I think it may be educational to relate a mechanical failure I had one day just at V.R.

The failure was bizarre to say the least.

At the very moment we reached V.R. and the nose wheel just started to lift off the ground my left hand throttle broke off inside the quadrant at full power. Before I had started the take off run I was aware there was not a balanced field length for my all up weight at the time.......but I was flying a water bomber loaded with long term retardant and at any point in the take off run I could push a button and my airplane would be empty except for fuel and crew weight.

Guess what I did and why.

Well I have to admit that my experience is limited, but what I would have done is this:

Assuming that the power lever is stuck in the takeoff power position and the engine is producing full power, I would have continued the takeoff, climbed to a safe altitude, dumped the load, shut down the problem engine, and returned for landing on the remaining engine...

If you are producing full takeoff power, then I can think of no reason to reject, especially on a short field!

There was one extenuating circumstance that I had to consider before I continued with the take off.

The engine had a max time allowed at full power which meant I had very little time to climb to a safe altitude to complete the shut down, and my only hydraulic pump was on the engine I would have to shut down.

So with that in mind would you still take off?

Dump the retardent, kill the engines, max braking...? Not knowing what systems run off the Hydraulic pump on the A/C.
It's a gamble between stopping on the avialable runway/ stopway avialable and not destroying anything or hoping that the engine will run at Max power long enough to reach a safe altitude...

. . wrote:There was one extenuating circumstance that I had to consider before I continued with the take off.

The engine had a max time allowed at full power which meant I had very little time to climb to a safe altitude to complete the shut down, and my only hydraulic pump was on the engine I would have to shut down.

So with that in mind would you still take off?

wreaking the engine is better than killing the the crew and bending the whole plane off the end of the runway so I'd climb it up at the max power should be able to get at least 5 minutes if not more get what you need to set up for on a final with flaps / gear if required with the engine running with the power to your hydraulics then shut down the engine once landing is assured.

Continue the takeoff, use a screwdriver through the slot to set cruise power, have your copilot do a proper repair to the throttle enroute, and place the retardant on target.

You would be willing to bet your life that the engine would run at full power while you did all those things?

Let's assume the engine would run at full power long enough to get it set up for a safe approach back to the runway, would you do all this in a climb what about the other engine, would you use M.E.T.O. Power, climb power, cruise power?

I never depart any runway without taking into consideration as much as possible, on that runway I knew that I could abort at VR and get it stopped before I would go off the airport and into the trees.

The first post sounded like insufficent runway to reject at that speed. You would bet your life it would stop?

agreed didn't the first post say you didn't have enough runway?

I should have said not enough runway but there was enough room to stop before I would go into the trees...which was what happened.

I got it stopped about five hundred feet after I left the runway.

The last quarter of the gravel runway was a nice dull red from the long term retardant I had dumped at the same time I killed both engines. It was dust free for a long time.

When one thinks of a reject on the runway we would by habit or instinct pull the throttles to the closed stops.....but in the case I am describing I only had one throttle lever to pull and if I had done that I would have had an uncontrollable airplane with full power on one side and none on the other.

So what I did was pushed the drop button with my left thumb and at then same time reached down and pulled the emergency ignition kill button that shut off all four mags at once, using maximum braking for the surface I was on the over run of the runway was no big deal, they called a tow truck from town and pulled the thing back to the parking area and a couple of days later I had a new throttle quadrant and back to work we went.

The reason I am relating this is there are times when using normal emergency procedures can really create a problem...so by recognizing the problem and making a quick decision you can keep the airplane under control and walk away from it.

And what if you didn't have the trump card of the retardant drop option?

And what if you didn't have the trump card of the retardant drop option?

Then I wouldn't have this story to tell.

You could ask me what if I had been flying a high performance airplane that would be safe to continue the take off in, you could ask me all kinds of questions.

I can only relate what happened and the decision I made at the time.....which turned out to be the correct one in that instance.

Should this be an example of what not to do?

I don't understand why a takeoff would be rejected at such a high speed with all engines providing full power.

Should this be an example of what not to do?

The decision to reject was the correct one considering the circumstances, the proof is the fact the airplane was brought to a stop with no damage.

I don't understand why a takeoff would be rejected at such a high speed with all engines providing full power.

How much time do you have on a PBY and what do you know about its performance envelope and its emergency systems?

I have never been in a PBY but I have been near one. I don't know what releasing the load does to the elevator forces or if the release causes the aircraft to fly at a lower airspeed or what pulling both mixtures does to two engines at takeoff power. Could this engine have been brought into a continuous power setting with the propellor lever?

Could this engine have been brought into a continuous power setting with the propellor lever?

No.

Having never flown a PBY, but with a good chunk of time on R1830's I would have rotated, dumped my load, when I went for the first power reduction, fuel off on the number one, meto on number two, feather number one, leave the gear down and return to land on number two. I wouldn't have rejected due to the asymmetric thrust that would result if the number one's fuel didn't immediately shut down the engine. I would have continued the take off, simply based on the fact that number one was producing max power, and I'd probably have "sorted it out" in the air.

Doc, the PBY does not fly worth a shit with an engine feathered and the gear down, there was nothing but forest in all directions and all it would have taken would be one mistake and I was at risk of not making it back to the runway.

The reject was a no brained as I had enough room ahead of me to stop even though it was past the end of the runway the ground was flat.

The reason I am posting this unusual event was to point out the fact that once the decision to reject was made the shutting down of the engines required a different set of actions than would be normally used........normally you pull the throttles to the closed position.

I used the kill switch in the center of the magneto switches......it kills all the mags on both engines at the same time.......the same switch is in the DC3.

Therefore yaw caused by asymmetric thrust was not a problem.

