Globe&Mail: Lives Could Have Already Been Saved

[Widow]

Safetywatch has posted the article in full in the next post.

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/ ... 2/TPStory/

[safetywatch]

SMALL-PLANE CRASHES
'Lives could have already been saved'
What caused Sunday's deadly crash in B.C.? One of the first assumptions is pilot error - but there could have been more to it than that

ROBERT MATAS

rmatas@globeandmail.com

November 22, 2008

VANCOUVER -- Hugh Danford believes he knows what was in the mind of the pilot of the amphibious Grumman Goose plane as he took off from Vancouver airport on his last flight with the fog rolling in last Sunday morning.

The pilot left in bad weather, got into worse and kept going. The plane crashed less than 20 minutes later, plowing through tree tops and slamming into a hillside on nearby Thormanby Island. The pilot and six passengers were killed. One bewildered passenger survived with severe burns.

Peter McLeod, 53, an Australian, had been with Pacific Coastal Airlines for only nine months. But he had been flying on the West Coast for four years and had more than 13,000 hours on his record. On his final trip, he was taking construction workers to a remote hydroelectric project in the Toba Valley on British Columbia's Sunshine Coast.

Mr. Danford, 61, has about 30 years of experience as a pilot. After beginning his career in Northern Manitoba, he flew small bush planes extensively in Antarctica and the oil fields of northern Africa. He believes Mr. McLeod would have been aware of the risks posed by the weather. Even though the airport cleared the flight for take-off, the pilot would realize the fog could be much worse just around the corner.

"You're flying - they call it 'special VFR [visual flight rules],' " Mr. Danford said, referring to rules that allow pilots of small planes to navigate by looking out the window rather than relying on instruments.

"You're ..-running and you feel safe because you are in a boat, really, a flying boat," Mr. Danford said in an interview from his home in Ottawa. "And you always have that in the back of your mind - I can put this down anywhere. It floats."

Everyone wonders what that guy was thinking when he took off in the fog, Mr. Danford said.

"Well, he was thinking what we all thought when we all lucked out. I figured I had nine lives and then some. That's the kind of flying it is."

But don't jump to conclusions when attributing blame, he quickly added. Look at why the pilot did what he did.

Recalling his experience in Northern Manitoba, Mr. Danford said pilots who fly in marginal circumstances are often under pressure to take the flight. "It was, if you don't take it, the other guy will. And if you do that too often, you don't have a job," Mr. Hanford said.

Looking at only the pilot, the weather or the condition of the aging plane cannot make sense of the accident. "The cause of the accident is no regulatory supervision," Mr. Danford said. No one was watching to ensure that safety regulations were followed, he said.

A week after the crash, investigators from the Transportation Safety Board of Canada have begun looking for answers. TSB spokesman Bill Yearwood said yesterday that investigators took photographs and collected items from the wreckage scene before the RCMP, the coroner and the media went through the site. They are interviewing people while events are fresh in their minds and gathering documents.

The TSB decides whether to dig deep into the cause of an accident only when the initial review indicates that something new can be learned. The Grumman Goose crash was one of those accidents requiring an exhaustive review, Mr. Yearwood said.

A public report of the investigation, possibly with recommendations for changes to improve safety, will be issued once the team discovers "the ultimate source" of the accident, he said. Investigators will also consider whether lack of enforcement of Transport Canada regulations was an issue.

Last weekend's crash evoked troublesome memories for Kirsten Stevens. The TSB decided not to investigate the fatal accident that killed her husband Dave and four others on Feb. 28, 2005. Authorities listed the crash for statistical purposes, but did not pursue what happened.

Ms. Stevens and the families of others killed in the accident could not accept the TSB's response. Ms. Stevens said she believes a closer look at accidents would save lives. "There are recommendations that should have come out of our accident, and if those recommendations had by now been issued, there is a good chance that lives could have already been saved," she said.

Mr. Stevens was on a DeHavilland Beaver float plane with three other passengers when the pilot took off in stormy weather from Campbell River on Vancouver Island. The plane disappeared. Three days later, Mr. Stevens's body washed ashore, but the float plane, the pilot and other passengers have never been found.

