More on the 777 Crash at heathrow
Moderators: sky's the limit, sepia, Sulako, lilfssister, North Shore, I WAS Birddog
More on the 777 Crash at heathrow
Received this from one of my friends who flies 747 for China Airlines... Interesting find
> I'm a little surprised that the engines did not break loose at the fuse pins....looks like there was a high drag load applied during the crash landing. Guess the loads must have been within design parameters for wheels up landing as the outboard wing fuel tanks did not rupture
>
>
>
> I received this from a good friend who is a retired Boeing engineer/manager now living in Arizona . It has a very interesting theory and there are several pictures of the crash attached also.
>
> Photos of recent 777 crash at Heathrow.
>
> Boys, Looks like someone has solved the mystery.
>
> During the flight, Beijing to London , more fuel burned than expected. However, the pilots decided to continue to their destination (Heathrow) knowing they would have less than the Alternate Fuel requirement (enough fuel to fly to an alternate airport and hold 30 minutes at 1500ft). The aircraft's load was less than 50% so the amount of Alternate Fuel needed was probably lowered during the flight, thus making the Captain legal
>
> to continue to London with less alternate fuel than was on his flight plan. That's legal procedure considering weather, runway and delay situations.
>
>
> The result was a very light fuel load during the final approach to Heathrow. However, using maximum flap setting for landing increased the nose attitude to a level where the remaining fuel ran to the rear of the fuel tank and the fuel pumps were sucking air and unable to supply sufficient fuel to keep the engines running. This resulted in both engines flaming out on final approach, along with a complete loss of electricity and hydraulics.
>
>
> On the Airbus we have procedures saying that when low on fuel do not use full flaps for landing, due to the higher nose attitude. I'm no B777 expert but I would guess there is a similar Boeing recommendation/procedure. The pilots either forgot this, simply ignored it, or for some reason, weren't aware of the danger they were in.
> I'm a little surprised that the engines did not break loose at the fuse pins....looks like there was a high drag load applied during the crash landing. Guess the loads must have been within design parameters for wheels up landing as the outboard wing fuel tanks did not rupture
>
>
>
> I received this from a good friend who is a retired Boeing engineer/manager now living in Arizona . It has a very interesting theory and there are several pictures of the crash attached also.
>
> Photos of recent 777 crash at Heathrow.
>
> Boys, Looks like someone has solved the mystery.
>
> During the flight, Beijing to London , more fuel burned than expected. However, the pilots decided to continue to their destination (Heathrow) knowing they would have less than the Alternate Fuel requirement (enough fuel to fly to an alternate airport and hold 30 minutes at 1500ft). The aircraft's load was less than 50% so the amount of Alternate Fuel needed was probably lowered during the flight, thus making the Captain legal
>
> to continue to London with less alternate fuel than was on his flight plan. That's legal procedure considering weather, runway and delay situations.
>
>
> The result was a very light fuel load during the final approach to Heathrow. However, using maximum flap setting for landing increased the nose attitude to a level where the remaining fuel ran to the rear of the fuel tank and the fuel pumps were sucking air and unable to supply sufficient fuel to keep the engines running. This resulted in both engines flaming out on final approach, along with a complete loss of electricity and hydraulics.
>
>
> On the Airbus we have procedures saying that when low on fuel do not use full flaps for landing, due to the higher nose attitude. I'm no B777 expert but I would guess there is a similar Boeing recommendation/procedure. The pilots either forgot this, simply ignored it, or for some reason, weren't aware of the danger they were in.
Re: More on the 777 Crash at heathrow
Well, case closed then.
What a bunch of crap.
Have you ever heard of no-alternate IFR? A large number U.S. and Canadian flights are planned without an alternate and therefore without alternate fuel. Shouldn't there be planes falling out of the sky all over the place then if this guys "theory" was correct?
What a bunch of crap.

Have you ever heard of no-alternate IFR? A large number U.S. and Canadian flights are planned without an alternate and therefore without alternate fuel. Shouldn't there be planes falling out of the sky all over the place then if this guys "theory" was correct?
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Re: More on the 777 Crash at heathrow
When I add flaps I push the nose because I get more lift...
- Cat Driver
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Re: More on the 777 Crash at heathrow
I always found popping 20 degrees of flap on those Cessna's popped them right into the air on floats......but some here think that is very dangerous.. 

The hardest thing about flying is knowing when to say no
After over a half a century of flying no one ever died because of my decision not to fly.
After over a half a century of flying no one ever died because of my decision not to fly.
Re: More on the 777 Crash at heathrow
Interesting theory except that:
1. Whoever came up with it would have no idea how much fuel was on board, and;
2. Full flaps actually results in a lower pitch attitude, not higher.
1. Whoever came up with it would have no idea how much fuel was on board, and;
2. Full flaps actually results in a lower pitch attitude, not higher.
- viccoastdog
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Re: More on the 777 Crash at heathrow
Vortex_driver wrote:When I add flaps I push the nose because I get more lift...
