YYZ Does not meet INTL standards-ALPA
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YYZ Does not meet INTL standards-ALPA
Attention National And Foreign Editors:
ALPA Statement on Airport Issues in the Air France Accident
WASHINGTON, Aug. 4 /CNW/ -- The following statement was issued
today by the Air Line Pilots Association, Int'l. (ALPA) regarding airport
safety issues as they relate to the Air France accident in Toronto:
The crash of Air France Flt. 358 in Toronto occurred at an international
airport that, unfortunately, does not meet international standards. It is the
latest in a series of airline accidents that highlight the dangers of
inadequate runway safety areas.
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) recommends that
runways should have a defined "runway safety area" free of obstacles and
extending well past the end of the actual runway. In the event that an
aircraft is unable to stop normally before the end of the runway, a margin of
safety must be maintained so that a slight overrun due to mechanical, weather,
or other operational problems does not become a catastrophe.
Air France Flt. 358 is not the first aircraft to fall victim to inadequate
runway safety areas, or even the first to be "stopped" by the ravine off the
end of Toronto's runways. In 1978, an Air Canada DC-9, following a rejected
takeoff, overran what is now Runway 24R, hit the same ravine as did Air France
Flt. 358, and broke into pieces. Two passengers died. The report from the
Canadian government concluded that the ravine "contributed to a high casualty
rate."
ALPA has participated in the investigations of many accidents in the U.S.
and Canada in which the number fatalities and injuries, or the level of
damage, was magnified because of hazards at or near the ends of runways.
* A B-737 in Charlotte, North Carolina was severely damaged, and
passengers severely injured following a runway overrun in 1986. In its
investigative findings, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
noted that "contributing to the severity of the accident was the ...
concrete culvert located 318 feet from the ... end of the runway."
* In 1989, another B-737 attempted a takeoff abort on runway 31 at
LaGuardia Airport in New York. Later analysis would show that the
aircraft could have stopped safely 190 feet past the end of the runway,
well within the FAA and ICAO recommended runway safety areas. However,
because the runway was operational before current standards were
developed, only 129 feet separate the end of the runway from the East
River. The aircraft went into the water and broke apart, killing one
passenger. In its report to the NTSB, ALPA recommended that this
runway, and all other runways, be compliant with appropriate U.S. and
international standards. In that same report, we recommended that
where real estate is not available to extend runway safety areas, an
alternative would be "some sort of aircraft decelerative device at the
end of the runway."
* In 1992, the severity of a takeoff accident at LaGuardia was increased
and resulted in 27 fatalities when the aircraft impacted a pump house
and structures supported by steel I-beams closer to the runway than the
ICAO standards recommend. ALPA again was on record as recommending
airports comply with stronger standards for runway safety.
* Following the crash of an American Airlines aircraft in Little Rock,
Arkansas in 1999, ALPA observed that "the runway ... was not equipped
with a safety overrun area in accordance with FAA guidance ... and no
requirement exists that will make ... runway safety areas ... adequate
any time soon." We warned, "that all runways without the minimum
safety areas should be modified so that their overrun areas cannot
severely damage an airplane overrunning the runway end."
Solutions to this continuing problem vary from the simple to the complex.
Removing obstacles and filling in ravines and culverts is frequently the most
straightforward solution. In many instances, circumstances may prevent an
apparently simple solution like this. In others, the physical space may
simply not exist to have the recommended runway safety area. In these
instances, the solution has already been developed, and has already
successfully passed real-world tests in actual operation.
In 1999, a Saab 340B left the paved portion of the runway at New York's
Kennedy airport and traveled into the newly installed 600-foot strip of
Engineered Materials Arresting System (EMAS). This installed safety system
decelerated the aircraft in approximately 215 feet, resulting in only one
minor injury. ALPA's recommendation following that event was that the FAA
"coordinate the efforts of manufacturers and the aviation industry in
continuing to pursue current and new technology to provide that an Engineered
Material Arresting System (EMAS) be placed at all airports." The same
material was put to a much more severe test when it safely stopped a 747
freighter in January of this year.
EMAS has been shown to be an effective alternative to extending runways
when circumstances prevent such extension. In 2001, ALPA worked with the
managers of the Santa Barbara, California airport. They knew they needed more
runway, but faced strong opposition to a runway extension from the surrounding
community. At ALPA's suggestion, they installed EMAS and were able to improve
the safety of the operation with the concurrence of their community.