The official search for the plane and its passengers stretched into April, 2005. The families of the missing passengers were under the impression that officials had dismissed the accident as the result of bad weather and possible pilot error.

Undeterred by the TSB's refusal to issue a formal report, the families continued the search with the help of friends, neighbours and businesses and located the wreckage in the summer of 2005. They retrieved the fuselage, but not the engine. To the untrained eye, oil on the windscreen and smoke scarring indicated that an engine problem may have precipitated a crash landing.

The TSB investigators disagreed. Finally, in September, 2007, the families' search team pulled up the engine. After another review of the available evidence, investigators concluded no mechanical malfunction had occurred.

Frustrated with the TSB response, the families turned to an outside investigator. He found problems with the plane - illegal replacement parts, inadequate patches on the floats - as well as systemic issues that may have contributed to the accident. Ms. Stevens said she has learned a lot about the workings of the aviation industry since her husband's death.

Numerous recommendations have been made over the years dealing with the safety of the small planes flying into bad weather, but implementation of the changes has been spotty, she said.

Mr. Danford worked for five years at Transport Canada, from 1998 when he started in the enforcement area until he left on sick leave.

A self-proclaimed whistle-blower, he said he was pushed out of the department for allegations that the regulators were not doing their job.

He is now helping out a small but highly vocal group that is making plans to go to Parliament Hill in January to lobby for significant changes in the role of Transport Canada and TSB. "I expect by the time we get there," Mr. Danford said, "some of the families from the latest crash will be with us as well, knocking on some doors."

DANGER IN THE AIR

A job flying in the small planes commonly used as air taxis and for charter flights in British Columbia is almost as dangerous as logging, the deadliest job in the province.

In the past 20 years, the death rate for those flying in a small fixed-wing plane with a pilot and nine or fewer passengers was marginally less than the death rate for logging, according to statistics compiled this week by WorkSafeBC for The Globe and Mail.

The death rate was 28.7 per 10,000 person years of employment in logging, compared to 27.6 per 10,000 person years of employment aboard small planes.

The statistics have varied significantly over the years. The fatality rate for flying in small planes was significantly higher than logging from 1988 to 1997, with the rate for logging at 25.7 per 10,000 person years of employment and the rate for flying at 41.6 per 10,000 person years of employment. It reversed in the following decade as the rate for logging increased significantly. From 1998 to 2007, the death rate in logging was 36.1 per 10,000 person years of employment, compared to 11.1 per 10,000 person years of employment for flying.

The hazards of flying in B.C. are well known: mountainous terrain, difficult weather and remote geography are compounded by pilots with little experience and self-dispatch practices. The variety of activity is also unusual. The smaller planes are used for heli-skiing, heli-logging, fire suppression activities, game hunting and sightseeing as well as air-taxi services.

Increased risks have given B.C. a disproportionate number of the accidents in the country. B.C. accounts for 105 of 507 accidents over the past decade in Canada involving small planes with a pilot and nine or fewer passengers, according to statistics from the Transportation Safety Board of Canada.

The statistics also show that the Grumman Goose, a sturdy Second World War-era plane that has been in two fatal accidents within the past four months, is relatively safe. It flies without computer instrumentation, but has been involved in only four of the 105 accidents reported in B.C. over the past 10 years.

THE FACTS

When the Grumman Goose took off from Vancouver on Sunday, the visibility was less than five kilometres, meaning the pilot had to get special permission from the tower. He got the permission.