When I popped 20 degrees of flap on a 185 floats AND pushed the nose because of the increased lift I got wetCat Driver wrote:I always found popping 20 degrees of flap on those Cessna's popped them right into the air on floats......but some here think that is very dangerous..

Re: More on the 777 Crash at heathrow
That's because youre taking off....viccoastdog wrote:Vortex_driver wrote:When I add flaps I push the nose because I get more lift...When I popped 20 degrees of flap on a 185 floats AND pushed the nose because of the increased lift I got wetCat Driver wrote:I always found popping 20 degrees of flap on those Cessna's popped them right into the air on floats......but some here think that is very dangerous..
No secret, fuel waxing is to blame, poor quality fuel where the wax and water separated during cruise at extreme low temp, collecting in the descend in both collector tanks and restricting fuel flow....nobody wants to tell you that because the PM was heading to China the same day......politics will get in the way of justice once again....
My 2penys...
Re: More on the 777 Crash at heathrow
Actually, you push the nose down because the center of pressure moves aft.Vortex_driver wrote:When I add flaps I push the nose because I get more lift...
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Re: More on the 777 Crash at heathrow
Cat Driver wrote:I always found popping 20 degrees of flap on those Cessna's popped them right into the air on floats......but some here think that is very dangerous..
Hey Cat I sometimes pulled a lot more that 2 notches on T/O - I also would play the flaps landing and touch down anywhere from almost zero to full flap depending on where you were in the gust - only time I left the flap lever in the locked position was for glassy water -- like the lift dump system on a 1011 00 lmfaoooooooo

Back to the topic -- ya -- more flaps = less deck angle that's why most people raise their seats when landing with reduced flaps (hydraulic loss) or flapless -- in Europe there is no such thing as declaring "min" fuel - your low on gas and want priority you must declare an emergency. If he had an unusual over burn I know he would have declared - no foul for him -- nope more to this that low fuel and deck angle -- I know there was concern of contaminated fuel -- air canada made an unscheduled stop to check fuel quality. I doubt people go into LHR no alternate but airports are close -- I have landed (several times) with not enough fuel to light the apu -- but we were still legal -- so here we sit speculating

Black Air has no Lift - Extra Fuel has no Weight
ACTPA
ACTPA

- tripleseven
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Re: More on the 777 Crash at heathrow
You may have heard of it, but is doesn't sound like you know jack shit about it. Your destination needs to be within 6 hours of your departure airport, and no international flying is allowed (flights from Caribbean and Mexico excepted). There are lots of other restrictions. I would think that England's laws on no-alt IFR are similar, or at least in the ball park.matrix wrote:Well, case closed then.
What a bunch of crap.
Have you ever heard of no-alternate IFR? A large number U.S. and Canadian flights are planned without an alternate and therefore without alternate fuel. Shouldn't there be planes falling out of the sky all over the place then if this guys "theory" was correct?
777's at my company are planned with anywhere from 4.5 to 7.5 metric tonnes of fuel at destination. This includes the reserve fuel plus alternate fuel. Contingency and extra fuel is on top of this. If that plane indeed started sucking fumes on final, then a bunch of people made a bunch of colossal screw-ups for that situation to ever happen. I hope we learn from it.
Re: More on the 777 Crash at heathrow
This isn't KeystoneI hope we learn from it.
We don't know what it is that we need to learn so why don't we wait for the results of the investigation?
Re: More on the 777 Crash at heathrow
Matrix,
As far as I know there are no designers here from Boeing being able to judge if this reasoning is true, it could be as much as the reason while it also could not be. Just like how some aren't able to determine that 20 degrees flaps causing different pitch attitudes ain't due to lift, it's due to C of P.
Maybe the offline rumor of how most people here aren't pilots is starting to show it's truth?
Although I believe everything Cat has lol.
Some dude came out with this, now let's see what else is out there as far as confirmation goes.
Cheers.
As far as I know there are no designers here from Boeing being able to judge if this reasoning is true, it could be as much as the reason while it also could not be. Just like how some aren't able to determine that 20 degrees flaps causing different pitch attitudes ain't due to lift, it's due to C of P.
Maybe the offline rumor of how most people here aren't pilots is starting to show it's truth?
Although I believe everything Cat has lol.
Some dude came out with this, now let's see what else is out there as far as confirmation goes.
Cheers.