There are dozens of airports in the U.S. and Canada, many of which service
large metropolitan areas with large, international aircraft, that do not meet
U.S. or international standards. Compounding the problem is the fact that
certain international standards are not adequate, and they do not recommend
solutions such as EMAS. ALPA, through its own direct efforts and in
coordination with the London-based International Federation of Air Line Pilots
Associations (IFALPA) and other aviation organizations, will continue to work
toward the goal of providing adequate overrun protection for all airport
runways serving commercial air transport.
ALPA is the union that represents 64,000 airline pilots at 41 airlines in
Canada and the U.S. Its website is at http://www.alpa.org
ALPA Statement on Airport Issues in the Air France Accident
WASHINGTON, Aug. 4 /CNW/ -- The following statement was issued
today by the Air Line Pilots Association, Int'l. (ALPA) regarding airport
safety issues as they relate to the Air France accident in Toronto:
The crash of Air France Flt. 358 in Toronto occurred at an international
airport that, unfortunately, does not meet international standards. It is the
latest in a series of airline accidents that highlight the dangers of
inadequate runway safety areas.
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) recommends that
runways should have a defined "runway safety area" free of obstacles and
extending well past the end of the actual runway. In the event that an
aircraft is unable to stop normally before the end of the runway, a margin of
safety must be maintained so that a slight overrun due to mechanical, weather,
or other operational problems does not become a catastrophe.
Air France Flt. 358 is not the first aircraft to fall victim to inadequate
runway safety areas, or even the first to be "stopped" by the ravine off the
end of Toronto's runways. In 1978, an Air Canada DC-9, following a rejected
takeoff, overran what is now Runway 24R, hit the same ravine as did Air France
Flt. 358, and broke into pieces. Two passengers died. The report from the
Canadian government concluded that the ravine "contributed to a high casualty
rate."
ALPA has participated in the investigations of many accidents in the U.S.
and Canada in which the number fatalities and injuries, or the level of
damage, was magnified because of hazards at or near the ends of runways.
* A B-737 in Charlotte, North Carolina was severely damaged, and
passengers severely injured following a runway overrun in 1986. In its
investigative findings, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
noted that "contributing to the severity of the accident was the ...
concrete culvert located 318 feet from the ... end of the runway."
* In 1989, another B-737 attempted a takeoff abort on runway 31 at
LaGuardia Airport in New York. Later analysis would show that the
aircraft could have stopped safely 190 feet past the end of the runway,
well within the FAA and ICAO recommended runway safety areas. However,
because the runway was operational before current standards were
developed, only 129 feet separate the end of the runway from the East
River. The aircraft went into the water and broke apart, killing one
passenger. In its report to the NTSB, ALPA recommended that this
runway, and all other runways, be compliant with appropriate U.S. and
international standards. In that same report, we recommended that
where real estate is not available to extend runway safety areas, an
alternative would be "some sort of aircraft decelerative device at the
end of the runway."
* In 1992, the severity of a takeoff accident at LaGuardia was increased
and resulted in 27 fatalities when the aircraft impacted a pump house
and structures supported by steel I-beams closer to the runway than the
ICAO standards recommend. ALPA again was on record as recommending
airports comply with stronger standards for runway safety.
* Following the crash of an American Airlines aircraft in Little Rock,
Arkansas in 1999, ALPA observed that "the runway ... was not equipped
with a safety overrun area in accordance with FAA guidance ... and no
requirement exists that will make ... runway safety areas ... adequate
any time soon." We warned, "that all runways without the minimum
safety areas should be modified so that their overrun areas cannot
severely damage an airplane overrunning the runway end."
Solutions to this continuing problem vary from the simple to the complex.
Removing obstacles and filling in ravines and culverts is frequently the most
straightforward solution. In many instances, circumstances may prevent an
apparently simple solution like this. In others, the physical space may
simply not exist to have the recommended runway safety area. In these
instances, the solution has already been developed, and has already
successfully passed real-world tests in actual operation.
In 1999, a Saab 340B left the paved portion of the runway at New York's
Kennedy airport and traveled into the newly installed 600-foot strip of
Engineered Materials Arresting System (EMAS). This installed safety system
decelerated the aircraft in approximately 215 feet, resulting in only one
minor injury. ALPA's recommendation following that event was that the FAA
"coordinate the efforts of manufacturers and the aviation industry in
continuing to pursue current and new technology to provide that an Engineered
Material Arresting System (EMAS) be placed at all airports." The same
material was put to a much more severe test when it safely stopped a 747
freighter in January of this year.
EMAS has been shown to be an effective alternative to extending runways
when circumstances prevent such extension. In 2001, ALPA worked with the
managers of the Santa Barbara, California airport. They knew they needed more
runway, but faced strong opposition to a runway extension from the surrounding
community. At ALPA's suggestion, they installed EMAS and were able to improve
the safety of the operation with the concurrence of their community.