TSB SMALL*, COMMERCIAL

PLANE ACCIDENTS BY PROVINCE
Que. 78
Nfld./Lab. 16
N.S. 2
Man. 64
Sask. 29
Alta. 58
B.C. 105
N.B. 3
NWT. 42
Yukon 25
Ont. 64
N.Y. 2
Idaho 1
Nunavut 18
TOTAL 507

*703-air taxis seat nine or fewer

DEATH RATES COMPARED

Over the 20 years, the death rate for flying is just below that of logging - 28.7 per 10,000 person years of employment for logging, compared to 27.6 per 10,000 person years of flying for a living.
Logging Small planes
88-97 25.7 41.6
98-07 36.1 11.1

THE GRUMMAN G-21A

Reportable accidents, in B.C., since 1988
'88 1
'90 1
'91 2
'92 1
'93 1
'94 3
'01 1
'06 1
'08* 2

*as of Nov. 18

TONIA COWAN/THE GLOBE AND MAIL

SOURCE: VANCOUVER AIRPORT; ENVIRONMENT CANADA; WORKSAFEBC-THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION BOARD

[Chuck Ellsworth]

Interesting.

Especially this:

Looking at only the pilot, the weather or the condition of the aging plane cannot make sense of the accident. "The cause of the accident is no regulatory supervision," Mr. Danford said. No one was watching to ensure that safety regulations were followed, he said.

What I want to see is an in depth investigation of how the Pacific Region is run under it's present management. ( I use the word management only because that is what it is supposed to be called. )

[binderdundat]

The authorities with all their experience decide that sometimes an accident is just an accident but some people need to examine the facts on their own which is always commendable. Here we are years later with tens of thousands of dollars spent and the only conclusion that has been drawn that maybe an accident sometimes is just an accident. Not always, but maybe sometimes the authorities know what they are talking about. I think that it goes back to the fact that they are not emotionally involved to the point of wanting a witch hunt and that they have so much experienced in these matters. Maybe that is why they are called "the authorities".

[Rudy]

"It was, if you don't take it, the other guy will. And if you do that too often, you don't have a job..."

Sadly this is very much a reality. It's pretty rare that an employer will come right out and say go flying or your fired though. Usually it's much more subtle. For many there is a "perceived pressure" that is felt on a daily basis. It's a pressure you put on yourself really and that makes it so much harder to ignore. Sources for this pressure include your boss, passengers, outside commitments (I've GOT to get home tonight etc.), and other pilots at your company. Most of time it's you that's talking yourself into it. . says "The hardest part about flying is knowing when to say no." Sometimes it's almost impossible.

[Widow]

Here we are years later with tens of thousands of dollars spent and the only conclusion that has been drawn that maybe an accident sometimes is just an accident.

Since every one of your 8 posts has been to criticize me, I take it this comment is also directed at ME.

So, the "authorities" may have concluded the accident was just an accident, but the EXPERTS did not agree. FYI, you actually have to INVESTIGATE THOROUGHLY to make an accurate determination.

[Widow]

Transport Canada's Satops:

When an accident occurs, often the pilot is the only one held accountable. While the pilot may be at fault for having made a poor decision or series of decisions that led to the accident, other questions have to be asked... Were there any systemic problems in the company? What was management’s role in the accident? What did management do to prevent the accident? What is management doing to prevent a recurrence? Management must be accountable for the safety of the day-to-day operations. When management is held responsible for an accident, they will become more proactive in promoting safe operating practices.

SR 30 - Recommend the Transportation Safety Board evaluate the management factors that contributed to the accident during the accident investigation.

[trey kule]

A couple of things struck me as I read this thread.

First:

"There are recommendations that should have come out of our accident, and if those recommendations had by now been issued

An interesting quote. I would be interested in the specifics of these recommendations that should have come out of this accident. Would you provide the details of both the recommendations and why they should have come from this accident, as I, for one, would like to learn the lessons offered.

and secondly,

I find it disturbing that the general feeling is that it is a regulatory oversight issue. Do the people that run companies realy have to have a regulator overseeing them all the time to be safe? If that is the case, then the industry is hooped, because there simply is no way the regulator can possibly be everywhere all the time. Seems a bit like shifting the blame, or victim mentality on the part of operators.

Most people in the industry want less regulator involvement. Until they dont get what they want and then they, like Canadians in general, run to the government. I think the regulators job should be primarily, to set a set of minimum standards, and let the companies do the rest. This whole thng has been turned upside down.

My Saturday morning, coffee induced rant.