Re: More on the 777 Crash at heathrow
Date: January 24, 2008
From: Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), ANM-100S and Manager,
Engine Certification Office, ANE-140
To: Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-100 and Manager, Engine and
Propeller Directorate, ANE-100
Prepared by: Seattle ACO, ANM-102S
Subject: INFORMATION: British Airways Flight 38, Boeing 777 Accident, London,
England
New Information as of January 24, 2008:
Internal inspections of the fuel tanks were started today. The only anomalies were a loose Bnut
on a sensor line for the fuel scavenge system and a plastic scrapper near a suction feed port.
These findings are not significant. Fuel sample analysis continues to show the fuel is within
specification.
The investigation continues to look broadly for a cause of the dual engine rollbacks. Fuel
exhaustion is the only item that has been positively ruled out. Aspects that the FAA believes
the investigation is concentrating on are:
• Ice in the fuel somehow limiting the fuel flow to the engines. A maintenance message
indicating excessive water in the center tank was set during taxi on the two previous
flight legs, although it cleared itself both times. The airplane was being operated in a
high humidity, cold environment, conducive to ice formation.
• Small-sized contamination building up in the engine fuel systems somehow limited the
fuel flow to engine. All the fuel samples have tested for contamination of larger
particles (sizes outside the fuel specification). Testing has been started looking for
small particles (greater than 5 microns).
• Engine hardware failures sending inaccurate data to the engine electronic control
(EEC) causing the EEC to demand insufficient fuel. A preliminary review of the EEC
data from the right engine shows erratic combustor inlet pressure (P30). A leaking P30
sense line could cause this, or the EEC receiving a higher than actual fuel flow
parameter.
INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS BASED ON PRELIMINARY
REPORTS AND IS SUBJECT TO REVISION.
PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER
5 U.S.C. 552
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
• Software coding problem in the EEC causing the EEC to demand insufficient fuel.
British Airways installed a new engine EEC software revision in December 2007. The
software was approved in May 2006. There were several changes to the software as
part of the revision. Two items seem remotely related to the accident: improvements
to low power stall recovery logic and fan keep out zones for ground maintenance.
The first two items would be related to a part 25 compliance issue, while the last two items
would be related to a part 33 compliance issue.
As stated yesterday in this briefing paper, the electrical system anomalies noted earlier have
been resolved, as describe below, and the conclusion now is that the electrical buses were
powered until impact and performing as expected.
• The auxiliary power unit (APU) began its auto start sequence, even though the buses
were still powered. In the days following the event, the flight crew has added
additional details to their report. The crew now believes they turned the APU on prior
to impact. There was sufficient time before the impact for the APU inlet door to open,
but not for the APU fuel pump to turn on or the APU engine to start spooling up.
• The quick access recorder (QAR) saved data and shut down approximately 45 seconds
prior to impact. The QAR saves data in batches. It is believed the QAR was working
properly and was in the process of saving data when impact occurred, accounting for
the “lost” 45 seconds of data.
• The fuel crossfeed valves were closed in flight according to the flight crew, but the
switches were found in the open position and only one valve was open. In the days
following the event, the flight crew has added additional details to their report. The
crew now believes they opened the valves just prior to impact and the airplane lost
power before both valves moved to the open position.
• The ram air turbine (RAT) was found deployed, even though the buses were still
powered. It did not deploy until after the airplane came to a stop, as determined by the
pristine condition of the turbine blades. The RAT either deployed due to electrical
power loss during impact with a failed air/ground signal or the impact unlatched the
RAT door.
New Information as of January 23, 2008:
Ms. McCormick has finished her review of the crashworthiness of the airplane and is coming
home tomorrow. Gary Horan, an engine controls expert from the Engine and Propeller
Directorate, is going to London tomorrow at the NTSB’s request. Boeing has drafted a
message to all operators of the 777 airplanes, and is still waiting for approval from the Air
Accident Investigation Branch of the United Kingdom to send it out.
Electrical system: The electrical system anomalies noted earlier have been resolved, and the
conclusion now is that the electrical buses were powered until impact and performing as
expected.
INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS BASED ON PRELIMINARY
REPORTS AND IS SUBJECT TO REVISION.
PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER
5 U.S.C. 552
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Fuel system: Leads regarding water in the fuel and fuel contamination are continuing to be
investigated. Fuel testing looking for small-sized contaminants (5 microns) is beginning. The
tanks are still being drained and the team hopes to start evaluating the fuel system hardware
tomorrow.
Engines: Component testing and teardown of the engine-driven fuel pumps and the fuel
metering units is planned for later this week. The data from the electronic engine controls is
still being analyzed. Rolls-Royce is planning an engine test, unscheduled as yet, to try and
duplicate the rollbacks.
New Information as of January 22, 2008:
The airplane has been moved to a hanger, and the team is now working near the airplane.
Fuel system: The post crash fuel leak came from the right engine; the main tanks were intact.
There was a message of water in the center fuel tank shortly after departure from Beijing. The
fuel was being drained from the tanks today. Hardware analysis should begin tomorrow.
