down the #2 engine. The aircraft returned to CYWG and landed uneventfully.
The operator's maintenance reviewed the engine trends from an onboard recording device and
noted the #2 engine torque slowly decreased to idle over a 28 second span after takeoff power
was applied. All other recorded data was reported to have remained in the normal parameters. The
operator's maintenance inspected/cleaned the firewall and engine high pressure fuel pumps filters
and replaced the low-pressure fuel filter. No faults or excessive contamination was reported to
have been found. During a follow-up ground run, the operator's maintenance could not duplicate
the fault but noted that the #2 engine power lever friction lock was not engaged. The aircraft was
returned to service subject to a satisfactory flight test."

not likely, there have been sooooo many rejected takeoffs or power losses just after takeoff when work load is high due to power/thrust levers or prop/ condition/speed levers rolling back due to friction locks either not being used properly or not working quite right. With the slow decrease in torque it sounds exactly how this normally presents itself.

[‘Bob’]

From TSB.....

"C-FPQQ, a Beech B200 operated by Keewatin Air LP., was conducting flight KEW213-M from
Winnipeg/James Armstrong Richardson Intl Airport (CYWG), MB to Churchill Airport (CYYQ), MB.
Shortly after takeoff, the #2 engine (Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-42) torque rolled back. The
flight crew feathered the #2 propeller, declared an emergency, ran the appropriate checklists, and
shut down the #2 engine. The aircraft returned to CYWG and landed uneventfully.
The operator's maintenance reviewed the engine trends from an onboard recording device and
noted the #2 engine torque slowly decreased to idle over a 28 second span after takeoff power
was applied. All other recorded data was reported to have remained in the normal parameters. The
operator's maintenance inspected/cleaned the firewall and engine high pressure fuel pumps filters
and replaced the low-pressure fuel filter. No faults or excessive contamination was reported to
have been found. During a follow-up ground run, the operator's maintenance could not duplicate
the fault but noted that the #2 engine power lever friction lock was not engaged. The aircraft was
returned to service subject to a satisfactory flight test."

not likely, there have been sooooo many rejected takeoffs or power losses just after takeoff when work load is high due to power/thrust levers or prop/ condition/speed levers rolling back due to friction locks either not being used properly or not working quite right. With the slow decrease in torque it sounds exactly how this normally presents itself.

Soooooooooo many?

Why is it soooooooooooooooo difficult for the PM to hold the power levers after takeoff?

Why is maximum power after the call of engine failure sooooooooooooooooooooo hard to do?

[goingnowherefast]

Was the friction block worn out, but the operator too cheap to replace it?
Nobody has ever found worn out and useless friction blocks, snagged it for "ground check serviceable".

Not saying this is what happened here

[TG]

Soooooooooo many?

Why is it soooooooooooooooo difficult for the PM to hold the power levers after takeoff?

Why is maximum power after the call of engine failure sooooooooooooooooooooo hard to do?

I don't know about their SOPs but as PF you are supposed to remove your hands from the power levers past V1.
This said visually missing a power levers mismatch where one is at climb power and the other idle seems to be a stretch yes.

[airway]

.

This just reminded me of the miracle on the Hudson. The engines rolled back but didn't actually quit. The F/O wasted some time trying to restart engines that were heavily damaged but still running. Understandable in that time compressed situation, and probably unusual gauge readings.


From the NTSB report:

2.2.4 In-Flight Engine Problem Diagnostics
FDR data indicated that, although the engine power and fuel flow decreased immediately
after the bird ingestion, both engines’ LPC spools continued to rotate, and no loss of combustion
occurred. According to FDR and CVR data, after the bird ingestion, the first officer followed the
Engine Dual Failure checklist and spent about 30 to 40 seconds trying to relight the engines;
however, since engine combustion was not lost, these attempts were ineffective in that they
would not fix the problem, and the N2 speeds could not increase during the remainder of the
flight. The flight crew was unaware that the extent and type of the engine damage precluded any
pilot action from returning them to operational status. If the flight crewmembers had known this,
they could have proceeded to other critical tasks, such as completing only the Engine Dual
Failure checklist items applicable to the situation. (See section 2.3.1 for information about the
Engine Dual Failure checklist and the flight crew’s accomplishment of it.)
The NTSB notes that it is unreasonable to expect pilots to properly diagnose complex
engine problems and take appropriate corrective actions while they are encountering an
emergency condition under critical time constraints. Many modern engines are equipped with
engine sensors and full-authority digital engine controls (FADEC) that can be programmed to
advise pilots about the status of an engine so that they can respond better to engine failures.
However, currently, no commercially available engines have diagnostic capabilities to
identify the type of engine damage (sensors and FADECs can only identify that a problem exists)
and recommend mitigating or corrective actions to pilots; yet, work has been performed to
develop this technology for both military and civilian applications. For example, in 1998, the
Department of the Navy, in conjunction with industry and the FAA, initiated the Survivable
Engine Control Algorithm Development project, which was tasked, in part, to develop
technology that would inform flight crews about an engine’s condition following foreign-object
or bird ingestion that resulted in engine gas path damage. The intent was to use existing engine
sensors to define the type of engine damage and then apply appropriate mitigation through
changing control schedules within the FADEC. Although a successful demonstration of this
technology was conducted on the U.S. Navy’s GE F414 turbofan engine, the project was
terminated because of a lack of funding. In 2007, similar work was conducted on the GE T700
82
NTSB Aircraft Accident Report
turboshaft engine; however, this project was also terminated before it was completed because of
funding shortfalls.
Commercial applications for this type of technology were investigated in 2002 by
NASA’s Aviation Safety and Security Program, which initiated the CEDAR (Commercial
Engine Damage Assessment and Reconfiguration) project using a GE CF6-80C2 engine to
develop damage detection algorithms. Again, initial efforts were terminated because of a lack of
funding and shifted priorities.
The NTSB concludes that, if the accident engines’ electronic control system had been
capable of informing the flight crewmembers about the continuing operational status of the
engines, they would have been aware that thrust could not be restored and would not have spent
valuable time trying to relight the engines, which were too damaged for any pilot action to make
operational. Therefore, the NTSB recommends that the FAA work with the military,
manufacturers, and NASA to complete the development of a technology capable of informing
pilots about the continuing operational status of an engine. The NTSB further recommends that,
once the development of the engine technology has been completed, as asked for in Safety
Recommendation A-10-62, the FAA require the implementation of the technology on transportcategory airpl







.