There are dozens of airports in the U.S. and Canada, many of which service
large metropolitan areas with large, international aircraft, that do not meet
U.S. or international standards. Compounding the problem is the fact that
certain international standards are not adequate, and they do not recommend
solutions such as EMAS. ALPA, through its own direct efforts and in
coordination with the London-based International Federation of Air Line Pilots
Associations (IFALPA) and other aviation organizations, will continue to work
toward the goal of providing adequate overrun protection for all airport
runways serving commercial air transport.
ALPA is the union that represents 64,000 airline pilots at 41 airlines in
Canada and the U.S. Its website is at http://www.alpa.org
...Seems they are going to remove the axe and the control column from the cockpits for security reasons.
I didn't read that but welcome to AvCanada 

"FLY THE AIRPLANE"!
http://www.youtube.com/hazatude
http://www.youtube.com/hazatude
Maybe not those yellow things, but perhaps a 1000' sand/vermiculite mix at the end of the threshold would have helped. These "sand traps" are in use all over the world, including Paris where this flight originated from! They have been tested and proven to stop airliners from 100kts+ in less than 800'.
Pierre Maguire should have his larnyx ripped out! IDIOT!
I strongly recommend that ALPA members should refuse to accept the landing clearance if the "runway safety area" is less than ICAO recomendation.
The other option is ask their president to send in the Marine to invade those countries because a "runway safety area" that is less than ICAO recommendation endangers the life of American citizens.
The other option is ask their president to send in the Marine to invade those countries because a "runway safety area" that is less than ICAO recommendation endangers the life of American citizens.
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Fluckmachine wrote:Maybe not those yellow things, but perhaps a 1000' sand/vermiculite mix at the end of the threshold would have helped. These "sand traps" are in use all over the world, including Paris where this flight originated from! They have been tested and proven to stop airliners from 100kts+ in less than 800'.
If the pilots do their jobs properly and keep their birds either on the pavement (and not the 401 either!) or in the air, an extra 1000' of dirt, or pillows is completely unneccesary. At what point do we say enough is enough, its safe as it is. I'm curious to know what this ALPA would have to say about some of the "airports" that their counterparts up north use everyday, with no runout area at all! oh dear!
Does anyone know how many flights are undertaken around the world that end safely vs. the ammount that end in an overrun (or any other major accident for that matter)? I don't but I'm sure the ammount of accidents vs. safe flights is miniscule. Personally I think that we as pilots (especially those in the commercial world) do an excellent job of maintaining the safety level of our air transport system, and we don't need changes at all. No matter how safe we make flying there will always be accidents that fall into the "shit happens" category. There will always be a certain ammount of inherent risk that goes along with riding in large chunks of metal at several hundred knots. Perhaps if we all rode in blimps, blimps with passenger compartments in the very centre, so you are riding in the middle of a big airbag............ nah we'd still find ways to crash'em.
Summary: 1000' of dirt at the end of a bloody two mile runway, give me a break!
Planes
“Does anyone have ICAO data on that?”
The actual reference document is ICAO ANNEX 14 – Aerodromes – Design and Operations and the document used for Canadian Certification Standards is TP-312 – Aerodrome Standards and Recommended Practices. LBPIA has a certificate as issued by the minister (see CFS REF) and meets the criteria as specified in the above documents, as least it should and I would be highly surprised if it didn’t. AIP Canada - AGA gives a good description of certification standards and the Declared Distances as published in the CAP – Aerodrome chart are designed referencing the above noted documents (TP312 and ANNEX 14), incidentally aerodrome charts are a requirement for published IAPs in the Canada Air Pilot. With reference to the incident at LBPIA it is interesting to note the published LDA for 24L.

The actual reference document is ICAO ANNEX 14 – Aerodromes – Design and Operations and the document used for Canadian Certification Standards is TP-312 – Aerodrome Standards and Recommended Practices. LBPIA has a certificate as issued by the minister (see CFS REF) and meets the criteria as specified in the above documents, as least it should and I would be highly surprised if it didn’t. AIP Canada - AGA gives a good description of certification standards and the Declared Distances as published in the CAP – Aerodrome chart are designed referencing the above noted documents (TP312 and ANNEX 14), incidentally aerodrome charts are a requirement for published IAPs in the Canada Air Pilot. With reference to the incident at LBPIA it is interesting to note the published LDA for 24L.