Engines: A preliminary review of electronic engine control data from the right engine shows
parameters indicating impending engine stall. It has not been determined yet if these items
indicate a fuel system or engine stability issue. Data from the left engine has not yet been
reviewed.
Crashworthiness: Ms. McCormick is documenting the condition of the cabin. Information
from cabin crew and passenger questionnaires indicate that the evacuation bell was faint, but
the evacuation light was seen and the captain’s message to evacuate over the passenger address
system was heard. Preliminary data indicates that the descent rate at impact was roughly 30
ft/sec. Dynamic seat requirements that became effective at the introduction of the Model 777
series airplanes require seats protect occupants for hard landing impact up to 35 ft/sec. The
passenger with the broken leg was sitting next to the point where the right main landing gear
punctured the fuselage and pushed into the cabin (pictured below).
New Information as of January 19, 2008:
INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS BASED ON PRELIMINARY
REPORTS AND IS SUBJECT TO REVISION.
PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER
5 U.S.C. 552
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Ms. Langsted spent the day at the airplane. Ms. McCormick reviewed the crew interview
reports. The airplane has not been moved from the runway yet. The airplane is considered a
hull loss.
Crashworthiness: There was only one serious injury, a compound fracture to the leg. The
airplane landed on the main gear, bounced, came back down on the gear, then the gear failed,
and the engines supported weight of the airplane. The descent rate at landing was 1500-1800
feet per minute. One of the main landing gear swung around and pushed slightly into the
cabin. The other punctured the center fuel tank (empty) leaving a 1-by-2-foot hole. The report
of a fuel leak is unconfirmed. All the slides deployed and the doors worked. Some passengers
had to shuffle down the slides due to the slight angle. The flight deck door opened on its own
during the landing. Some oxygen masks dropped.
Engines: No indication as yet of why engines rolled back. They ingested grass and dirt during
the landing. One engine had recently had the electronic engine control (EEC) replaced due to
indicated faults. The EECs have been removed from the engine to have the memory read.
Fuel system: No indication as yet that the fuel system was not providing fuel to the engines.
Center fuel tank was empty, and the main fuel tanks had a quantity of fuel in the tons. The
spar valves were open until the pilots pulled the fire handle just prior to evacuating the airplane
(normal). The fuel crossfeed valves were closed in flight (normal) according to the flight crew,
but the switches were found in the open position and only one valve was open. All fuel boost
pumps were on and indicating high pressure (normal). The engine fuel filters have been
removed for analysis. Several fuel samples from this airplane and other airplanes coming in
from Beijing have been analyzed with no significant findings. The fuel temperature indicated
in flight was as low as -34 degrees Celsius, although its proper functioning is being questioned.
Electrical System: Although the electrical buses seemed to have been powered through the
landing, there were several electrical anomalies close in time with the engine rollbacks. The
auxiliary power unit began its auto start sequence, and the quick access recorder saved data and
shut down. There were also the unexpected fuel valve positions mentioned earlier. The flight
data recorder was powered through the landing.
New Information as of January 18, 2008:
Sue McCormick and Margaret Langsted arrived at Heathrow in the afternoon London time and
met with Bill English (NTSB), Carol Horgan (NTSB), Steve Magladry (NTSB), TR Proven
(FAA), for a quick briefing.
At about 700 ft AGL, the auto throttle commanded engine acceleration. One engine started to
rollback during and the other engine started to accelerate then 8-10 seconds later began to roll
back. Once the flight crew noticed, they pushed the throttles up and the engines' EECs
responded but the engines did not. It appears that no fuel was getting to the engines. There
was adequate fuel on the airplane. Fuel sample tests are not complete. No one from this group
INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS BASED ON PRELIMINARY
REPORTS AND IS SUBJECT TO REVISION.
PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER
5 U.S.C. 552
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
of investigators has been on board the airplane. The airplane has been released to the operator
and we assume they will move it tonight.
January 17, 2008
Background:
On January 17, 2008, at approximately 1242 (GMT), a British Airways Boeing 777, operating
as Flight 38 from Beijing, China to London, England with 152 people on board, landed short of
the runway at Heathrow International Airport. The airplane skidded in the grassy runway
overrun area resulting in substantial structural damage and came to rest at the approach end of
the runway. There was no fire, and the airplane was successfully evacuated with only minor
injuries reported. The captain stated that at 400ft on a stabilized approach, the power on both
engines simultaneously rolled back. Weather does not appear to be a factor.
An investigation team including members from the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB), Boeing, FAA Aircraft Accident Investigation, and the Seattle ACO will be leaving
Thursday evening. An accident investigator from Boeing happened to be in London on other
business and is currently at the accident site. The Seattle ACO in sending a propulsion and a
cabin safety engineering specialist to participate in the investigation. The cabin safety
specialist will help assess the factors that contributed to the successful protection and egress of
the aircraft’s occupants.