[Chuck Ellsworth]

Maybe that is why they are called "the authorities".

Yeh, that is the attitude to have " the authorities " will look after you....

So tell me binderdundat if these "authorities" are so all knowing and their only concern is safety why did Dave Nowzek destroy me and my company and drive me out of aviation in Canada????

Because I was such a danger to the flying public?

Or was it because I was a danger to him?

[Widow]

I would be interested in the specifics of these recommendations that should have come out of this accident. Would you provide the details of both the recommendations and why they should have come from this accident, as I, for one, would like to learn the lessons offered.

The STILL UNRELEASED Coroner's Report contained 10 recommendations BEFORE RJ Waldron's rec's were received. Recommendations related to flight following, ELT's, egress training, oversight ... considering in our accident there were five unneccessary deaths, the TSB had an obligation to publically report and make recommendations - their failure to do so resulted in the failures of the overseeing Occupational Health and Safety overseers as well. You can rest assured that when the Coroner's Report is FINALLY released, it will be shared here - so that everyone CAN learn.

Trey Kule, I think you agree (or at least you used to) that it isn't a matter of more oversight, but a matter of EFFECTIVE oversight. IMHO, when it comes to the lives of the general public, AND workers transported by air - pilots or those travelling to/from work - Minimum standards are not good enough.

[Chuck Ellsworth]

it isn't a matter of more oversight, but a matter of EFFECTIVE oversight.

How come so many on this forum can't grasp this concept?

[binderdundat]

So, the "authorities" may have concluded the accident was just an accident, but the EXPERTS did not agree. FYI, you actually have to INVESTIGATE THOROUGHLY to make an accurate determination

Your "experts" saw engine failure before the engine was in their hands. How thorough was that investigation? Upon seeing the engine, it was proven that engine failure was not a factor.

Since every one of your 8 posts has been to criticize me, I take it this comment is also directed at ME.

If I were directing comments at you I would certainly have a lot to say and perhaps even quote phanotm experts and anonymous witness to make my slanted opinion seem more credible. As it happens, I have children who would not benefit from being ignored while I post endlessly, so I will save my thoughts and just wade in occasionally.

[Chuck Ellsworth]

If I were directing comments at you I would certainly have a lot to say and perhaps even quote phanotm experts and anonymous witness to make my slanted opinion seem more credible.

Interesting, can you elaborate on the " anonymous " witnesses?

Are we to believe these witnesses do not really exist, or were they just not interviewed by your beloved "authorities"?

And please don't try and discredit my understanding of the issues involved in aviation safety.

[flyinthebug]

Firstly, I applaud Mr Danford for finally making some of our concerns PUBLIC.
His idea that if "you dont take the flight someone else will" is all too true.
A good friend of mine spent a year flying floats on the wet coast and his exact words after a 20+ yr with TC was that he didnt fly on the coast for a year but rather, he found a way to stay alive for a year on the coast. I only have 3 years on the coast but there are many days that I felt exactly the same.. Damn, I made it home tonight and how many jobs in this country do u go home thanking god you "survived another one". Not many guys at GM worry if they will live to see their next shift. Coastal float pilots do not always have the same luxury. On a clear VFR day, there isnt a much more spectacular place to fly then on the west coast of Canada.. but its the other days that im speaking about.. The days when its 150' and if you lie to yourself long enough, you`ll sware u can see a mile through the fog.. because if you dont, Captain Fantastic with his tongue up the CPs ass will grab the wheel at his first opportunity rather then support your decision as PIC to turn down a flight. This has happened to me at the same spit near where Widow lost her husband (diffrent employer, same situations.. see the theme here). This was mentioned above and in Mr Danfords statement and believe me when I say its TRUE!

Its time that people like Hugh Danford speak out and when they do, they then need our support! Pilots are indeed "pushed" far beyond their limits in order to make a buck and I could bore you all day with stories of days that I used up more of my nine lives on the coast.