If the ravine was not there the french guy could have take the 401, out on Dixie and back to the terminal.... traffic is orrible at that time thoughJBI wrote:I find it interesting how everybody is making a big deal about the ravine at the end of 24L and 24R. It's a good thing the incident didn't occur on one of the other runways at Pearson. At the end of 06L and 06R is Silver Dart Drive then the 427, which runs perpendicular. Then at the end of 05, you've got Airport road and then a GAS station that also fills propane tanks.

It's better to break ground and head into the wind than to break wind and head into the ground
Driving Rain wrote:Good thing that ravin was there to stop that aircraft. Can you imagine what would have happened if it had made to the 401?
He'd have got her stopped by the highway 10 turn off.



Well...there are a ton of discount malls up toward Brittania & Hwy 10. It may have boosted the local economy with an injection of 380 French Passengers looking for bargins.
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Re: YYZ Does not meet INTL standards-ALPA
High Casualty rate??? A DC-9 breaks to pieces and kills two (probably elderly near death) passengers and they call it a high casualty rate??? Sure the ravine could have caused two deaths but I would hardly call that a problem. I wonder how many motorists lives the ravine saved. On the other hand looking at the pic of the plane resting meters from those two concrete lamp posts, it would have been a very different story if France was going just a little bit faster.Redwine wrote:In 1978, an Air Canada DC-9, following a rejected
takeoff, overran what is now Runway 24R, hit the same ravine as did Air France
Flt. 358, and broke into pieces. Two passengers died. The report from the
Canadian government concluded that the ravine "contributed to a high casualty
rate."
We have no effective screening methods to make sure pilots are sane.
— Dr. Herbert Haynes, Federal Aviation Authority.
— Dr. Herbert Haynes, Federal Aviation Authority.
An article about how TC chose not to install doppler RADAR for wind shear detection due to it's high cost.
This article is a little biased and written from an American point (and of the RADAR's manufacturer) but still makes for a good read.
http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/08/04/news/radar.php
This article is a little biased and written from an American point (and of the RADAR's manufacturer) but still makes for a good read.
http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/08/04/news/radar.php
Re: YYZ Does not meet INTL standards-ALPA
Here are some relevant clips from the accident report:justplanecrazy wrote:High Casualty rate??? A DC-9 breaks to pieces and kills two (probably elderly near death) passengers and they call it a high casualty rate??? Sure the ravine could have caused two deaths but I would hardly call that a problem.
1.1 HISTORY OF THE FLIGHT
…
The aircraft crossed the end of the runway on a heading 3 degrees left of the runway heading, laterally 65 feet left of centreline, at about 70 KIAS. It traversed 457 feet of overrun and went over a 51 foot precipice at about 46 KIAS. It came to rest at the bottom of a ravine with the main gear 599 feet from the end of the runway.
…
1.2 INJURIES TO PERSONS
Fatal: 2 Passengers
Serious: 4 Crew 43 Passengers
Minor/None: 1 Crew 57 Passengers
...
1.13 MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION
In the accident the Captain suffered back and head injuries. Although he was wearing his seat belt and shoulder harness, his head struck the overhead panel and glare shield knocking him unconscious briefly.
The First Officer sustained back injuries. He was also wearing a seat belt and shoulder harness. He stated that he tightened his lap belt before take-off and felt the shoulder harness lock during the crash sequence.
Two forward cabin attendants sat together on the rear facing bench. One sitting near the aisle suffered an injury to the left lower limb and superficial bruising. The other attendant near the exit door sustained injuries to her back, right hip and chest. The flight attendant sitting in the rear attendant’s seat suffered a serious hip fracture when struck by a dislodged overhead water tank.
The two passengers who were killed were sitting in seats 6A and 7A. The one in 6A suffered a broken neck, transverse fracture of the spinal cord, intercranial haemorrhage, contusion of chest, broken ribs and a punctured heart. He also had a seatbelt injury. The passenger in seat 7A died of strangulation after becoming wedged firmly beneath the seat ahead of him. He was still wearing his seatbelt.
The most severe injuries were incurred by passengers sitting at the fuselage break and immediately aft of it (Rows 5 to 10). Most of these passengers had fractured vertebral columns as well as numerous other fractures of the limbs and the head. Several were unconscious for varying lengths of time.
The passengers sitting in rows 11 to 21 (rear of aircraft) sustained less severe injuries than those in rows 5 to 10. Their trauma consisted of spinal injuries, head, shoulder, chest, and limb injuries such as lacerations, bruises and fractured ankles. Several were unconscious for various periods of time. Passengers sitting in the right window seats however had more severe injuries than those on the left side.
Report #H80002 - Air Canada Flight 189 - June 26, 1978