Airplane Configuration Data:
The aircraft is a Boeing Model 777-200, Serial Number 30314, registration G-YMMM,
operated by British Airways. The airplane was delivered May 31, 2001 and had accumulated
22,046 hours and 3,181 cycles and is powered by two Rolls-Royce (RR) Trent 895 engines.
The engines were last overhauled approximately one year ago at the Roll-Royce facility in
Derby, United Kingdom (UK).
The Trent 895 is part of the Trent 800 series of engines which are high by-pass, axial flow,
three spool turbofan engines, originally certified by the UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA)
and subsequently validated by the FAA in 1999. European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)
began oversight of the type design on behalf of the UK CAA in 2003. The engine FAA type
certificate data sheet number is E00050EN.
Top 5 Operators of Boeing Model 777 series airplane:
Airline Number of Airplanes
Singapore Airlines 69
Emirates Airline 55
United Airlines 52
Air France 49
American Airlines 47
INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS BASED ON PRELIMINARY
REPORTS AND IS SUBJECT TO REVISION.
PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER
5 U.S.C. 552
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
777-200 Airworthiness Directives (ADs) (See Attachment 1)
Engine Information
Engine #1 Engine #2
Serial No. 51426 51359
Total engine hrs 15,700 24,247
Total engine cycles 1,928 3,412
The current IFSD rates for RR-powered 777’s are as follows:
Worldwide fleet total IFSD rate – 0.0048 per 1,000 hrs. (RR data thru Sept 07)
Worldwide fleet basic IFSD rate – 0.0038 per 1,000 hrs. (RR data thru Sept 07)
Action Requested/Recommended:
Information only. This information is preliminary and is subject to change.
From: Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), ANM-100S and Manager,
Engine Certification Office, ANE-140
To: Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-100 and Manager, Engine and
Propeller Directorate, ANE-100
Prepared by: Seattle ACO, ANM-102S
Subject: INFORMATION: British Airways Flight 38, Boeing 777 Accident, London,
England
New Information as of January 24, 2008:
Internal inspections of the fuel tanks were started today. The only anomalies were a loose Bnut
on a sensor line for the fuel scavenge system and a plastic scrapper near a suction feed port.
These findings are not significant. Fuel sample analysis continues to show the fuel is within
specification.
The investigation continues to look broadly for a cause of the dual engine rollbacks. Fuel
exhaustion is the only item that has been positively ruled out. Aspects that the FAA believes
the investigation is concentrating on are:
• Ice in the fuel somehow limiting the fuel flow to the engines. A maintenance message
indicating excessive water in the center tank was set during taxi on the two previous
flight legs, although it cleared itself both times. The airplane was being operated in a
high humidity, cold environment, conducive to ice formation.
• Small-sized contamination building up in the engine fuel systems somehow limited the
fuel flow to engine. All the fuel samples have tested for contamination of larger
particles (sizes outside the fuel specification). Testing has been started looking for
small particles (greater than 5 microns).
• Engine hardware failures sending inaccurate data to the engine electronic control
(EEC) causing the EEC to demand insufficient fuel. A preliminary review of the EEC
data from the right engine shows erratic combustor inlet pressure (P30). A leaking P30
sense line could cause this, or the EEC receiving a higher than actual fuel flow
parameter.
INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS BASED ON PRELIMINARY
REPORTS AND IS SUBJECT TO REVISION.
PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER
5 U.S.C. 552
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
• Software coding problem in the EEC causing the EEC to demand insufficient fuel.
British Airways installed a new engine EEC software revision in December 2007. The
software was approved in May 2006. There were several changes to the software as
part of the revision. Two items seem remotely related to the accident: improvements
to low power stall recovery logic and fan keep out zones for ground maintenance.
The first two items would be related to a part 25 compliance issue, while the last two items
would be related to a part 33 compliance issue.
As stated yesterday in this briefing paper, the electrical system anomalies noted earlier have
been resolved, as describe below, and the conclusion now is that the electrical buses were
powered until impact and performing as expected.
• The auxiliary power unit (APU) began its auto start sequence, even though the buses
were still powered. In the days following the event, the flight crew has added
additional details to their report. The crew now believes they turned the APU on prior
to impact. There was sufficient time before the impact for the APU inlet door to open,
but not for the APU fuel pump to turn on or the APU engine to start spooling up.
• The quick access recorder (QAR) saved data and shut down approximately 45 seconds
prior to impact. The QAR saves data in batches. It is believed the QAR was working
properly and was in the process of saving data when impact occurred, accounting for
the “lost” 45 seconds of data.