Trust me, you do not want to willingly get a PBY in a situation where you have the gear down and one feathered at low altitude.

. . wrote:Doc, the PBY does not fly worth a shit with an engine feathered and the gear down, there was nothing but forest in all directions and all it would have taken would be one mistake and I was at risk of not making it back to the runway.

The reject was a no brained as I had enough room ahead of me to stop even though it was past the end of the runway the ground was flat.

The reason I am posting this unusual event was to point out the fact that once the decision to reject was made the shutting down of the engines required a different set of actions than would be normally used........normally you pull the throttles to the closed position.

I used the kill switch in the center of the magneto switches......it kills all the mags on both engines at the same time.......the same switch is in the DC3.

Therefore yaw caused by asymmetric thrust was not a problem.

Trust me, you do not want to willingly get a PBY in a situation where you have the gear down and one feathered at low altitude.

There's my DC3 background shining through. Obviously very different beasts. Always thought the "pig boat" looked a little underpowered with R1830's. Should have had R2800's bolted on from the get go? Mag master....good get. Especially given the limited time frame in which to "think". I think most would have just gone to the mixtures? Do I detect a "defence" of the live mag check? That would have made it interesting?

So .

You are coming in to land at Lac Labiche (narrow relatively short runway) in the DC 6, empty but with No 1 feathered and about 10 kts of crosswind from the left, just as the nose wheel touches it blows and the nose starts whipping from side to side as well as you experience the instantaneous loss of nose wheel steering......



Whatcha gonna do .......

Doc the PBY with the gear down and one feathered has a descent rate that is truly serious.

The mixture levers are behind the pilots seats and above their heads so a bit difficult to get at real fast......the F.O. had no idea the throttle lever had broken off and the fucking noise level in one of those beasts is unbelievable so trying to tell him to cut both mixtures would have been a waste of time.

If there had been a live mag I would have known in a split second and then would have pushed the master kill switch back in and for sure we would have continued the take off and dealt with it in the air.

As it turned out the decision to kill ignition to both engines and drop the load at the same time was the correct one as I knew there was room to safely stop.

What I am trying to point out is be aware of not becoming a slave to SOP's and always take those few seconds to ask yourself what the hell is going on here and how do I solve this problem.

I have no problem with sharing my experiences and explaining what I did and why, I am only pointing out that flying an aircraft requires one to think things out and solve each problem as they arise...SOP's are great but sometimes one has to use innovative means to solve some of the mechanical problems that occur during your career.

Once again when an examination of what I did on a given flight is looked at and questions arise as to whether or not I did the correct thing all I can say in my own defense is in over thirty thousand hours of flying I have not wrecked one, and believe me I have flown in some real tough conditions.

So .

You are coming in to land at Lac Labiche (narrow relatively short runway) in the DC 6, empty but with No 1 feathered and about 10 kts of crosswind from the left, just as the nose wheel touches it blows and the nose starts whipping from side to side as well as you experience the instantaneous loss of nose wheel steering......



Whatcha gonna do .......

Hey that's an easy one BPF, I would immediately smash the BMEP gauges.

We may not agree on some things BPF but I am fairly certain you can understand my advising pilots to think before they do something is good advice.....automatic actions do not always give the best results.

. . wrote:

So .

You are coming in to land at Lac Labiche (narrow relatively short runway) in the DC 6, empty but with No 1 feathered and about 10 kts of crosswind from the left, just as the nose wheel touches it blows and the nose starts whipping from side to side as well as you experience the instantaneous loss of nose wheel steering......



Whatcha gonna do .......

Hey that's an easy one BPF, I would immediately smash the BMEP gauges.

We may not agree on some things BPF but I am fairly certain you can understand my advising pilots to think before they do something is good advice.....automatic actions do not always give the best results.

Actually IMO for takeoff emergencies, automatic reactions are almost always the best ones. This is why the virtually universal SOP for large aircraft makes V1 the automatic and fixed point where the PIC switches from being primed to reject the takeoff to being primed to continue the takeoff. The vast majority of takeoffs that were rejected after V1 ended badly.

I have no opinion on whether the successful outcome of your PBY emergency was good management or good luck as I was not there and have no personal Canso operating experience. However I would say that I think care should be taken when extrapolating a very unusual failure in a very non typical aircraft type
into general operating advice.

The basis of good decisions IMO starts with a sound understanding of aircraft systems so that failing systems are detected early and the personal discipline to follow checklists and SOP's. To deviate from SOP's one first has to understand what one is deviating from and should be response to the failure of the "normal" emergency procedures to be effective or appropriate.

The EFATO emergency in Piston twins is a good example where some pretakeoff critical thought is important. A VG equiped Cessna 340 is the only piston twin I regularly fly. The owner and I put a lot of thought into our EFATO SOP and checklist. We do all takeoffs no flap and with the VG's, Blueline is 100 kts so we rotate at 95 to fly off at 100 knots and the landing gear is retracted with positive rate of climb. Our "decision" point is gear retraction. Before the gear is retracted any engine failure/fire results in the immediate closing of both throttles and a land/stop straight ahead. After gear retraction the conditions for continued flight are in place and the only think left to do is feather the failed engine. Therefor the visual/physical indications that the flight has gone from stopping to going is when the pilot moves his hands from covering the throttles to covering the prop levers. At this point, in the event of an engine failure, only one action is required. After identifying the failure through yaw and EGT indications, the pilot verifies by moving the appropriate prop lever to the feather gate, pauses to ensure it is the right one, then continues to the full feather position. After that you just have to concentrate on flying the aircraft to a safe height and then complete the engine failure and securing checklists.

. . wrote:Guess what I did and why.

Uh, wrote up a Service Difficulty Report and submitted it here: http://www.tc.gc.ca/wsdrs ???