The problem is not just isolated to the west coast but we experience higher fatality rates just due to local terrain. If Ontario, MB, Sask etc had higher hills.. I promise you there would be more small plane crashes as well. Its time to honestly DO something. Collectively as pilots, the very first thing we can learn to say is NO and if there isnt that idiot standing there waiting to take the flight u just turned down.. wouldnt that at least help?

I made a rookie mistake and relied on someone else to confirm my fuel load. I crashed and will never fly again.. Pushing things, whatever they may be (wx, range, your own skill level etc) will always eventually, bite you in the ass.. The depth of the bite usually depends on the number of risks your willing to overlook before it does bite.

There IS something to be learned from ALL accidents. Widows efforts are not in vain and I for one will attempt to make a diffrence in our industry and i hope others will join me. I know so many guys that I used to fly the coast with that feel the same way but everyone was scared (me included) to open our mouths for fear of losing our jobs. How sad is that!

We are professional pilots and when all standards are reached and regs adhered to, we can usually feel comfortable and safe in our work environment.. But if we keep making the same mistakes over and over.. how will the circle ever be broken? White knuckle flying makes for some great stories.. but tell that to the families and friends of all those lost pilots/passengers in the stats above. Ouch.

Keep it real on the coast espically guys/gals because if you dont, I promise you its just a matter of time for you too. Widow thanks for this post and the link. Mr Danford has certainly impressed me with his candor and forthright statements.

Fly safe all!
Cheers FTB

PS.. ., I believe that binder was referring to Widow with his comments and not you. Either way he obviously doesnt get it!

[mag check]

THE FACTS

When the Grumman Goose took off from Vancouver on Sunday, the visibility was less than five kilometres, meaning the pilot had to get special permission from the tower. He got the permission.

It is my understanding that the controllers can't refuse a request for special VFR,(aside from waiting for IFR traffic). It seems like they are trying to put some blame on an innocent controller.

[Chuck Ellsworth]

Good post FTB and I also support Mr. Danfort in his efforts to bring about changes within the regulator, he is a rare bird to have decided to stand up for what is right knowing he would be losing his secure job at TC.

PS.. ., I believe that binder was referring to Widow with his comments and not you. Either way he obviously doesnt get it!

Yes I was aware of that and decided to ask him/her to elaborate on his/her slagging of widow.

I haven't got a clue of who binderdundat is but I have been around to long to let that go unchallenged in other words I'm to old a Cat to be fu.ked by a kitten.

[_dwj_]

THE FACTS

When the Grumman Goose took off from Vancouver on Sunday, the visibility was less than five kilometres, meaning the pilot had to get special permission from the tower. He got the permission.

It is my understanding that the controllers can't refuse a request for special VFR,(aside from waiting for IFR traffic). It seems like they are trying to put some blame on an innocent controller.

You still need 1 mile viz for special vfr, so if he was granted SVFR then the visibility at takeoff was legal for VFR. It seems strange to be blaming TC or the controller. Do we need a TC inspector sitting beside the pilot for every flight making sure he doesn't fly into below VFR conditions after takeoff?

The point is that the weather along the route was worse than at the airport (or maybe deteriorated), so from that point on it was up to the pilot. Perhaps the company knew the weather en-route was bad and shouldn't have let him take off, or the pilot himself should have known, but unless we find out what weather reports they had access to before the flight this is just speculation.

[Chuck Ellsworth]

Why are we using kilometers as a unit to measure visibility? If we are going to use metric why does Canada not use the ICAO measurements of meters when giving the visibility in their observations?

[xsbank]

It gets really narrow next to Thormanby if you are following the coast like he was, and the weather gets trapped in that slot. The wind drives the fog and crap in there and it is too narrow to turn until you get past Smuggler Cove. Had he gone around the outside of Mary Island he might have been better off but if the vis was so sh*tty he might have lost visual reference heading for Texada. If he was based in Port Hardy he might not have known those details (local knowledge) and not realized the trap there.

He pushed it too hard, I guess. Maybe he should have turned back before Halfmoon Bay?

Climbing out has been proven to not work and a Goose can't slow down and noodle like a Beav can.