• The fuel crossfeed valves were closed in flight according to the flight crew, but the
switches were found in the open position and only one valve was open. In the days
following the event, the flight crew has added additional details to their report. The
crew now believes they opened the valves just prior to impact and the airplane lost
power before both valves moved to the open position.
• The ram air turbine (RAT) was found deployed, even though the buses were still
powered. It did not deploy until after the airplane came to a stop, as determined by the
pristine condition of the turbine blades. The RAT either deployed due to electrical
power loss during impact with a failed air/ground signal or the impact unlatched the
RAT door.
New Information as of January 23, 2008:
Ms. McCormick has finished her review of the crashworthiness of the airplane and is coming
home tomorrow. Gary Horan, an engine controls expert from the Engine and Propeller
Directorate, is going to London tomorrow at the NTSB’s request. Boeing has drafted a
message to all operators of the 777 airplanes, and is still waiting for approval from the Air
Accident Investigation Branch of the United Kingdom to send it out.
Electrical system: The electrical system anomalies noted earlier have been resolved, and the
conclusion now is that the electrical buses were powered until impact and performing as
expected.
INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS BASED ON PRELIMINARY
REPORTS AND IS SUBJECT TO REVISION.
PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER
5 U.S.C. 552
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Fuel system: Leads regarding water in the fuel and fuel contamination are continuing to be
investigated. Fuel testing looking for small-sized contaminants (5 microns) is beginning. The
tanks are still being drained and the team hopes to start evaluating the fuel system hardware
tomorrow.
Engines: Component testing and teardown of the engine-driven fuel pumps and the fuel
metering units is planned for later this week. The data from the electronic engine controls is
still being analyzed. Rolls-Royce is planning an engine test, unscheduled as yet, to try and
duplicate the rollbacks.
New Information as of January 22, 2008:
The airplane has been moved to a hanger, and the team is now working near the airplane.
Fuel system: The post crash fuel leak came from the right engine; the main tanks were intact.
There was a message of water in the center fuel tank shortly after departure from Beijing. The
fuel was being drained from the tanks today. Hardware analysis should begin tomorrow.
Engines: A preliminary review of electronic engine control data from the right engine shows
parameters indicating impending engine stall. It has not been determined yet if these items
indicate a fuel system or engine stability issue. Data from the left engine has not yet been
reviewed.
Crashworthiness: Ms. McCormick is documenting the condition of the cabin. Information
from cabin crew and passenger questionnaires indicate that the evacuation bell was faint, but
the evacuation light was seen and the captain’s message to evacuate over the passenger address
system was heard. Preliminary data indicates that the descent rate at impact was roughly 30
ft/sec. Dynamic seat requirements that became effective at the introduction of the Model 777
series airplanes require seats protect occupants for hard landing impact up to 35 ft/sec. The
passenger with the broken leg was sitting next to the point where the right main landing gear
punctured the fuselage and pushed into the cabin (pictured below).
New Information as of January 19, 2008:
INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS BASED ON PRELIMINARY
REPORTS AND IS SUBJECT TO REVISION.
PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER
5 U.S.C. 552
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Ms. Langsted spent the day at the airplane. Ms. McCormick reviewed the crew interview
reports. The airplane has not been moved from the runway yet. The airplane is considered a
hull loss.
Crashworthiness: There was only one serious injury, a compound fracture to the leg. The
airplane landed on the main gear, bounced, came back down on the gear, then the gear failed,
and the engines supported weight of the airplane. The descent rate at landing was 1500-1800
feet per minute. One of the main landing gear swung around and pushed slightly into the
cabin. The other punctured the center fuel tank (empty) leaving a 1-by-2-foot hole. The report
of a fuel leak is unconfirmed. All the slides deployed and the doors worked. Some passengers
had to shuffle down the slides due to the slight angle. The flight deck door opened on its own
during the landing. Some oxygen masks dropped.
Engines: No indication as yet of why engines rolled back. They ingested grass and dirt during
the landing. One engine had recently had the electronic engine control (EEC) replaced due to
indicated faults. The EECs have been removed from the engine to have the memory read.
Fuel system: No indication as yet that the fuel system was not providing fuel to the engines.
Center fuel tank was empty, and the main fuel tanks had a quantity of fuel in the tons. The
spar valves were open until the pilots pulled the fire handle just prior to evacuating the airplane
(normal). The fuel crossfeed valves were closed in flight (normal) according to the flight crew,
but the switches were found in the open position and only one valve was open. All fuel boost
pumps were on and indicating high pressure (normal). The engine fuel filters have been
removed for analysis. Several fuel samples from this airplane and other airplanes coming in
from Beijing have been analyzed with no significant findings. The fuel temperature indicated
in flight was as low as -34 degrees Celsius, although its proper functioning is being questioned.
Electrical System: Although the electrical buses seemed to have been powered through the
landing, there were several electrical anomalies close in time with the engine rollbacks. The
auxiliary power unit began its auto start sequence, and the quick access recorder saved data and
shut down. There were also the unexpected fuel valve positions mentioned earlier. The flight
data recorder was powered through the landing.
New Information as of January 18, 2008:
Sue McCormick and Margaret Langsted arrived at Heathrow in the afternoon London time and
met with Bill English (NTSB), Carol Horgan (NTSB), Steve Magladry (NTSB), TR Proven
(FAA), for a quick briefing.
At about 700 ft AGL, the auto throttle commanded engine acceleration. One engine started to
rollback during and the other engine started to accelerate then 8-10 seconds later began to roll
back. Once the flight crew noticed, they pushed the throttles up and the engines' EECs
responded but the engines did not. It appears that no fuel was getting to the engines. There
was adequate fuel on the airplane. Fuel sample tests are not complete. No one from this group
INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS BASED ON PRELIMINARY
REPORTS AND IS SUBJECT TO REVISION.
PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER
5 U.S.C. 552
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
of investigators has been on board the airplane. The airplane has been released to the operator
and we assume they will move it tonight.
January 17, 2008
Background:
On January 17, 2008, at approximately 1242 (GMT), a British Airways Boeing 777, operating
as Flight 38 from Beijing, China to London, England with 152 people on board, landed short of
the runway at Heathrow International Airport. The airplane skidded in the grassy runway
overrun area resulting in substantial structural damage and came to rest at the approach end of
the runway. There was no fire, and the airplane was successfully evacuated with only minor
injuries reported. The captain stated that at 400ft on a stabilized approach, the power on both
engines simultaneously rolled back. Weather does not appear to be a factor.
An investigation team including members from the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB), Boeing, FAA Aircraft Accident Investigation, and the Seattle ACO will be leaving
Thursday evening. An accident investigator from Boeing happened to be in London on other
business and is currently at the accident site. The Seattle ACO in sending a propulsion and a
cabin safety engineering specialist to participate in the investigation. The cabin safety
specialist will help assess the factors that contributed to the successful protection and egress of
the aircraft’s occupants.
Airplane Configuration Data:
The aircraft is a Boeing Model 777-200, Serial Number 30314, registration G-YMMM,
operated by British Airways. The airplane was delivered May 31, 2001 and had accumulated
22,046 hours and 3,181 cycles and is powered by two Rolls-Royce (RR) Trent 895 engines.
The engines were last overhauled approximately one year ago at the Roll-Royce facility in
Derby, United Kingdom (UK).
The Trent 895 is part of the Trent 800 series of engines which are high by-pass, axial flow,
three spool turbofan engines, originally certified by the UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA)
and subsequently validated by the FAA in 1999. European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)
began oversight of the type design on behalf of the UK CAA in 2003. The engine FAA type
certificate data sheet number is E00050EN.
Top 5 Operators of Boeing Model 777 series airplane:
Airline Number of Airplanes
Singapore Airlines 69
Emirates Airline 55
United Airlines 52
Air France 49
American Airlines 47
INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS BASED ON PRELIMINARY
REPORTS AND IS SUBJECT TO REVISION.
PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER
5 U.S.C. 552
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
777-200 Airworthiness Directives (ADs) (See Attachment 1)
Engine Information
Engine #1 Engine #2
Serial No. 51426 51359
Total engine hrs 15,700 24,247
Total engine cycles 1,928 3,412
The current IFSD rates for RR-powered 777’s are as follows:
Worldwide fleet total IFSD rate – 0.0048 per 1,000 hrs. (RR data thru Sept 07)
Worldwide fleet basic IFSD rate – 0.0038 per 1,000 hrs. (RR data thru Sept 07)
Action Requested/Recommended:
Information only. This information is preliminary and is subject to change.
bmc
Re: More on the 777 Crash at heathrow
So LC,Liquid Charlie wrote:Cat Driver wrote:I always found popping 20 degrees of flap on those Cessna's popped them right into the air on floats......but some here think that is very dangerous..
Hey Cat I sometimes pulled a lot more that 2 notches on T/O - I also would play the flaps landing and touch down anywhere from almost zero to full flap depending on where you were in the gust - only time I left the flap lever in the locked position was for glassy water -- like the lift dump system on a 1011 00 lmfaoooooooo
Back to the topic -- ya -- more flaps = less deck angle that's why most people raise their seats when landing with reduced flaps (hydraulic loss) or flapless -- in Europe there is no such thing as declaring "min" fuel - your low on gas and want priority you must declare an emergency. If he had an unusual over burn I know he would have declared - no foul for him -- nope more to this that low fuel and deck angle -- I know there was concern of contaminated fuel -- air canada made an unscheduled stop to check fuel quality. I doubt people go into LHR no alternate but airports are close -- I have landed (several times) with not enough fuel to light the apu -- but we were still legal -- so here we sit speculating
You like the DLC system?? Which of the series of L10's were your favourite??