Sad, sad story, stupid loss.

My conjecture.


I think the newspapers have to convert to metric, nobody else uses it here.

[Widow]

Your "experts" saw engine failure before the engine was in their hands. How thorough was that investigation? Upon seeing the engine, it was proven that engine failure was not a factor.

At least those experts didn't just lay it off on pilot error picking and choosing to look at evidence rather than fit evidence to their agenda, unlike your "authorities".

If I were directing comments at you I would certainly have a lot to say and perhaps even quote phanotm experts and anonymous witness to make my slanted opinion seem more credible.

Phantom Witnesses: If you are referring to either Jim Hayton of North Sound Aviation in Washington, or Kevin Laycraft of Suncoast Aviation in Powell River, both were public in their analysis and therefore can hardly be called phantom. Further, although they both postulated that engine failure was the precipitating factor, and were subsequently shown wrong (AFTER the engine was recovered by US)their analysis WAS RESPECTED by Transport Canada who subsequently released the Service Difficulty Advisory for the R-985 and I would suggest that this indicates at least SOME MEASURE OF EXPERTISE. As neither of these EXPERTS or the "authorities" disassembled the FUSELAGE to examine the fuel, carb or ignition systems, it is hardly possible that they could have concluded a precipitating event began there ... and that area can now never be ruled out.

Oh, and Mr. Hayton's EXPERTISE should be further recognized as RJ Waldron's CONFIRMED his postulation that the pre-accident condition of the floats directly contributed to the fatal nature of the accident. Are you going to try to discredit RJ Waldron's too?

Anonymous Witness: I have no idea what you are talking about here. All witnesses have been documented and voice recorded. They have spoken to police, the coroner, the press ... do you want their names and phone numbers? Just because your precious "authorities" chose not to speak to all the witnesses does not mean they are either anonymous, or non-existant.

As it happens, I have children who would not benefit from being ignored while I post endlessly

And your point in saying this is ... ? I take great offense at the implication. If you think I'll fight you over aviation ... start a fight with me over my children.

One more thing binderdundat, don't you think it "odd" that the only people who seem to think I'm nothing more than a "babe in the woods" are also those who have some measure of responsibility???


Back on the topic of recommendations that could have prevented deaths/injuries/further trauma if they had been made and followed-up since AQW went down ...

ELT. In the case of "my" crash, and both of Pasco's gooses ... the ELT did not go off. Assuming they were all working, but were all (apparently) damaged at impact - the TC switch to the 406Mhz would not have made much (if any) difference. I do not know the specifics of what the Coroner's Rec's from "our" accident will contain, BUT, I would hope that something like tail-mounting a bouyant ELT that ejects high into the air with the first abrupt deceleration (or something like that) will be included. Existing and inexpensive technology, is it not?

Tracking. By GPS or satellite. That is another recommendation that should have come from "our" accident. Especially in light of sporadic communication. For goodness sake, even street taxi's are GPS tracked now.

Personally, I think that the forthcoming ELT requirements should include the alternate of the pilot/life-jackets/rafts carrying a personal waterproof GPS.

[Chuck Ellsworth]

binderdundat you gotta admit for a non aviation person widow sure seems to grasp the issues that surround aviation safety.....and what she does not know she has many friends who do know and they advise her....

.....anyhow I don't really need to defend widow as she is quite capable of doing that herself.

...what riles me is all you fu.kin know it all's who snipe from the cover of anonymity.

[trey kule]

Yes, Widow, I do believe the key to safety, on the regulators part is effective, not necessrily, increased oversight.
And quite frankly that will never occur as long as every thing from FSS/CARS incident reports, to self admited corporate transgressions are sent to enforcement each and every time. That is not effective. It is opressive.

Anyway, with out posting several quotes from the thread, (just this one), the sense I get is pilots do not want to take any responsibility after the fact for their actions. "it is the regulators fault" "If I did not take it someone else would.and I would be fired". My experience over the years in Canada is that one of the most important things a CP could do in a small operation is keep pilots from going out and killing themselves trying to push the weather..Not pushing them out"
The God complex kicks in right up until the time of a an accident I think. Then they are victims.

In the last couple of years I have had the opportunity to look at a few accidents/incidents where, thankfully no one was ever hurt and only in one, was metal bent, but it was always a revelation to hear the crew side....."I though.....
or " I didnt think.....(my favorite). I was just trying.......
Crews taking off with MEL items unservicable because the crew before them did not snag it and they found out when airborne.. When asked why it was not picked up on the pre-take-off check...well it was missed...doesnt everyone make mistakes...dont make a big deal of it...nothing happened..and, did I mention it before...everyone makes mistakes....


We want accidents from Weather pushing, inadequate maintenenace, poor managemnet to decrease. Start preaching to pilots to grow a spine and say "no"..BEFORE the accident.

[Chuck Ellsworth]

My experience over the years in Canada is that one of the most important things a CP could do in a small operation is keep pilots from going out and killing themselves trying to push the weather..Not pushing them out"

Good chief pilots who have the backbone to do the job they accepted ( ensure the safety of flight in the company they work for. ) can reduce these accidents by a very high percent.

Regulation of company flight operations starts with the chief pilot.

You are correct Trey Kule, that is sadly lacking in a lot of operations.

So how can that be changed?

[freakonature]

If the vfr requirement's are x feet and x mile's visibility why can you arbitralily request a special vfr? Were the vfr requirement's not set on the basis of safe visual flight? If the airspace is free of ifr traffic at what point will you be refused a special vfr? Is there a shift of responsibility when a special vfr is requested?

[trey kule]

Good question ..

I will await your thoughts, but here are my initial ones.

First, lets look at what it takes to be a chief pilot. The short answer is to meet TC's requiremnts, wirte a little evaluation form, and have an interview. Without getting into a discussion of how valid all that is, it only satisfies the regulator.
There is no requirement from TC for leadership ability, management ability or experience, or well..nothing.
And many companies hire based pretty much entirely on TC's requirement. Read the ads. Few state more than must meet TC's ability. And TC themselves dont help the matter because if someone has a bad experience with them it is considered a career ender, not a learning experience by TC, and thus we have a culture of perfection or exclusion when it comes to CP's.

In any event many CPs,over the years have started their own business and learned on the job. Done a good job. They are the exception, and when it comes to hiring newer ones as the company expands, there is a problem.

So. my quick thoughts on the solution

a. Companies should have a set of standards that not only meet TC requirements, but address the other requirements.
b. It should be understood by companies that the CP , where they are hired is more than another pilot with an approval from TC. CP's should be compensated accordingly.
c. TC should not have the right to Vet CP applicants based on their "opinion" Their track record of opinions, I dont think, is one that is very good.

When a company can not hire experience, then they should look at training programs, and this is where other regulators, like the CAA do help and TC does not.
A course for new CP's dealing with everything from appropriate dress, leadership by example, and dealing with fiscal vs. operational challanges would be of great benefit.
Otherwise an Assit. CP training program

The responsibility is on the company. And unfortunetly in our modern system with its continual focus on upward and onward mobilty in the pilot ranks, it is a difficult challange.

As an aside, one of the prime challanges I think many CPs face today is the "mentor me" attitude of pilots. They want to be hired to fly equipment past their ability at the time. They want to get experience, and , in many cases, they simply are unable to do the job required. I have seen pilots graduating from one of the 'professional' IFR schools with glowing recommendations from the owner who could not keep the greasy side down when they got into a cloud. The issue then becomes one of " I am being pushed...by the pilot" to one of "you cant do the job," by the CP. And if the CP has the audacity to replace the pilot on a flight, or even want to get rid of them because they are, to put it bluntly, over their head, then there is the whining and crying that the pilot is being 'pushed'..but hey ..its OK to ride around with a buddy on a bag run and then log the time as PIC...right.

Enough of the old man chat. Mostly will fall on deaf ears I think.

So now, ., lets have your thoughts, and anyone else who can offer some good points. Maybe there is a way.