I'd love to hear it..
Re: More on the 777 Crash at heathrow
As a believer in closed loop systems, it is interesting
to re-read the original (and often hysterically funny
and wrong) avcanada thread on this subject:
http://www.avcanada.ca/forums2/viewtopi ... 54&t=38874
and compare it with what is now known
to re-read the original (and often hysterically funny
and wrong) avcanada thread on this subject:
http://www.avcanada.ca/forums2/viewtopi ... 54&t=38874
and compare it with what is now known

Re: More on the 777 Crash at heathrow
What I really like is the fact that 3 completely different threads are going on here.. one on the 777 and one on floats and one on flapps! Who says pilots can't multi task



Re: More on the 777 Crash at heathrow
Isn't anyone concerned that we are still driving 777s around when we don't know the cause of this accident? I am. 

Re: More on the 777 Crash at heathrow
Where did I say that THIS FLIGHT was operating no alternate??? Maybe read my post again.tripleseven wrote:You may have heard of it, but is doesn't sound like you know jack @#$! about it. Your destination needs to be within 6 hours of your departure airport, and no international flying is allowed (flights from Caribbean and Mexico excepted). There are lots of other restrictions. I would think that England's laws on no-alt IFR are similar, or at least in the ball park.matrix wrote:Well, case closed then.
What a bunch of crap.
Have you ever heard of no-alternate IFR? A large number U.S. and Canadian flights are planned without an alternate and therefore without alternate fuel. Shouldn't there be planes falling out of the sky all over the place then if this guys "theory" was correct?
777's at my company are planned with anywhere from 4.5 to 7.5 metric tonnes of fuel at destination. This includes the reserve fuel plus alternate fuel. Contingency and extra fuel is on top of this. If that plane indeed started sucking fumes on final, then a bunch of people made a bunch of colossal screw-ups for that situation to ever happen. I hope we learn from it.
I was simply saying that having less than the required fuel for an alternate is an absurd theory as to why this aircraft would lose power and crash.
- viccoastdog
- Rank 3
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- Location: White Rock
Re: More on the 777 Crash at heathrow
Isn't the pitch change also caused by the change in air flow over the horizontal stab with flaps deployed, possibly causing a more pronounced and opposite pitch change than the pitch changed caused by the centre of pressure change on the wing?wxnut wrote:Just like how some aren't able to determine that 20 degrees flaps causing different pitch attitudes ain't due to lift, it's due to C of P.
- Cat Driver
- Top Poster
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Re: More on the 777 Crash at heathrow
What is a horizontal stab?
The hardest thing about flying is knowing when to say no
After over a half a century of flying no one ever died because of my decision not to fly.
After over a half a century of flying no one ever died because of my decision not to fly.
Re: More on the 777 Crash at heathrow
Also, Mr. Tripleseven, you may want to consult CAR 725.35 1 (a) (iii) before you go spouting off about things of which you may know jack @#$! about.You may have heard of it, but is doesn't sound like you know jack @#$! about it. Your destination needs to be within 6 hours of your departure airport, and no international flying is allowed (flights from Caribbean and Mexico excepted). There are lots of other restrictions. I would think that England's laws on no-alt IFR are similar, or at least in the ball park.
- viccoastdog
- Rank 3
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- Location: White Rock
Re: More on the 777 Crash at heathrow
Horizontal stabilizer? That thingy on the back of the part of the plane with the French-sounding name and that has the flappy part hanging off of it that goes up and down when you push and pull a stick in front of your seat?
- Cat Driver
- Top Poster
- Posts: 18921
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Re: More on the 777 Crash at heathrow
aahhh, so that is what everyone has been talking about...I always wanted one of those things that goes up an down on my stick....does it moan?
The hardest thing about flying is knowing when to say no
After over a half a century of flying no one ever died because of my decision not to fly.
After over a half a century of flying no one ever died because of my decision not to fly.
- viccoastdog
- Rank 3
- Posts: 187
- Joined: Thu Feb 08, 2007 11:19 pm
- Location: White Rock
Re: More on the 777 Crash at heathrow
After a while, yes....Cat Driver wrote:aahhh, so that is what everyone has been talking about...I always wanted one of those things that goes up an down on my stick....does it moan?
-
- Rank 1
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- Joined: Thu Jun 07, 2007 10:13 pm
Re: More on the 777 Crash at heathrow
A friend who works for Boeing has said that only one engine was turning at the time of impact and a major aspect of the investigation is in regards to fuel icing/below normal temperatures at cruise (apparently a phenomenon that has existed over the past year). Not being a heavy jet pilot I'll refrain from spewing my worthless opinion on what happened.